(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur only in the result of the majority opinion, which holds that defendant, Huron Valley Radiology, EC. (Huron), is not entitled to dismissal.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that a plaintiff is required to serve a professional corporation not enumerated in MCL 333.20106(1) with a notice of intent to commence a medical malpractice action (NOI) under MCL 600.2912b (“the NOI statute”). Such a defendant is neither a “health professional” nor a “health facility” under the NOI statute; thus, a plaintiff is not required to give that defendant written notice under the NOI statute before commencing a medical malpractice action. I would additionally hold that plaintiffs claim against defendant Huron was tolled pursuant to MCL 600.5856(d) because plaintiff provided an NOI in compliance with the NOI statute for “a claim” that would have been barred during the applicable notice period.
I further dissent from the majority’s analysis whether plaintiffs NOI was deficient. The NOI statute requires that the plaintiff provide a statement of “[t]he factual basis for the claim.”1 A necessary factual predicate for a vicarious liability claim is that there is an employer-employee (or other principal-agent) relationship, but such a statement of defendant Huron’s relationship to the other individual defendants is not found in plaintiffs NOI; thus, plaintiffs NOI is defective.
As the majority opinion itself demonstrates, it is swiftly becoming increasingly acceptable for this Court to avoid attempting a precise or meaningful statutory analysis in favor of imprecise vagaries and broad pronouncements. Such analyses are favored only by those *432who seek a particular result and cannot find an explicable justification for it. The majority’s analysis threatens to render the statutory notice procedure nugatory and undermines, if not overrules, this Court’s precedent.2 I believe that this Court’s decisions should be grounded in precise and rigorous analysis of the relevant statutory text and that this Court should avoid creating “inconsistencies among its cases and... reduce confusion in [the Court’s] jurisprudence by overruling conflicting decisions.”3
Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that defendant is not entitled to dismissal due to plaintiffs defective NOI.
I. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SERVE DEFENDANT HURON, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, WITH AN NOI.
The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff served defendant Huron, a professional corporation, with a defective NOI and that entitled Huron to dismissal. However, only a “health professional” and “health facility” are entitled to notice under the NOI statute, MCL 600.2912b.4 Thus, a threshold issue is whether defendant Huron is a “health professional” or “health facility.” If not, the defect in plaintiffs NOI is rendered moot and does not entitle defendant to dismissal.
*433Because plaintiff has persuasively argued in this Court that defendant Huron is neither a “health professional” nor a “health facility” entitled to notice under the NOI statute, I would hold that plaintiffs defective NOI as to defendant Huron was inconsequential.5
*434This Court has previously defined the term “health facility” in the NOI statute through reference to the Public Health Code (PHC),6 which defines “health facility or agency” as:
*435(a) An ambulance operation, aircraft transport operation, nontransport prehospital life support operation, or medical first response service.
(b) A clinical laboratory.
(c) A county medical care facility.
(d) A freestanding surgical outpatient facility.
(e) A health maintenance organization.
(f) A home for the aged.
(g) A hospital.
(h) A nursing home.
(i) A hospice.
(j) A hospice residence.
(k) A facility or agency listed in subdivisions (a) to (h) located in a university, college, or other educational institution. [7]
Several of the health facilities listed could be incorporated as professional corporations. Significantly, however, defendant Huron, although a professional corporation, is not a listed health facility. Thus, defendant Huron is not a “health facility.”
The PHC does not define “health professional.” “Professional,” however, is commonly defined as “a member of a profession, [especially] one of the learned professions.”8 The PHC defines “health profession” as “a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment performed by an individual acting pursuant to a license or registration *436issued under this article.”9 Thus, only an “individual” can practice a “health profession.” Because the PHC defines “individual” as “a natural person,”10 only a natural person can be a “health professional,” and defendant Huron is therefore not a “health professional.”
Instead of applying these interpretations consistent with our precedent, the majority relies on the definition of “licensed health care professional” in the accrual statute, MCL 600.5838a:11 “an individual licensed or registered under article 15 of the public health code .. . *437and engaged in the practice of his or her health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity.”12 As stated, a professional corporation is not an “individual.”
Interestingly, the majority simply disregards this Court’s very recent interpretation of the definition of “licensed health care professional” in the accrual statute. In Kuznar, the defendant pharmacy sought the benefit of the shortened period of limitations for medical malpractice and argued that it was subject to medical malpractice liability because it was a “licensed health care professional” under the accrual statute. Just last year, we unanimously rejected that argument and explained that “[t]he flaw in defendant’s position is that the Public Health Code defines ‘individual’ to mean ‘a natural person.’ ”13 The majority’s argument here suffers the same flaw that we unanimously rejected. A professional corporation is not “a natural person.” Furthermore, a professional corporation is not “licensed or registered under article 15 of the public health code.” The majority cannot acknowledge the existence of Kuznar without overruling it or changing its rationale here. It has therefore chosen to ignore Kuznar.
The majority’s analysis is superficial. The majority merely announces that it discovered the term “professional corporation” in a related statute and, therefore, a professional corporation is entitled to notice. In serious statutory construction, context matters and so does grammar.
In the accrual statute, “licensed health care professional” is defined by modifying the subject, “an indi*438vidual,” with the clause “engaged in the practice of his or her health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity.” Thus, instead of providing that a professional corporation is a “licensed health care professional,” the statute provides that practice of a health profession in a professional corporation is simply one way for “an individual” to meet the requirements to be a “licensed health care professional.”
The context of subsection (1) of the accrual statute also betrays the majority’s position. It provides, in pertinent part, that
a claim based on the medical malpractice of a person ... who is ... a licensed health care professional,.. . whether or not the licensed health care professional... is engaged in the practice of the health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity, accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice .... [MCL 600.5838a(l).]
Thus, the reference to a professional corporation makes clear that practice in a professional corporation does not affect when a medical malpractice claim accrues.
Moreover, the majority’s interpretation is repudiated by the rule of statutory interpretation that prohibits rendering statutory terms surplusage or nugatory.14 The majority proclaims that “[f]or all practical purposes, the PC and the health care provider are treated as the same entity when professional services are involved.”15 This pronouncement is designed to ignore reality and the actual text of the statute.
*439To arrive at its conclusion that a professional corporation is included in the NOI statute, the majority conflates common-law principles with its obligation to accurately construe this statute. It therefore emphasizes the unremarkable proposition of common-law vicarious liability that a corporation can only act through its officers and agents,16 but ignores the equally unremarkable proposition that a corporation is a distinct legal entity.17 The flaw in this analysis is that it imports common-law theories of liability to defeat the statutory enumeration of covered entities that does not include a professional corporation.18 The Legislature is free to include and exclude any entity from the statutory notice procedure that it desires. By importing extra-textual theories of liability into this statutory procedural requirement, the majority deprives the Legislature of that option and renders surplusage portions of the statute the Legislature enacted.
As stated, the majority holds that a professional corporation is a “health professional” because the term “professional corporation” appears in the accrual stat*440ute definition of “licensed health care provider.” That definition, however, also includes any “other business entity.” By the majority’s logic, any “other business entity” is a “health professional.” If that were true, then the terms “health facility” in the NOI statute and “licensed health facility or agency” in ¿he accrual statute would be needless surplusage. For example, a hospital is listed in the PHC definition used to define “health facility” and “licensed health care facility or agency.”19 A hospital may be incorporated and, as such, is any “other business entity.” Thus, under the majority’s analysis, a hospital is, “for all practical purposes,” a “licensed health care professional.” The same is true for all other entities listed in the PHC definition of “licensed health facility or agency.”20 Because it renders the term “health facility” in the NOI statute needless surplusage, the majority’s interpretation is erroneous.
Because defendant Huron is neither a “health facility” nor a “health professional,” I would hold that plaintiff was not required to serve it with an NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action against it.21 Thus, plaintiffs claim against defendant Huron was not subject to dismissal for a defective NOI.
*441II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT HURON WAS TOLLED UNDER MCL 600.5856(d).
This Court ordered supplemental briefing on “whether, if a defendant professional corporation is not an entity to whom notice is required to be provided under MCL 600.2912b, the applicable statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), was nonetheless subject to statutory tolling provided in former MCL 600.5856(d).”22 If the statute of limitations was not tolled under former subsection (d) of the tolling statute, MCL 600.5856, then plaintiffs claim against defendant Huron was filed after the period of limitations expired and defendant Huron would be entitled to dismissal with prejudice. I am persuaded that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs claim against Huron was tolled under former subsection (d).
The tolling statute applicable here provided:23
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled:
(a) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant.
(b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired.
(c) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute is not tolled longer than 90 days after the copy of the summons and complaint is received by the officer.
(d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equal *442to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff argues that because subsection (d) uses the indefinite article “a,” not the definite article “the,” it is not claim specific and, therefore, tolls all claims in the complaint. Defendant argues that tolling only applies for “a claim” to which “the applicable notice period under section 2912b” applies.
I believe that the dispositive question is “what is being tolled?” The first sentence of the tolling statute states that “[t]he statutes of limitations or repose are tolled.” The plural form suggests that more than one statute of limitations can be tolled by each subsection, including subsection (d).
By their nature, each of the other tolling provisions, § 5856(a) through (c), apply to all claims in a complaint, not just individual claims. Thus, the plural form in the prefatory clause is consistent with those provisions because they could involve multiple statutes of limitations.
Based on the prefatory provision, there is a strong textual argument that under subsection (d), “[t]he statutes of limitations . . . are tolled” for all claims in a complaint when “during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim, would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose.” Thus, for example, in a complaint alleging a malpractice claim and a negligence claim, if the requirements of subsection (d) are met, the “statutes of limitations . . . are tolled” for both claims. I believe that this is the superior textual argument.
Although the prefatory clause does not specify which statutes of limitations are tolled, there is no textual *443basis for restricting tolling to a single claim.24 Subsection (d) only requires “a claim” to be barred during the notice period and notice to be given in compliance with the NOI statute; the prefatory clause provides that multiple statutes are tolled as a result.25
*444I note that the current tolling provision is more precise on this issue. MCL 600.5856(c) provides:
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances:
(c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b, if during that period a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in this case, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given. [Emphasis added.]
As indicated by the highlighted text, the significant distinction between current subsection (c) and former subsection (d) is that the current provision restates what is tolled (“the statute”), which specifies that tolling is limited to only one statute while the former provision remained unlimited by the prefatory clause (“[t]he statutes”). Thus, current subsection (c) is expressly claim specific and only tolls “the statute” for the previously referenced claim that would be barred.26
*445Here, plaintiffs NOI was sufficient as to co-defendant Murry.27 Subsection (d) applied to plaintiffs claim against Murry because the period of hmitations would have expired during the notice period if the statute of limitations was not tolled. Thus, “notice [was] given in compliance with section 2912b” for “a claim” that “would [have been] barred by the statute of limitations,” so “[t]he statutes of hmitations ... [were] tolled.” Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that defendant Huron was not entitled to dismissal.
III. PLAINTIFF’S NOI WAS DEFICIENT.
I join part III(E) of Justice MARKMAN’s dissent28 regarding the majority’s decision to address and resolve an issue that the parties were specifically directed not to address. The majority has deprived the parties of an opportunity to brief and argue the merits of the sufficiency of plaintiffs NOI. As such, the majority’s action suggests that parties should follow our grant orders at their peril. No serious court should function in this fashion.
Although not properly before this Court nor pertinent to my analysis, I address the majority’s analysis that plaintiffs NOI was not deficient because it will likely affect how lower courts evaluate an NOI. I believe that plaintiffs NOI was deficient and the majority’s analysis is no more than a shallow gloss over the statutory text.
*446As stated, a plaintiff must serve an NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action against a health facility or health professional.29 In subsection (4) of the NOI statute, the Legislature has enumerated six specific topics that the plaintiff must address in his NOI:
The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.
“Subsections 2912b(l) and (4) clearly place the burden of complying with the notice of intent requirements on the plaintiff.”30
In Roberts II, this Court established the standard for whether an NOI complied with the statutory requirements of subsection (4) of the NOI statute: “the claimant is required to make good-faith averments that provide details that are responsive to the information *447sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is consistent with the early stages of the proceedings.”31 An NOI that does not meet this standard is deficient.
Subsection (a) requires the plaintiff to provide a statement of “[t]he factual basis for the claim.” Here, plaintiff has alleged that defendant Huron is vicariously liable for the acts of its agents, defendants Murry, Dr. Richard D. McLeary, and Dr. Gary Augustyn. Thus, “the claim” is vicarious liability. An essential factual predicate for plaintiffs vicarious liability claim is that the individual defendants were defendant Huron’s employees. Nowhere in the notice does plaintiff suggest that any employer-employee (or other principal-agent relationship) existed between the defendants.32 Because plaintiff omitted “[t]he factual basis for the claim,” he failed to meet the Roberts II standard and, therefore, the NOI is deficient.
The majority holds that there is “no language in [subsection (4) of the NOI statute] that requires a claimant to set forth the nature of the relationship between the parties to be sued.”33 To support its conclusion, the majority states that no such requirement is found in subsection (f).34 That is true, but no more sufficient than stating that no such requirement is found in subsection (e). The majority offers no discussion of subsection (a) — “[t]he factual basis for the claim” — and why a principal-agent relationship is not part of *448the factual basis of plaintiffs vicarious liability claim. The majority proclaims that it is not “necessary to plead facts supporting vicarious liability.”35 As stated, here, “the claim” is vicarious liability. Thus, the majority has proudly announced that it is not necessary to state the factual basis for the claim.36 This is most likely a relief to plaintiffs and a shock to the Legislature and anyone who has read the NOI statute since it was enacted. The majority cannot square its analysis with the text of the relevant statute, so it does not attempt such folly.
The majority buttresses its conclusion with its assessment of defendant Huron’s subjective knowledge: “Certainly they are fully aware of the legal relationship between them.”37 The majority’s reliance on the knowledge of this defendant is not a relevant assessment of what the Legislature has required a plaintiff to provide in its NOI.
*449This Court previously rejected such a construction of subsection (4) of the NOI statute for an obvious reason: it would render the statutory notice procedure completely nugatory.38 The NOI statute, in plain and unambiguous terms, places the burden on the plaintiff to provide “written notice under this section”39 that “con-taints] a statement”40 of six specific topics. Thus, the Legislature has not required that the defendant “fill in the blanks.” Undeterred, the majority replaces the legislative standards with its own requirement and creates a slippery slope in which the plaintiff complies with the NOI statute by simply declaring “I went to the doctor and something bad happened.”41 Under the majority’s analysis, the burden is on the defendant to fill in the remainder of the missing but required NOI information.
The majority fails to comprehend the significance of its decision. Our decisions do not resolve only the case before us, but rather, all cases subsequently filed in Michigan raising similar issues; we are obligated to ensure that all cases are resolved in a manner that is consistent with the text of the applicable statute.42 Consider, for example, a corporate defendant that never employed or worked with any of the other individual *450defendants listed — one that is named in the NOI through mistake or error. How does an NOI that fails to allege any relationship between the corporate defendant and the individual defendants inform that defendant of the factual basis for the claim against it? The majority’s analysis threatens to deprive a named defendant of the notice that the statutory procedure is designed to provide.
The justification that a particular defendant might have knowledge about data the plaintiff is statutorily obligated to supply is just a fancy way for the majority to subvert a statute it does not like. At the very least, the majority is not pretending any longer to enforce the plain language of the NOI statute.
The majority’s lack of concern for the implications of its discussion is illustrated by its treatment of Roberts II. The majority purports to leave for another day the question whether Roberts II was correctly decided.43 *451Nevertheless, it states that “the issue is whether [Huron] could reasonably be held to comprehend the nature of the claims being asserted against it.”44 That standard is distinctly not the Roberts II standard set out above. Indeed, that standard is similar to the standard articulated by the dissent in Roberts II: “The statement simply must provide notice of a potential claim sufficient to allow potential defendants to ascertain the basis for the claim and enter into settlement discussions.”45 Once again, such a view is inconsistent with the statutory text.
This continues a disturbing trend in which the majority
overrules by indirection, or at least leaves the impression that it is doing so, thereby sowing the seeds of confusion and making it difficult for the citizens of this state to comprehend precisely what our caselaw requires. This appears to be an unfortunate return to our predecessors’ past practice of “frequently pa[ying] little attention to the *452inconsistencies among its cases and declin[ing] to reduce confusion in [the Court’s] jurisprudence by overruling conflicting decisions.”[46]
IV CONCLUSION
I do not believe that defendant Huron is a “health professional” or “health facility” entitled to notice under the NOI statute and, therefore, plaintiff was not required to serve defendant Huron with an NOI. I also believe that plaintiffs claim against defendant Huron was tolled pursuant to subsection (d) of the tolling statute. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that defendant Huron is not entitled to dismissal because of plaintiffs defective NOI.
MCL 600.2912b(4)(a).
See Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (Roberts II).
Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 571 n 19; 702 NW2d 539 (2005).
MCL 600.2912b(l) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. [Emphasis added.]
The NOI statute only applies to medical malpractice actions. This is clearly a medical malpractice action, but not for the reasons stated by the majority. Huron is subject to medical malpractice liability because a principal sued for the medical malpractice of its agent is sued in medical malpractice.
The first step when determining whether a plaintiff has alleged medical malpractice is to consider “whether [the claim] is being brought against someone who, or an entity that, is capable of malpractice.” Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 420; 684 NW2d 864 (2004). This Court has consistently explained that the accrual statute, MCL 600.5838a, does not define, but rather expands, who may be sued for medical malpractice. Bryant, supra at 420-421; Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 177; 750 NW2d 121 (2008). Here, plaintiff raises a claim of vicarious liability, not direct liability, against defendant Huron. See Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 11; 651 NW2d 356 (2002).
Michigan courts have consistently recognized actions against a principal in medical malpractice under a vicarious liability theory when the principal was not identified in the accrual statute but the agent was subject to medical malpractice liability. See, e.g., Francisco v Parchment Med Clinic, PC, 407 Mich 325; 285 NW2d 39 (1979) (vicarious liability action against a professional corporation for medical malpractice of a general practitioner and surgeon before the amendment of MCL 600.5838a adding “professional corporation” in 1994, 1993 PA 78); Becker v Meyer Rexall Drug Co, 141 Mich App 481; 367 NW2d 424 (1985) (vicarious liability action against a pharmacy, which is not identified in that accrual statute, Kuznar, supra, for medical malpractice of a pharmacist); Simmons v Apex Drug Stores, Inc, 201 Mich App 250; 506 NW2d 562 (1993) (same).
Conversely, this Court has held that vicarious liability claims against corporate entities were stated in ordinary negligence because the agent could not be hable in medical malpractice. See Kambas v St Joseph’s Mercy Hosp of Detroit, 389 Mich 249, 256; 205 NW2d 431 (1979) (decided when the accrual statute did not refer to a “licensed health facility or agency” or otherwise include a hospital, and holding that “[t]he *434defendant hospital’s liability, being herein predicated upon the theory of respondeat superior, and having determined that nurses are not subject to the two year malpractice statute of limitations, we conclude that the three year statute of limitations is applicable to injuries arising from the negligent act of a nurse and is equally applicable to defendant employer hospital herein”); Kuznar, supra at 172 (holding that because the employee could not be liable in medical malpractice, “vicarious liability for [the employee’s alleged negligence] by the pharmacy [which is not referenced in § 5838a(l)] may also proceed under the three-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence”). Thus, when the principal is not identified in the accrual statute, a vicarious liability claim is not automatically an ordinary negligence claim. Rather, the nature of the claim depends on whether the agent is sued in medical malpractice.
The nature of the claim against the agent defines the vicarious liability claim. If the agent is sued in medical malpractice, the vicarious liability claim against the principal is in medical malpractice. This does not malee the principal a “licensed health care professional.” MCL 600.5838a(l)(b). It makes the principal liable for the acts of a “licensed health care professional.”
Here, defendant Huron’s agents, defendants Dr. Kristyn Murry and Dr. Richard McLeary, are radiologists subject to medical malpractice liability. There is no dispute that plaintiffs claim sounds in medical malpractice. See Bryant, supra at 422; ante at 414 n 23. Accordingly, plaintiffs vicarious liability claim against defendant Huron is a medical malpractice claim.
See Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 571 n 11; 609 NW2d 177 (2000). See also Bates v Gilbert, 479 Mich 451, 459; 736 NW2d 566 (2007) (using the definition of “health profession” in the PHC to define that term in MCL 600.2169 — expert testimony in medical malpractice actions).
In Omelenchuk, the plaintiffs’ decedent suffered a heart attack and the plaintiff sued the defendant city and fire department alleging medical malpractice. At issue was whether the plaintiffs’ complaint was timely filed in accordance with the various notice periods in the NOI statute. A threshold issue was whether the NOI statute applied to the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants. This Court held that the NOI statute applied because the PHC “defines ‘[h]ealth facility’ to include an ‘ambu*435lance operation’. .. [and t]he city of Warren has an ambulance operation.” Omelenchuk, supra at 571 n 11.
MCL 333.20106(1).
Random, House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). See MCL 8.3a (“All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language . . ..”).
MCL 333.16105(2) (emphasis added).
MCL 333.1105(1). See MCL 333.16101(2), which provides that the definitions in MCL 333.1101 et seq. are applicable to MCL 333.16105(2).
MCL 600.5838a(l), in pertinent part, provides:
For purposes of this act, a claim based on the medical malpractice of a person or entity who is or who holds himself or herself out to be a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency who is engaging in or otherwise assisting in medical care and treatment, whether or not the licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or their employee or agent is engaged in the practice of the health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity, accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim. As used in this subsection:
(a) “Licensed health facility or agency” means a health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.20101 to 333.22260 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(b) “Licensed health care professional” means an individual licensed or registered under article 15 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.16101 to 333.18838 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and engaged in the practice of his or her health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity. However, licensed health care professional does not include a sanitarian or a veterinarian.
MCL 600.5838a(l)(b).
Kuznar, supra at 179, quoting MCL 333.1105(1).
See Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 471; 760 NW2d 217 (2008), citing Herald Co, Inc v Eastern Michigan Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 470; 719 NW2d 19 (2006).
Ante at 412.
See Mossman v Millenbach Motor Sales, 284 Mich 562, 568; 280 NW 50 (1938), citing Garey v Kelvinator Corp, 279 Mich 174, 191; 271 NW 723 (1937).
See Bourne v Sanford, 327 Mich 175, 191; 41 NW2d 515 (1950) (“[A corporation] is an artificial entity separate and distinct from the holders of its individual stock.”), citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518; 4 L Ed 629 (1819); Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 650; 364 NW2d 670 (1984) (“We recognize the general principle that in Michigan separate entities will be respected.”).
Justice Markman makes the same error. See post at 458. Furthermore, my analysis is neither inconsistent with Kuznar and the tolling statute nor internally inconsistent. See post at 459 n 5.1 emphasize that liability and procedure are distinct matters. Here, Huron’s liability is provided by common law. See note 5 of this opinion. The pertinent procedure is provided by statute.
See MCL 333.20106(l)(g); Omelenchuk, supra at 571 n 11; Kuznar, supra at 177-179.
See MCL 333.20106(1).
Justice Makkman contends that my analysis is inconsistent with Roberts I and Roberts II. Post at 459 n 5. Justice Markman is certainly aware that no matter how thoughtful the opinion, we are, as a practical matter, incapable of resolving every potential issue that could conceivably arise in a case. Neither the parties nor this Court raised the issue whether the professional corporation there was required to receive an NOI in Roberts I or Roberts II. I prefer to base my analysis on issues that we did address rather than consider inferences from issues that we did not and were not asked to address.
483 Mich 922 (2009).
The tolling statute was amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004.
Justice Markman misconstrues my analysis. I do not suggest that more than one statute of limitations is always tolled. Post at 469. Certainly, if there is only one claim, then only one statute of limitations is tolled. Nor do I suggest that “all claims against all defendants in Michigan” are tolled by a single sufficient NOI as to a single defendant. Post at 472 n 16 (emphasis omitted). Hyperbole aside, I believe that there is simply no textual basis for treating subsection (d) of the tolling statute different than subsection (a) through (c) of the tolling statute. The Legislature is perfectly capable of providing such a basis for distinction; see my discussion of subsection (c) of the tolling statute as amended hy 2004 PA 87 below.
I agree with Justice Markman that “the notice of intent must contain all of the statements required by § 2912b(4) as to ‘each particular [defendant] named in the notice.’ ” Post at 470, quoting Roberts II, supra at 692. Because a plaintiff is statutorily prohibited from commencing a medical malpractice action without first giving the notice required under the NOI statute, dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to give such notice. See MCL 600.2912b(l); Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 471 Mich 745, 753; 691 NW2d 424 (2005) (holding that “dismissal is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance with the notice provisions” of the NOI statute). Thus, contrary to Justice Markman’s concern that my analysis would deprive defendants the notice that the statutory procedure is designed to provide, post at 473-474, a plaintiffs failure to provide a defendant with a sufficient NOI still entitles that defendant to dismissal, tolling notwithstanding.
Justice Markman suggests that I create a “trap for unwary plaintiffs.” Post at 474 n 19. Admittedly, a plaintiff will be unable to re-file some claims — specifically, those for which an NOI is required. However, as I discussed above, a professional corporation that is not a “health facility” is not entitled to notice; thus, a defective NOI is inconsequential for such a defendant. Moreover, if that claim is dismissed, tolling afforded by subsection (d) of the tolling statute is not rendered moot because the plaintiff will not need to wait the notice period to re-file his complaint. It is for this reason that my interpretation does not create an irreconcilable conflict with MCL 600.2912b(6).
Justice Markman correctly states that under my analysis of who must receive an NOI and my interpretation of current subsection (c) of the tolling statute, “the plaintiff would have to file his medical malpractice action against the professional corporation before he filed a medical malpractice action against the physician, if the period of limitations would have expired within 182 days after the plaintiff served his notice of intent on the physician.” Post at 471 n 14. Although this procedure seems unusual, we are without authority to question the wisdom of the Legislature and “fix” perceived problems. See State Tax Law Cases, 54 Mich 350, 360; 20 NW 493 (1884) (“[W]e have no supervisory power in respect to legislation;... the law-making power is not responsible to the judiciary for the wisdom of its acts, and ..., however unwise or impolitic their acts may appear, they must stand as law unless the legislature has plainly overstepped its constitutional authority ....”). Moreover, aplaintiff is not prohibited from bringing an action against the principal without naming the agent, Krolik v Curry, 148 Mich 214, 223; 111 NW *445761 (1907); Al-Shimmari v Detroit Med Ctr, 477 Mich 280, 294; 731 NW2d 29 (2007); 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, § 333, p 699, and I fully expect that such actions would be consolidated, see MCR 2.505(A)(2), if the action against the agent proceeds after the notice procedure.
See Potter v McLeary (On Remand), 278 Mich App 279; 748 NW2d 599 (2008).
Specifically, post at 476-478 and nn 22 & 23.1 also join post at 455
MCL 600.2912b(l).
Roberts I, supra at 66.
Roberts II, supra at 701.
As this Court stated in Roberts II, “the claimant is not required to craft her notice with omniscience.” Id. at 691. All that was required of plaintiff was a good-faith averment of the relationship that served as the factual basis for his vicarious liability claim, Roberts II, supra at 701; the claimant was not required to know the precise employment relationship between the defendants. See ante at 422 n 29.
Ante at 421.
Ante at 421.
Ante at 422 n 30.1 do not contend that the plaintiff must “state the phrase ‘vicarious liability.’ ” Ante at 422 n 30. That is a legal theory. Rather, plaintiff must state “[t]he factual basis for the claim.” MCL 600.2912b(4)(a).
The majority asserts that subsection (4) of the NOI statute does not require a plaintiff to state facts supporting a vicarious liability claim because the majority has managed to conjure up a way that the Legislature “could have” phrased subsection (4) of the NOI statute. Ante at 422 n 30. The Legislature is not required to place the judiciary in checkmate when enacting its policy choices. Rather, it is our obligation to “to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature... by examining the language of the statute itself [because the] words of a statute provide ‘the most reliable evidence of its intent....’” Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). The majority offers no discussion of the meaning of the words actually enacted in subsection (a). Nor does the majority state why an agent-principal relationship is not part of “[t]he factual basis” for plaintiffs vicarious liability claim. The majority reaches its desired result using this faulty analysis and does so mindless of the consequences of its rule by flat.
Ante at 421.
See Roberts II, supra at 696 n 14.
See MCL 600.2912b(l), -which provides that “a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.”
MCL 600.2912b(4).
Roberts II, supra at 697 n 15.
See Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55, 66; 718 NW2d 784 (2006), citing Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177; 2 L Ed 60 (1803) for the fundamental proposition that “ours is to declare what the law is, not what it ought to be.”
Ante at 424 n 32. It is quickly becoming a new favored practice of the majority to flag decisions of the past decade and invite challenges to those decisions. See Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 175 n 34; 772 NW2d 272 (2009). It is difficult to reconcile this practice with the majority’s previous claims of fidelity to stare decisis. See, e.g., People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 87; 753 NW2d 78 (2008) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“Our decision about whether an earlier case must be overruled should be guided by more than a notion that the case was incorrectly decided.”); Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 712; 641 NW2d 219 (2002) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable.”); Devillers, supra at 620 (Weaver, J., dissenting) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, it is necessary to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”); Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 278; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction become precedent and should not be lightly departed. Absent the rarest circumstances, we should remain faithful to established precedent.”);
*451People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 517-518; 668 NW2d 602 (2003) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“ ‘We have overruled precedents when the intervening developments of the law has “removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.” Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress’ original intent, our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes.’ ”), quoting Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 173; 109 S Ct 2363; 105 L Ed 2d 132 (1989) (citations omitted). See also Todd C. Berg, Hathaway Attacks, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 27, 2008, in which Justice Hathaway was quoted: “I believe in stare decisis. Something must be drastically wrong for the court to overrule.”; Lawyers’ Election Guide: Judge Diane Marie Hathaway, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 30, 2006, in which Justice Hathaway, then running for a position on the Court of Appeals, was quoted: “Too many appellate decisions are being decided by judicial activists who are overturning precedent.”
Ante at 425.
Roberts II, supra at 713-714 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
Beasley v Michigan, 483 Mich 1025, 1030 (2009) (Corrigan, J., dissenting), quoting Devillers, supra at 571 n 19.