concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am most sympathetic to the efforts of the Circuit Court of Cole County to deal with the problem of prisoners who must appear in court, either to respond to additional criminal charges or to maintain litigation on their own behalf. As the principal opinion points out, the legislature had no intention one way or the other about the use of audiovisual equipment because use of that equipment was not contemplated when the governing statutes were adopted. Nor do I find much help in Section 544.275, RSMo 1986, authorizing the holding of certain proceedings in the penitentiary. I am inclined to accept the State’s argument that the use of the electronic equipment in the manner shown by the record satisfies requirements of “presence” and “open court” as used in the governing statutes and rules, and am reluctant to decide the case by resort to these terms because of the possible effect on other kinds of proceedings in which the closed circuit is used.
*657I nevertheless agree that in the exercise of our superintending control under Mo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 4, we should make the writ absolute as to the relator in Case No. 69544 who wants to enter a guilty plea. Under prevailing standards the court is required to conduct an extensive inquiry as to the defendant’s understanding of the proceedings and the voluntariness of the plea before accepting a guilty plea. We know from experience that many who enter guilty pleas quickly seek to have the pleas set aside, and litigate for years in state and federal courts. We place great reliance on the record made before the trial court. I do not believe that the substantial requirements can be met in a satisfactory way unless there is a personal exchange between the pleading defendant and the judge who receives the plea.
I also concur in the issuance of an absolute writ with regard to preliminary hearings for the several relators in Case No. 69546. The preliminary hearing has assumed a new importance in that testimony given at the preliminary hearing, at which the defendant is represented by counsel, may be used during the trial on the merits if a witness is unavailable. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). I do not believe that use of this testimony should be permitted unless the defendant has the right to be present in the same room with the judge, his counsel, and the witness. Cross-examining counsel is entitled to be in the physical presence of the witness, and to have his client at his side for assistance and consultation. The use of the closed circuit procedure for preliminary hearings is unwise as a matter of judicial administration, and I would not allow it.
I have no similar qualms regarding arraignment and entry of a plea of not guilty. There is no reason why the effective administration of justice requires the presence of the judge, the defendant and the defendant’s counsel in the same room. Nor is there prejudice to the defendant. If questions are raised the defendant could be rearraigned in open court before trial. I would not interfere with the circuit court’s procedure on arraignments through the issuance of an extraordinary writ, but would allow the case to proceed in due course following closed circuit arraignment. There may be situations in which the transport of prisoners to the courthouse is dangerous and burdensome. I would mandate it only when strictly necessary.
There is an advantage in the closed circuit procedure, as opposed to the use of a room in the penitentiary for arraignment. One of the purposes of open proceedings is so that the public may be informed about the progress of judicial proceedings. Our tradition rejects secret criminal proceedings. Few members of the general public will find their way to the penitentiary. The courthouse, by contrast, is the most public of places.
I also reserve judgment as to whether this Court could issue rules supplementing or modifying existing statutes with regard to the closed circuit procedure in cases such as these, or in other cases.
I concur in making the writ of prohibition absolute in State ex rel. Turner v. Kinder, No. 69544, and State ex rel. Jackson v. Kinder, No. 69546. I would quash the writ in Case No. 69545, State ex rel. Arnold v. Kinder.