OPINION
Chief Justice WILLIAMS, for the Court.In 2003 the City of Cranston (city) was faced with a fiscal crisis. In the midst of this period of financial distress, Mayor Stephen P. Laffey terminated the employment of each of the city’s existing crossing guards in an effort to manage more effectively the city’s budget.1 After losing their jobs, the crossing guards, through their union, Rhode Island Laborers’ District Council, on behalf of Public Service Employees’ Local Union 1033 (Local 1033), filed a grievance, alleging that this termination violated the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. Although an arbitrator determined that the city violated the collective-bargaining agreement, the Superior Court vacated the arbitrator’s decision. Local 1033 timely appealed to this Court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that subsequent events have caused this appeal to become moot, and we therefore decline to address its merits.
*531I
Facts and Travel
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Since 1991, the city and Local 1033 have negotiated collective-bargaining agreements concerning wages and other terms of employment. The parties entered into a collective-bargaining agreement on July 1, 2001, which was to be effective until June 30, 2004.
Almost one year later, on June 4, 2002, former Mayor John O’Leary and Local 1033 engaged in concession bargaining. They entered into a new collective-bargaining agreement, effective July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005. This new collective-bargaining agreement differed from its predecessor by (1) eliminating previously secured wage increases, as well as allowances for uniforms, uniform cleaning, and uniform maintenance; and by (2) adding a provision to increase job security. The provision to increase job security, which is the focus of this dispute, took the form of a no-restructuring clause, which provided:
“[T]he City agrees for the life of this collective bargaining agreement (July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2005), not to layoff or furlough any bargaining unit member and further agrees to maintain not less than thirty-nine (39) crossing posts staffed by 39 bargaining unit employees. This provision will ‘sunset’ at the completion of this three (3) year agreement (i.e. June 30, 2005) and the provisions of the prior contract regarding layoffs, furloughs and staffing will be reinstated.”
In January 2003, Mr. Laffey became the city’s new mayor. In June 2003, during Mayor Laffey’s administration, the Cran-ston City Council (council) adopted a new budget, which provided no funding for the city-run crossing guard program. On July 22, 2003, the city sent out layoff notices to all of the existing crossing guards, informing them that the program had been eliminated.
Two days later, Local 1033 filed a grievance against the city. At around the same time, Local 1033 instituted legal proceedings against the city in Superior Court. It sought an injunction to prevent the city from laying off the crossing guards and to preserve the status quo so that the grievance could proceed toward arbitration. The hearing justice granted a temporary restraining order and later issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the layoffs of the crossing guards until after the arbitrator issued a final and binding award.
Meanwhile, the grievance proceeded to arbitration and, after hearing from both parties, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of Local 1033, concluding that the grievance was arbitrable and that the city had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by laying off the crossing guards.
On June 3, 2004, the city asked the Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award. Local 1033 opposed the city and filed a motion to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. After conducting a hearing, the motion justice vacated the arbitrator’s award, ruling that the no-restructuring clause conflicted with the Cranston City Charter (charter), which authorized the mayor to modify or abolish organizational units. The motion justice also concluded that the no-restructuring clause violated public policy in that the charter evinced an intent that the mayor and the council have the authority to protect the financial well-being of the city through the abolishment of organizational units. A judgment vacating the arbitration award was entered on January 18, 2005; Local 1033 timely appealed.
*532Because the motion justice’s decision to vacate the arbitration award occurred in January 2005, only a few months before the end of the 2004-2005 school year, the city allowed the crossing guards to continue in their employment until the end of the school year (June 2005). During this time, the crossing guards continued to work and receive compensation for their services. The collective-bargaining agreement expired on June 30, 2005.
II
Analysis
On appeal, Local 1033 contends that the motion justice erred in vacating the arbitrator’s award. Local 1033 maintains that the dispute was arbitrable and that the no-restructuring clause did not violate the charter provisions allowing the mayor and council to abolish organizational units. They further argue that the city cannot act inconsistently with its own contractual obligations. The city, on the other hand, asserts that the motion justice properly vacated the arbitrator’s award. The city contends that, because the charter has the force and effect of state law, it prevails over any conflicting no-restructuring clause. According to the city, this renders the dispute non-arbitrable. The city alternatively contends that the no-restructuring clause was unenforceable as against public policy.
A
Standard of Review
In reviewing an arbitration award, this Court, like the Superior Court, follows G.L. 1956 § 28-9-18(a), which requires a vacation of an arbitration award in three instances: (1) “When the award was procured by fraud”; (2) “[WJhere the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”; and (3) “[I]f there was no valid submission or contract, and the objection has been raised under the conditions set forth in § 28-9-13.” See City of East Providence v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 15509, 925 A.2d 246, 252 (R.I.2007). We have held that an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers “by resolving a non-arbitrable dispute.” Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild, Local 951, AFT v. Woonsocket School Committee, 770 A.2d 834, 837 (R.I.2001).
Thus, when examining an arbitration award, a “preliminary issue for a reviewing court must be whether the parties derive from the contract an arbitrable grievance.” Rhode Island Court Reporters Alliance v. State, 591 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I.1991) (citing United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Whether that preliminary issue “is arbitrable is a question of law to be reviewed by the [C]ourt de novo.” State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social Services Employees, Local 580, SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 468 (R.I.2000) (quoting Rhode Island Council 91, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State, 714 A.2d 584, 588 n. 2 (R.I.1998)).
Upon determining that an issue is arbitrable, the Court then must examine the arbitration award.2 We conduct this review deferentially, upholding an award *533“absent a manifest disregard of a contractual provision or a completely irrational result * * Providence Teachers Union v. Providence School Board, 725 A.2d 282, 283 (R.I.1999) (quoting Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections, 707 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I.1998)). “A manifest disregard of the law occurs when an arbitrator understands and correctly articulates the law, but then proceeds to disregard it.” North Providence School Committee v. The North Providence Federation of Teachers, Local 920, American Federation of Teachers, 945 A.2d 339, 344 (R.I.2008) (citing Purvis Systems, Inc. v. American Systems Corp., 788 A.2d 1112, 1115 (R.I. 2002)).
B
Mootness
Although neither party directly has raised the issue, this Court first must address the threshold issue of justiciability before we may entertain the merits of the parties’ substantive arguments. This Court long has recognized the need, apart from certain exceptional circumstances, to confine judicial review only to those cases that present a ripe case or controversy. State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 898 A.2d 1234, 1238 (R.I.2006) (citing G & D Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 337 (1856) (“Indeed, laws and courts have their origin in the necessity of rules and means to enforce them, to be applied to cases and controversies within their jurisdiction; and our whole idea of judicial power is, the power of the [courts] to apply the [laws] to the decision of those cases and controversies.”)). If this Court’s judgment would fail to have a practical effect on the existing controversy, the question is moot, and we will not render an opinion on the matter. See Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I.1980) (“As a general rule we only consider cases involving issues in dispute; we shall not address moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical questions.”).
We also have held that “[a] case is moot if it raised a justiciable controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy.” Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1110 (R.I.1993). See also Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 378 (R.I.2007); In re New England Gas Co., 842 A.2d 545, 554 (R.I.2004) (concluding that because the underlying labor dispute had settled, New England Gas no longer had a continuing stake in the controversy, thereby rendering the case moot); Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Providence, 754 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I.2000) (holding that the plaintiffs’ claim was moot because the construction project, which was the subject of the dispute, had been completed).
One narrow exception to the mootness doctrine exists for those cases that are “of extreme public importance, which [are] capable of repetition but which [evade] review.” Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 819 (R.I.2007) (quoting Morris, 416 A.2d at 139). “Although we generally refrain from addressing issues that the case at hand does not require us to address, there are occasions when we deem it jurisprudentially sound to provide guidance with respect to an issue that ‘is bound to resurface’ at some future point in time.” State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 470 (R.I.2008) (quoting Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I.1996)). For a matter to be deemed of extreme public importance, it will usually implicate “important constitutional rights, matters concerning a person’s livelihood, or matters concerning citi*534zen voting rights.” Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 1106 (R.I.2002) (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc., 754 A.2d at 91). This Court will exercise its discretion in determining if a matter raised on appeal is of such importance. See In re Paula G., 672 A.2d 872, 874 (R.I.1996).
When this case was heard by the motion justice, a live case or controversy then existed. Members of Local 1033 had been laid off by the city, and the city was seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s award in favor of Local 1033, which would result in the permanent termination of the crossing guards. The motion justice ruled in favor of the city, holding that the no-restructuring clause was void. Yet one very important event occurred while this appeal was pending that significantly affects how we shall deal with this case: on June 30, 2005, more than three years before we heard the oral arguments in this matter, the no-restructuring clause in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement expired. As such, the parties will not be affected by a decision about the validity vel non of the no-restructuring clause.
The no-restructuring clause provided that the crossing guards’ bargained-for job security would “sunset at the completion of this * * * agreement * * *.” In other words, any job security promised to Local 1033 would end naturally on June 30, 2005. Indeed, the crossing guards were employed until the end of the 2004-2005 school year and were paid for their services until the no-restructuring clause expired. Although the city could have let the crossing guards go as early as January 2005, based on the motion justice’s ruling, the city retained and paid the crossing guards until the school year ended. Because the crossing guards remained employed by the city for as long as the city was required to retain them, Local 1033 cannot rightfully contend that its members suffered a loss as a result of the motion justice’s vacation of the arbitration award. Regardless of the motion justice’s decision in favor of the city, the terms in the no-restructuring clause would have concluded at the end of June. Accordingly, because the no-restructuring clause in the collective-bargaining agreement at issue did expire, the provision no longer is applicable and the instant matter does not present a five case or controversy.
In an analogous scenario, in Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 749 (R.I.1997), the Warwick City Council and the mayor of Warwick sought a declaratory judgment over a dispute concerning the interpretation of budgetary provisions contained in the city charter. The issue concerned the operative tax for the 1997 fiscal year. Id. at 753. In reviewing the matter, this Court concluded that the issue “is now a moot question because the 1997 fiscal year has concluded and plaintiffs are no longer seeking a ruling that would invalidate that particular budget and tax rate.”3 Id. Later events, namely the expiration of the 1997 fiscal year, deprived the litigants of an ongoing personal stake in the controversy. Id.
The facts in Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers’ Association, 110 R.I. 679, 680, 296 A.2d 466, 467 (1972), are even more analogous. The Scituate Teachers’ Association and the School Committee of the Town of Scituate entered into a two-year collective-bargaining agreement. Id. One provision of the collective-bargaining agreement provided that the teachers’ salaries for the second year were subject to renegotiation. Id. Pursuant to the con*535tract terms, the salaries subsequently were revised. Id. Shortly thereafter, the town’s budget was decreased substantially and the town was unable to provide the agreed-upon second-year salaries. Id. The school committee then asked the trial justice for a judicial declaration of whether the collective-bargaining agreement was binding despite the new financial constraints. Id. at 682, 296 A.2d at 468. After the trial justice denied declaratory relief, the school committee appealed to this Court. Id. at 682-83, 296 A.2d at 468.
By the time this Court heard the appeal, the circumstances surrounding the parties’ dispute had changed. The two-year collective-bargaining agreement had expired and a financial town meeting had been held subsequent to the entry of judgment, providing additional funds to the committee. Town of Scituate, 110 R.I. at 683, 296 A.2d at 468-69. Due to these changes, we determined that what had been a live case or controversy at the trial level effectively had become a moot question at the appellate level. Id. at 684, 296 A.2d at 469. Accordingly, we declined to address the merits of the parties’ appeal. Id.
In the instant matter, we are presented with a question concerning a long-since-expired term in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. If we were to answer the question about whether the charter trumps the collective-bargaining agreement’s no-restructuring clause, our decision would not affect the parties before this Court because the no-restructuring clause terminated by its own conditions, on June 30, 2005. In Sullivan, we declined to address the implications of a charter provision on a budget pertaining to a fiscal year that had ended; and in Town of Scituate, we did not address the substantive legal issue concerning a collective-bargaining agreement that had expired before the appeal. Here, the crossing guards’ right not to be terminated expired several years ago. Despite the motion justice’s January 2005 order to vacate the arbitration award and terminate the crossing guards, the actual termination occurred at the natural expiration of the no-restructuring clause— June 30, 2005. Until their eventual dismissal, the crossing guards were paid for them services. Furthermore, the parties informed the Court, during oral arguments, that they currently are engaged in negotiations for a new contract between Local 1033 and the city. Thus, as we noted in Town of Scituate, “we are being asked to determine an abstract question which neither rests upon existing facts or rights, nor presents an actual and present case.” Town ofScituate, 110 R.I. at 684, 296 A.2d at 469. The issue before us, therefore, is moot.
It is important to note that the motion justice ruled only on the validity of the no-restructuring clause. The motion justice did not consider the entire collective-bargaining agreement, but solely a provision within the agreement. The other provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the collective-bargaining agreement as a whole, are not before us. This Court has been asked to determine whether the motion justice erred in voiding the no-restructuring clause. In considering the no-restructuring clause, we conclude that it expired by its own terms, on June 30, 2005, thereby rendering that question moot.
The dissent disagrees with our determination of mootness and argues at length that Local 1033 has a continuing stake in this collective-bargaining agreement. Notwithstanding, we have been advised at oral argument that the question of the continued viability of the collective-bargaining agreement at issue currently is before the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board. Therefore, this Court takes no position on *536the merits of that controversy, and nothing in this opinion should be construed otherwise.
We turn next to the exception to the mootness doctrine. Although a similar legal question possibly may arise in the future concerning a conflict between a city charter and the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement, we cannot conclude that this particular factual scenario is one that is capable of repetition but which evades review.
In Sullivan, we concluded that the factual situation, a dispute over the interpretation of a budgetary provision, was not necessarily one that was “likely both to recur and yet to evade judicial review.” Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 753. We explained that it did not fall within the mootness exception because not only could the charter be amended to remedy any ambiguity, but this was the only instance under that particular charter in which the parties had resorted to litigation to resolve a dispute. Id. In Town of Scituate, 110 R.I. at 683-84, 296 A.2d at 468-69, a principal reason the matter was dismissed as moot was because the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement had expired. The instant matter presents a substantially similar scenario.
Quite recently the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island ruled that a political election period was so inherently short that violations therein always would be capable of repetition, yet would evade review. Driver v. Town of Richmond ex rel. Krugman, 570 F.Supp.2d 269, 274 (D.R.I.2008). The three-year term of a collective-bargaining agreement, however, is not of such an “inherently brief duration” that it would “almost invariably be too short to enable full litigation on the merits.” Id. (quoting Caruso v. Yamhill County ex rel. County Commissioner, 422 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2005)).
The substantive legal issues involved in the instant case one day may be appropriately before this Court, but until that time, we will not grapple with those issues. Indeed, “we have been loath to relax the rule insisting upon an actual, justiciable controversy in situations in which the subject matter of a case merely relates to ordinary contract disputes * * * or to the binding effect of a collective bargaining agreement involving public school teachers * * *.” Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 753.
In the case at bar, the parties no longer have a continuing stake in the outcome. As it stands today, the case is presented to us in the form of a hypothetical question that may or may not recur. We conclude, therefore, that this appeal became moot when the no-restructuring clause in the collective-bargaining agreement expired, on June 30, 2005. Accordingly, we believe it prudent not to reach the merits in this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the appeal is denied and dismissed because it now has become moot.4 The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court.
. The record reflects that thirteen of the original thirty-nine crossing guards had retired.
. If the dispute is non-arbitrable, the award must be vacated in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 28-9-18(a)(2), which provides, in pertinent part, "(a) In any of the following cases the court must make an order vacating the award, upon the application of any party to the controversy which was arbitrated: * * * (2) Where the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their powers * *
. Warwick’s fiscal year ended in June 1997. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in November 1997. Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 749 (R.I.1997).
. Because the controversy has become moot, the decision of the Superior Court will not substantively be reviewed by this Court.