dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there is clearly sufficient evidence to affirm the conviction of sodomy. The claimed errors do not require a reversal, and the ultimate result upon any retrial will be the same. The trial was fundamentally fair and reversal serves no useful purpose.
Dyer was convicted of first-degree sodomy by engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 12 years. A jury convicted him of the offense *655charged and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Pursuant to the evidence presented at trial, Dyer was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal as he first argues on appeal. Dyer has not properly preserved his issue for appellate review because the question was first raised at the close of the prosecution case. This Court has held that in order for the issue of the sufficiency of evidence to be preserved for appellate review, the party wishing to use the insufficiency as a basis for his appeal must have sought a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, not just at the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Commonwealth v. Blair, Ky., 592 S.W.2d 132 (1977); Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 525 (1977). Dyer failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence and consequently, this issue was not properly preserved. RCr 9.22.
A review of the record indicates that the evidence presented at trial by the prosecution was sufficient. K.R.S. 510.070 requires proof that the defendant engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with a victim under 12 years of age. Deviate sexual intercourse has been defined as any act of sexual gratification between persons not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. Here, the victim who was 11 years old at the time of the trial, testified that he was sodomized by Dyer more than once. Clearly under the evidence as a whole, it was not unreasonable for the jury to find Dyer guilty. Trowel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530 (1977).
The testimony of the victim was sufficient evidence to prove all the evidence of the crimes charged. It established a jury issue. The unsupported testimony of the victim was sufficient to meet the burden of proof of the prosecution and the test to refuse a directed verdict of acquittal. Any rational trier of fact could easily have found that the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt were in the evidence presented at trial. Although admitting that there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of sodomy, the majority here seeks to become a self-styled defender of the bookcase. It creates the issue of profile evidence in an effort to justify the reversal of this case and magnifies and elaborates its importance in this case.
The investigating officer testified that he obtained a search warrant for the residence of Dyer for “magazines containing photographs of an obscene and sexual nature.” The officer had clear legal authority under both the law of Kentucky and the United States of America to obtain the items which were introduced at trial. Obviously, evidence must be relevant before it is admitted at trial. Here the evidence corroborated the testimony of the victim about the circumstances surrounding the crime. Consequently the photographs and articles in the magazines were clearly relevant and were properly admitted into evidence. Although he later objected on other grounds, there was no objection by defense counsel to the testimony by the victim that Dyer had shown him the pictures in the “Playboy” book of the naked girls and boys.
The issue relative to the materials obtained through the lawful search has not been properly preserved for appellate review. RCr 9.22. A review of the record indicates that there were six references to the use of the term “pedophile.” The first reference was during opening statement by the Commonwealth and did not draw an objection. The next two references, also without objection, were made during the case-in-chief of the prosecution. The fourth reference was made by defense counsel during cross-examination of the investigating police officer. The two remaining references were made during the closing argument of the prosecution.
The officer testified that the items found during the lawful search included an article from a magazine in which the officer said the author attempted to defend pedophilia. Dyer did not object to this statement. The officer was then asked if he had any law enforcement education on child molestation and he responded “Yes.” He was then asked to described the word “pedophile” and the officer testified that “a pedophile is *656an adult engaging in sexual activity with children.” There was no objection to this testimony.
During the closing argument of the prosecutor, he referred to Dyer as a “typical pedophile.” Again, there was no objection. The final reference to the term was also during closing argument by the prosecutor and defense counsel objected to the constant use of the term here. The objection was sustained immediately and the jury was properly admonished. No further relief was requested.
Clearly, Dyer failed to object to the use of the term “pedophile” and failed to ask for further relief when his objection was sustained and an admonition given. Therefore, the issue is not properly preserved for appellate review and he cannot seek further relief through the appellate courts. West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600 (1989); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 659 S.W.2d 201 (1983); McDonald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 84 (1977); RCr 9.22.
Disregarding the settled law of this State on preservation, sufficiency of the evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, the majority seeks to review its own concept of the issue and reverse the case.
In this situation, the closing argument by the prosecutor was fair comment on the evidence and was admitted without objection at trial. This has been the law in Kentucky for generations. See Nugent v. Commonwealth, Ky., 639 S.W.2d 761 (1982).
The police officer was not allowed to describe the behavior of a pedophile but he merely defined the word for the jury as a word used in a magazine article which had already been introduced into evidence. There was no objection to his testimony. The statement by the prosecutor was obviously based on the facts in evidence and reflected a fair inference therefrom. Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 644 S.W.2d 335 (1982).
In any event, the isolated remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument did not amount to reversible error when considered in context. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985); RCr 9.24.
The majority admits there was evidence sufficient to support a conviction. That should be the end of an opinion affirming the conviction rather than the lengthy majority opinion seeking to rationalize a reversal of the conviction. A careful review of the record clearly indicates that when you consider the quality and sufficiency of the evidence particularly the testimony of the victim and the entire case, there is no substantial possibility that the result upon any retrial will be any different. Consequently, the alleged error, if any, in regard to the “profile evidence” or the use of the word “pedophilia" is clearly nonprejudicial. Cf. Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 949 (1969); RCr 9.24. Here, as conceded by the majority, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was clear. There was no prosecutorial misconduct which required reversal. The comments of any prosecutor must be viewed in the context of the total trial and what effect it has on the fairness of that trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). See my dissenting opinion in Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58 (1989).
The majority uses this relatively simple case to launch a broad and far-reaching attack on another unrelated case. The majority asserts that there is a similar problem which it raises in this case with its so-called “profile evidence rule” regarding the “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.” Such a statement is totally lacking in logic. Clearly this is not an attempt by the majority to plant a small acorn or even to substitute a sapling; it is a bold planting of a fully mature oak tree when this case is analogized to the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The majority uses this shaky comparison to overrule Commonwealth v. Craig, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 387 (1990). Craig, supra, involved the affirmance of a manslaughter conviction in which this Court held that the battered woman syndrome is not a mental condition, and expert testimony on the syndrome may come from someone other than *657a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist in certain limited circumstances.
A careful examination of the briefs in this case reveals that neither party to the appellate process cited the case overruled or the case used by the majority to perpetrate the overruling. Clearly this is a giant leap in an effort that is totally beyond the authority of even a majority of this Court and has no place in this case. The noble language of the majority in defending the bookcases of the state pales into insignificance when we consider the ultimate invasion of privacy visited upon an 11 year old boy by the sodomy. The conviction should be affirmed in all respects.
REYNOLDS, J., joins in this dissent.