dissenting.
I take respectful, but sharp, issue with the majority’s holding that the appellees failed to satisfy the requirements of KRS 620.030(1) by reporting the suspected child abuse to their principal, and that the appellees were not entitled to immunity pursuant to the provisions of KRS 620.050(1).
It is undisputed that, upon hearing about inappropriate sexual contact by a fellow teacher, both Allen and Cook notified the principal of their school of the allegations. Nor is there an issue that such reporting conformed to local school protocol and the guidelines of the Bullitt County Public Schools.
*283Yet, the majority concludes that the appel-lees failed to satisfy their mandatory duty imposed by the first sentence of KRS 620.030(1), thereby nullifying the import of the second sentence which reads:
Any supervisor who receives from an employee a report of suspected dependency, neglect or abuse shall promptly make a report to the proper authorities for investigation.
The flaw in the majority’s opinion is in its search for the intent of the legislature. I certainly agree that in construing the provisions of a particular statute, a universal rule of judicial construction is to determine and carry out the intent of the legislature. Reed v. Greene, Ky., 243 S.W.2d 892, 893 (1951). KRS 446.080. Moreover, I concur that “[a] well-established rule of statutory construction is that the courts will consider the purpose which the statute is intended to accomplish — the reason and spirit of the statute— the mischief intended to be remedied.” City of Louisville v. Helman, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1952).
The purpose of the statute at issue is obvious. The legislature wished to make clear that there is a legal obligation upon any person with reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected to report that belief or suspicion to authorities so that the child may be promptly protected. Surely, this purpose was satisfied in the case at bar.
Unfortunately, the majority opinion speculates that the second sentence of KRS 620.030(1) was meant to impose a “dual responsibility” on supervisors. The majority overlooks another well-recognized rule of construction repeated more than fifty years ago in Johnson v. Frankfort & Cincinatti Railroad, Ky., 303 Ky. 256, 197 S.W.2d 432 (1946):
A cardinal rule for the interpretation of statutes — if there is any doubt from the language employed as to the intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting it— is that courts should avoid adopting a construction which would be unreasonable and absurd in preference to one that is “reasonable, rational, sensible and intelligent”....
Id. at 434.
In my opinion, it is more rational and sensible to interpret the sentence regarding a supervisor who receives a report from an employee as one contemplating the exact scenario that occurred in this case. Can one reasonably believe that the legislative intent was to hold educators, as Allen and Cook, criminally responsible for reporting only to their principal? To believe such is absurd. A statute should be construed, if possible, so that no part of it is meaningless or ineffective. Brooks v. Meyers, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1955). I submit that the majority’s interpretation of the language referring to a supervisor receiving an employee report renders that language meaningless.
Since the appellees, in reporting in good faith to their supervisor, satisfied the reporting requirements of KRS 620.030, they are immune from any liability pursuant to KRS 620.050(1). I cannot comment more eloquently on this issue than Judge Miller of the Kentucky Court of Appeals when he stated:
“We recognize the unique circumstances indigenous to the school environment and the consequent value of a teacher immediately reporting to the principal any suspected abuse of a student. Indeed, KRS 620.030(1) anticipates such a report. It specifically provides that the supervisor “shall promptly” convey same to proper authorities.” Is it not axiomatic that statutory compliance is effectuated upon the making of a report which has been presupposed by the statute? We think it is, and therefore think Allen’s and Cook’s respective reports to their principal conformed to the necessary implication of the statute. Moreover, we view it illogical that a statute would anticipate such a report by an employee and specifically provide for the supervisor’s duty thereunder, while, at the same time, condemn such report as being nonconforming. As such, we are of the opinion that Allen’s and Cook’s respective reports of suspected abuse to the principal effectively discharged their duties under KRS 620.030(1).
*284Allen v. Commonwealth, 95-CA-3122-DG at 4 (rendered April 11,1997).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals faced a similar situation in the ease of Phillips v. Behnke, 192 Wis.2d 552, 531 N.W.2d 619 (1995). There, the Behnkes reported allegations of sexual contact between their daughter and teacher Phillips to a school administrator, rather than the county department or police as mandated by the statute. As in the case at bar, the school administrator reported the allegations to the proper authorities. In determining whether the Behnkes were entitled to immunity, the Wisconsin court held:
To construe the statute as limiting immunity solely to the individual who actually reported the alleged abuse or neglect to the authorities would eviscerate the protections of the statute and lead to absurd results. For example, if five school teachers obtained information that would require reporting under the statute and agreed that one of them would report the information, the teacher who actually reported the information would receive immunity. The other teachers, however, would be deprived of immunity under the statute, despite the fact that they determined a report should be made and designated a reporter. Certainly the legislature did not intend to create such an absurd result. Accordingly, we conclude that the Behnkes were entitled to immunity, despite the fact that they did not report the allegations directly to the authorities, because they reported the necessary information to one who was expected to, and did, report the information to the proper authorities.
Id. at 622.
Today, the field of education is marred by pitfalls and stumbling blocks for teachers and administrators. For causes too numerous to mention, educators are called upon to face ever-increasing challenges and dilemmas without adequate resources or support. To further litter the educational landscape with the possibility of criminal prosecution for good faith attempts to protect children from abuse defies logic and good common sense. I would affirm the Court of Appeals and let the appellees go about their business of educating our children.
GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissent.