dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent.
In all that appeal before this Court, but especially when the death penalty is imposed, it is incumbent upon this Court to insure that every aspect of the trial comports with the laws of the Commonwealth. In the case sub judice, appellant’s conviction and sentence should be reversed due to errors which deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. Specifically, I disagree with the majority on *309the issues of jury selection and the admission of evidence to “humanize” the victims.
JURY SELECTION
It is a fundamental concept that all defendants are guaranteed a trial by an “impartial jury.” Ky. Const. § 11. There is no question
that a party charged with a criminal offense is entitled to be tried by a fair and impartial jury composed of members who are disinterested and free from bias and prejudice, actual or implied or reasonably inferred. This principle of justice is as old as the history of the jmy system.
Tayloe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1960).
Moreover, it has been recognized by this Court that
A trial court’s decision whether a juror possessed ‘this mental attitude of appropriate indifference’ must be reviewed in the totality of the circumstances. It is not limited to the juror’s response to a ‘magic question’. In this case the record is replete with circumstances establishing an inference of bias or prejudice on the part of jurors so pervasive that the jurors were beyond being rehabilitated as appropriate jurors by affirmative answer to such a question, however well intentioned.
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 718 (1992).
Considering the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, the jury panel was clearly biased due to the publicity surrounding the trial, close relationships between prospective jurors and investigating police officers, as well as some expressions of preconceived notions of guilt before the trial began. Nellie Cole and Rebecca Jones were both struck by defense preemptory challenges while Cleda Creech served on the jury-
Cole testified that she had read newspaper accounts of the murders and believed that both a burglary and a robbery had been committed. Cole further stated that her religious beliefs included an understanding that the death penalty was “accepted by God” and that she was a Christian “first and foremost.” This Court has frowned upon the institution of the death penalty based upon religious beliefs. See, Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671, 676 (1984); Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58, 62 (1989) (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
Rebecca Jones testified that she had read accounts of the crimes and believed she would need to hear some evidence to convince her that no robbery or burglary took place. Moreover, Jones had grown up living next door to Detective Phelps and carpooled with Detective Lewis’ daughter. In Marsch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830, 833 (1988), we concluded that
Irrespective of the answers given on voir dire, the court should presume the likelihood of prejudice on the part of the prospective juror because the potential juror has such a close relationship, be it familial, financial or situational, with any of the parties, counsel, victims or witnesses.
It is clear that the trial court should have sustained appellant’s challenge for cause and excused Jones based on her lifelong relationship with Detective Phelps.
Cleda Creech sat on the jury and participated in the sentencing of appellant. Creech testified that she could not consider a prison term of twenty years in a double murder case. Although Creech eventually stated that she would consider all the possible penalties, she only did so after repeated rehabilitation attempts by the trial court. This type of “rehabilitation” was condemned in Montgomery, supra, and does not cure the bias of the juror.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the prospective jurors’ responses during voir dire proved that they were not impartial and would thus be unable to render a decision based only upon the evidence presented at trial.
VICTIM HUMANIZATION
In McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 519, 523 (1984), this Court recognized the need to admit evidence to “humanize” a victim. Since that time, this Court has upheld the admission of “a certain amount of background evidence regarding the victim *310[as] relevant to understanding the nature of the crime.” Bussell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (1994). However, the background evidence may not be admitted if it is presented in a manner that is “emotional, condemnatory, accusative or demanding vindication.” McQueen, supra at 523.
The limitation on victim humanization evidence is based upon the principle that:
It is just as great a crime to kill the most hardened criminal as it is to kill the most upright and illustrious citizen in the land; hence evidence of the good or bad morals of the one slain has no proper place in a trial for murder.
Benge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 97 S.W.2d 54, 56 (1936). Further, the probative value of the evidence must be balanced with the danger of undue prejudice. When the balance tips in favor of undue prejudice, the trial court must “limit or exclude such evidence where the inflammatory effect clearly outweighs the probative value.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 543 (1988).
In the instant case, the majority has upheld the admission of background evidence that was clearly admitted solely “to engender sympathy for the vietim[s] and [their] families].” Id. There can be no other reason for admitting evidence that Marvin Hensley was a full time minister who bought the land on which he built a church which he later gave to that church. The Commonwealth also introduced evidence that Hensley “read the word” every morning, that he always helped out those in need, that his policy was not to resist a robbery attempt, and that his wife did not work before his death, but now had a part-time job at Wal-Mart. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that this evidence was merely “irrelevant”, this evidence is exactly the type this Court has condemned in Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58 (1989); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988); and Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671 (1984); Nickell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 145 (1978). The admission of this evidence denied appellant a fair trial.
Due to the tainted jury selection and the admission of the humanizing evidence, I would reverse appellant’s conviction and sentence.
STUMBO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.