¶ 285. {concurring in part and dissenting in pari). Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. (Dairyland) appeals summary judgment dismissing its complaint, which judgment the circuit court rendered in 2001. Dairyland's complaint involved the 1991-92 and the 1998-99 Indian gaming compacts. The majority opinion concludes that the games added to the compacts in 2003 do not violate Wisconsin law. Majority op., ¶ 91. However, the 2003 gaming compacts were never presented to the circuit court and therefore, they are not properly brought before this court as we review the circuit court decision. All that we are to decide is the effect of Article I\( Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, amended in 1993, as it relates to games that were included in the 1991-92 and the 1998-99 Indian gaming compacts.
¶ 286. In 2004, we decided the meaning and effect of the 1993 constitutional amendments and criminal statutes on the new types of games that were added to the Indian gaming compacts in 2003; the new games violate Wisconsin's criminal statutes. Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶ 96, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666. The decisions of this court are final if not set aside on a motion for reconsideration in the case in which the ruling was issued, Wis. Stat. § 809.64 (2003-04),1 or overturned by a federal court on a federal question, see State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 426 n.4, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983). Notwithstanding this rule of law, at the request of the Governor, the majority opinion takes up *158an issue we decided in 2004 and puts it into the appeal of a 2001 circuit court decision. In his request, the Governor asserts that Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, enacted by the people of Wisconsin, cannot be applied to the Tribal Nations that have gambling operations in Wisconsin.
¶ 287. The majority opinion adopts the view of the Governor, wherein he argues on behalf of the Tribal Nations that Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution cannot be applied to Indian gambling operations in Wisconsin. Majority op., ¶¶ 2, 91. In so doing, the majority opinion surrenders the judicial independence of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the Governor, thereby stripping the court of its claim to be an impartial decision maker and of its ability to act as a check on the political branches in Wisconsin's tripartite system of government. The majority opinion does so under the guise of an impairment of contracts discussion based largely on Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. Majority op., ¶¶ 51-95. In its efforts to achieve the result the Governor has requested, the majority opinion chooses to ignore controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court, which if applied, would uphold the State of Wisconsin's ability to enforce Wisconsin's criminal statutes that prohibit any type of Class III gambling that was not permitted before the 1993 constitutional amendment to Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
¶ 288. The majority opinion and Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent agree that Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution is a substantive constitutional amendment that is prospective in effect. Majority op., ¶ 22; Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶ 228-33. However, the majority interprets the 1993 amendment as having no effect on the compacts as a *159whole, majority op., ¶ 91, and Justice Prosser concludes the 1993 amendment has no effect on the types of games that were lawfully compacted prior to the 1993 constitutional amendment because of the amendment's prospective effect, Justice Prosser's concurrence/ dissent, ¶¶ 228-33. I agree with Justice Prosser that the 1993 amendment did not prohibit those types of games that were lawfully compacted for in 1991-92.2 Therefore, any type of game included in an Indian gaming compact prior to 1993 remained lawfully compactable subsequent to the 1993 amendment. Id. Because the 1998-99 compact amendments added no new types of games, the 1998-99 compacts are lawful as well.3 No party has terminated the 1998-99 compacts according to their provisions; therefore, they remain in effect, with an opportunity to amend or to non-renew next occurring in 2008.4 Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of the dismissal of Dairyland's complaint.
*160¶ 289. However, I dissent from the majority opinion's consideration of and decision about the new types of games that were added in the 2003 compacts for the following reasons: (1) in acceding to the Governor's request on behalf of the Tribal Nations, the majority opinion surrenders this court's judicial independence so necessary to protect the people of Wisconsin in a tripartite system of government; (2) the gaming compacts are not the type of contract that is protected by either Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution or Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution; (3) there is no obligation to contract for new types of games that were not permitted under the 1991-92 compacts; therefore, there can be no impairment of a contractual obligation in that regard; and (4) the State has a significant and legitimate public purpose in controlling the type of gambling that occurs within Wisconsin's borders, which Article I, Section 10 does not affect.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 290. This appeal is taken from a 2001 circuit court decision granting the Governor's5 motion for summary judgment dismissing Dairyland's complaint. It is before us on certification from the court of appeals. Dairyland asserts that the Class III casino games included in the 1991-92 gaming compacts are prohibited by the 1993 constitutional amendment in combination with state criminal statutes. Dairyland argues that this prohibition forms the legal basis for an order requiring the Governor to give notice of non-renewal of the compacts. Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 16 and 41-42 (Dane *161County Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2001). Accordingly, we are required to establish the meaning and effect of Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution in regard to whether the types of casino games that were compacted for in 1991-92 may continue after the 1993 constitutional amendment.
¶ 291. In the analysis of the provisions of Article TV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution that relate to the issues presented by this appeal, it is important to recognize what we decided, and what we did not decide, about the 1993 constitutional amendment in Panzer. Panzer concluded that the 1991-92 compacts were lawful when entered into, Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶ 99, but that any new type of game not included in those compacts was prohibited by the laws of Wisconsin subsequent to 1993, id., ¶ 96. We did not decide whether the types of games that were lawfully compacted in 1991-92 retained their lawful status after the 1993 constitutional amendment was ratified by the citizens of Wisconsin because that question was not before us. Id., ¶ 102. We also concluded that the 1993 constitutional amendment, in combination with Wisconsin criminal statutes, set out a state policy that prohibited all types of Class III games that were not of a type included in the 1991-92 compacts. Id., ¶¶ 96-97.
¶ 292. The Governor asks us to hold that those same types of games that our 2004 decision in Panzer held were unlawful additions to the 2003 compacts are not prohibited by the very same constitutional provision. However, judicial independence, the doctrine of stare decisis6 and the application of controlling United States *162Supreme Court precedent require that we reject this request. Because I join the concurrence/dissent of Justice David Prosser, which thoroughly explains the meaning and effect of the 1993 constitutional amendment in regard to the types of Class III7 games set out in the 1991-92 and 1998-99 compacts, I focus my concurrence/dissent on judicial independence and the majority opinion's contract impairment discussion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Independence
¶ 293. Judicial independence is universally recognized as central to a democratic form of government. *163But what does that phrase, judicial independence, really mean? We can determine its meaning, in part, by what it was designed to accomplish. For example, judicial independence is essential in a tripartite system of government where the judicial branch is to act as a check on the two political branches — executive and legislative. All would agree that judicial independence is a pillar of American jurisprudence that implies that courts should be trusted to issue decisions based on a rule of law, rather than permitting pressures from extra judicial sources to drive their decisions. Judicial independence requires a high level of judicial integrity and courage to make the "tough decisions," without being affected by political favors or reprisals. The integrity of the court as an institution is critical when the surrounding political context in which a case arises is highly charged or when the other branches of government are under particularly strong political pressure in regard to the issues a case presents.
¶ 294. Judicial independence is often described as being of two general types: decisional independence and institutional independence. Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 349, 351-52 (1993) [hereinafter. A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers].
¶ 295. Decisional independence is adherence to the rule of law in individual cases, such that decisions of a court or an individual judge are not affected by the demands of another branch of government or by political agendas. Id. "[A]n independent judiciary requires also that [its] decisions, once given, would not be altered or ignored by the government (responsible to enforce them)." Id. at 352.
*164¶ 296. Institutional independence focuses on independence of the entire judicial branch of government from the legislative and executive branches. It is most often associated with the separation of powers doctrine, though in reality both decisional and institutional independence have separation of powers qualities. For example, the legislature may enact a statute that affects the functioning of courts as an institution. See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41-47, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (concluding that Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5) (1979-80), which provides for the preemptory right of substitution of judges, is constitutional because the statute was enacted in an area of shared power). Or, the legislature may enact a statute that effectively overrules an individual supreme court decision. See Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 633-34, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996).
¶ 297. In my view, the majority opinion surrenders the decisional independence of this court to the Governor, who heads the executive branch, and is arguing against applying Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution to the Tribal Nations. The majority opinion does so by overruling this court's decision in Panzer, where we decided that the new types of games that were added to the tribal compacts in 2003 violated the 1993 constitutional amendment and were, therefore, prohibited by the criminal laws of the State of Wisconsin. Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶ 96-97.
¶ 298. Panzer was issued on May 13, 2004. That decision was subject to a motion for reconsideration for 20 days from May 13, 2004. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.64. A motion for reconsideration made more than 20 days after a decision of the supreme court is not timely and will not be heard. Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Wis., 120 Wis. 2d 419, 421-22, 355 N.W.2d 531 (1984). No *165motion for reconsideration was made in Panzer.:8 My research shows that no appeal was filed in any federal court. Therefore, the issue of whether the new types of games that were added to the compacts in 2003 could be lawfully operated in Wisconsin is not subject to further review, unless it were an issue in a case that was subsequently before us.
¶ 299. The summary judgment dismissing Dairyland's complaint was granted by the circuit court in 2001. That decision did not involve the issue of whether the new types of games that were added to the compacts in 2003 were prohibited by Article Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the criminal code of Wisconsin. The circuit court decision could not have reviewed the new types of games that were added in 2003 because those facts were not then in existence for the circuit court to address.
¶ 300. The majority opinion's decision to overrule our holding in Panzer is the culmination of an ongoing effort by the executive branch to undermine the judicial independence of this court in regard to Indian gaming compacts. To explain: shortly after our decision in Panzer was released, the executive branch of Wisconsin government sent out a clear message that it would not enforce our decision.9 All of the Tribal Nations that have gaming compacts, except one, the Ho-Chunk Nation,10 have picked up on this message and, subsequent to our decision in Panzer, they have continued to *166operate games that, according to Panzer, violate the criminal laws of Wisconsin.
¶ 301. The Governor, as the head of the executive branch of Wisconsin government, is charged by Article V, Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution,11 with enforcing the laws. Notwithstanding this constitutional obligation and the oath the Governor took upon entering office, the Governor has done nothing to enforce our 2004 decision in Panzer. To the contrary, the types of games we concluded were unlawful in Wisconsin in our 2004 decision are operated with the full knowledge and consent of the Governor. In my view, the failure of the Governor to enforce the law is exactly the type of undercutting of judicial independence that Eli Salzberger cautioned against at the 1993 International Conference when he said, "an independent judiciary requires also that [its] decisions, once given, would not be altered or ignored by the government." A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, at 352.
¶ 302. The executive branch's public lack of respect for the decisions of this court also undermines our tripartite system of government, which was created with checks and balances among the three branches of government. Judicial independence is required to sustain those checks and balances. We magnify the executive branch's lack of respect for the courts as an independent branch of government necessary to a tripartite system of government when we disregard our *167own rules and contort the law in order to achieve a particular result, as the majority does here.
¶ 303. There are methods by which to affect a decision of this court that do not impair the court's independence. For example, if the Governor really thought that this court's decision in Panzer was not in accord with Article IX Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, he could have asked the legislature to introduce a further constitutional amendment to specify that Indian gaming compacts are not within the scope of the constitutional prohibition contained in Article IX Section 24. However, when the majority opinion takes up an issue that we previously decided and places it in a case where the issue never existed, we assist the Governor in tearing apart the institutional integrity of this court. A court that lacks institutional integrity does not establish a rule of law; rather, it establishes only the personal preferences of the men and women who hold office on the court at any given time.
B. Impairment of Contract
¶ 304. The majority opinion relies mainly on its interpretation of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. See majority op., ¶¶ 2, 51-59, 69-79. However, with no discussion except to assert that "our prior decisions [regarding Contract Clause issues] have relied upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court," the majority refers to Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Majority op., ¶ 51. Neither constitution protects the new types of games that were added in 2003.
1. Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 12
¶ 305. The Governor enters into compacts with the Tribal Nations on behalf of the State. The Wiscon*168sin Constitution does not protect the State from impairing its own contractual obligations to itself, although it could potentially protect another party who had a contract with the State. Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution protects the contractual obligations of other contracting parties to be free from interference by the State. Article I, Section 12 provides:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed....
It makes no sense to say that the State of Wisconsin can claim that its own obligation of contract that is protected by one provision in the Wisconsin Constitution is unconstitutionally impaired by another provision of the Wisconsin Constitution. Essentially, the State would have to claim that it is interfering with itself.12 Yet this is the conclusion the majority opinion reaches. Majority op., ¶ 2. No citations to legal authority are given to support this conclusion.
2. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10
¶ 306. I begin by setting out a basic principle of Article I, Section 10 discussions:
Although the language of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State "to safeguard the vital interests of its people."
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & *169Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)). My discussion employs this principle to come to three conclusions: (1) a contract that permits gambling is not the type of contract that Article I, Section 10 protects; (2) there is no contractual obligation to agree to new types of games that were not permitted under the 1991-92 compacts; therefore, there can be no impairment of a contractual obligation in that regard; and (3) even if I were to assume that gambling contracts are of a type that potentially could be protected under Article I, Section 10 and also assume that there is an obligation to contract for additional types of games, Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution because the State of Wisconsin has a significant and legitimate public purpose in controlling the scope of gambling within its boundaries.
¶ 307. The majority opinion concludes that Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as interpreted in Panzer to prohibit expansion of the types of gambling beyond that contracted for in 1991-92, violates Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. Majority op., ¶ 2.
a. There is no protection for gambling contracts under Article I, Section 10 of the US. Constitution.
¶ 308. The first question that must be answered in any case where constitutional protection is sought for a contract under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution is whether the contract is of a type for which constitutional protection potentially could be afforded. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992). The answer to this question is determined by the application of federal law. See id. As the United States Supreme Court explained, whether a contract comes within the scope of those contracts to *170which Article I, Section 10 applies is an issue that underlies the oft-repeated question of whether a change in state law resulted in a substantial impairment of a contractual obligation. See id. at 186. This question must be answered in the negative in the case before us, and that answer should be decisive of the impairment of contract question as it relates to the United States Constitution.
¶ 309. I begin with the federal constitutional provision, Article I, Section 10. It states in relevant part:
No state shall.. . pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts....
The above statement seems broad and absolute. However, it has never been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to preclude a state from legislating to protect the public health or morals, regardless of what terms a contract with a state contains.13 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879).
¶ 310. In Stone, the legislature of Mississippi granted a charter to a company to run a lottery for 25 years in consideration for a stated sum of cash and annual payments of additional sums. Id. at 817. One year later, the citizens of the State of Mississippi adopted a constitutional provision that declared that the legislature could not authorize any lottery and therefore, the lottery had to be discontinued. Id. at 819. In its analysis, the Supreme Court explained that when an impairment of contract argument is made, the first *171inquiry is always "whether a contract has in fact been entered into, and if so, what its obligations are." Id. at 817. The Supreme Court set the inquiry as "whether the State of Mississippi, in its sovereign capacity, did by the charter now under consideration bind itself irrevocably by a contract to permit [the lottery] for twenty-five years." Id. The Court concluded that the language of the charter was clear so that the question of whether the state had bound itself turned on whether the legislature had the "authority" to bind the state and its people to the charter. Id. In concluding that the legislature had no such authority, the Court explained that "the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State. ... [N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of police." Id. at 817-18. In defining what comes within the "police power" of a state, the Court explained that while the police power has been defined in many ways, it always "extends to all matters affecting the public health or the public morals. Neither can it be denied that lotteries are proper subjects for the exercise of this power." Id. at 818 (citation omitted). In concluding that the State of Mississippi could not bargain away its right to prohibit lotteries in the future, the court explained:
[that whether] the legislature of a State can, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the people, authoritatively expressed, in relation to the further continuance of such business in their midst[,] [w]e think it cannot. No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals.
Id. at 819.
¶ 311. This same limitation on the authority of a state to contract away its police power in the regulation of public morals was addressed in Douglas v. Kentucky, *172168 U.S. 488 (1897). In Douglas, the State of Kentucky, by constitutional provision, forbade the operation of lotteries. Id. at 489. Douglas claimed he had a contractually "vested right" to operate a lottery by virtue of a written agreement with the City of Frankfort, id. at 492, "which the State was forbidden by the Constitution of the United States" from impairing, id. at 495. One of the initial issues the Court addressed in analyzing Douglas's impairment of contract claim was, "whether that which the defendant asserts to be a contract was a contract of the class to which the Constitution of the United States refers." Id. at 500. Because the regulation of gambling is a regulation affecting public morals, which regulation a state always has the power to effect, the Supreme Court concluded that a contract to operate a lottery was not the type of contract that falls within the scope of Article I, Section 10.
[W]e hold that a lottery grant is not, in any sense, a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, but is simply a gratuity and license, which the State, under its police powers, and for the protection of the public morals, may at any time revoke, and forbid the further conduct of the lottery; and that no right acquired during the life of the grant, on the faith of or by agreement with the grantee, can be exercised after the revocation of such grant and the forbidding of the lottery, if its exercise involves a continuance of the lottery as originally authorized. All rights acquired on the faith of a lottery grant must be deemed to have been acquired subject to the power of the State ....
Id. at 502-03 (emphasis added).
¶ 312. The retention by the sovereign of its authority to exercise its police power in matters of public morals and safety, notwithstanding an assertion of *173contract rights to curtail the sovereign, was strongly reaffirmed in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914):
[I]t is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.
Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
¶ 313. The principles of constitutional interpretation that were laid down in Stone, Douglas and Atlantic Coast Line were reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). Winstar involved a claim that the United States was contractually obligated to permit financial institutions to use special accounting methods that were authorized in exchange for the institutions' assumption of liabilities of other failed financial institutions, despite changes made in the law under FIR-REA.14 Id. at 843, 858-61. Winstar argued, among other things, that the passage of FIRREA violated its rights under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 860.
¶ 314. In reviewing the common law history of the ability of one session of Congress to undo what an earlier session had provided, the Supreme Court explained the "unmistakability doctrine," which has been *174used where the regulations at issue affected economic interests. Id. at 871-80. This doctrine permitted the court to side-step the effect of Article I, Section 10 on the claimed contract right by concluding that absent an unmistakable provision to the contrary, "contractual arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is a party, 'remain subject to subsequent legislation' by the sovereign." Id. at 877 (quoting Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
¶ 315. Winstar explained that the unmistakability doctrine was not universally applied because of "the different kinds of obligations the Government may assume and the consequences of enforcing them." Win-star, 518 U.S. at 880. Winstar noted that at times a variant of the unmistakability doctrine was referred to as the "reserved powers doctrine," wherein "a state government may not contract away 'an essential attribute of its sovereignty.'" Id. at 888 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)). Winstar went on to explain that "a classic example" of the limitations on a state's ability to contract for certain provisions was shown by Stone where the Supreme Court held that the legislature had no power to contract away the sovereign's police power in areas affecting public morals. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 888. Furthermore, as the Court held in U.S. Trust:
[The doctrine of reserved powers] requires a determination of the State's power to create irrevocable contract rights in the first place, rather than an inquiry into the purpose or reasonableness of the subsequent impairment. In short, the Contract Clause does not require a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty.
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23.
*175¶ 316. The Indian gaming compacts are contracts to permit gambling, pure and simple. Article I\£ Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the criminal laws contained within ch. 945 of the Wisconsin Statutes prohibit gambling. Laws that affect gambling of any type operate in regard to public morals and are enacted pursuant to the police powers of the State of Wisconsin. City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 240, 250-51, 125 N.W.2d 625 (1964).
¶ 317. In Milwaukee Amusement, we examined a city's action to collect a forfeiture from Milwaukee Amusement because its pinball machines violated the city's anti-gambling ordinance. Id. at 246. After concluding that the pinball machines were a gambling device, we addressed Milwaukee Amusement's contention that the ordinance was unlawful. Id. at 251. In concluding that the ordinance was valid, we clearly explained that the regulation of gambling by a governmental body was done in the exercise of the police power.
Ordinances, such as the instant one, proscribing gambling devices are enacted pursuant to the city's police power. Estoppel will not lie against a municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power.
Milwaukee Amusement, 22 Wis. 2d at 253 (citation omitted). Also in Wisconsin Bingo Supply & Equipment Co. v. Wisconsin Bingo Control Board, 88 Wis. 2d 293, 276 N.W.2d 716 (1979), while addressing a challenge to a statute that permanently barred gambling promoters from obtaining a bingo supplier license, we explained that the statute was enacted in the legislature's exercise of its police power:
*176[A] state may make any reasonable classification which it deems necessary to the police purpose intended to be attained by the legislation ....
Id. at 307 (citation omitted).
¶ 318. By adopting the Governor's argument on impairment of contract, the majority abrogates the State of Wisconsin's sovereign police power to regulate gambling within its jurisdiction. Even though this is a federal question that is to be decided based on precedent of the United States Supreme Court, the majority opinion ignores this precedent.15 As the Supreme Court explained in Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905):
The plain object of this legislation is to discourage, and, if possible, prevent gambling. ... We are aware of no provision in the Federal Constitution which prevents this kind of legislation in a State for such a purpose.
Id. at 225.
¶ 319. We are required to follow the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law, such as the meaning of a provision of the United States Constitution. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d at 426 n.4. And as I noted earlier, it is a question of federal law whether a contract has been created that is of a type that potentially could be protected by the United States Constitution. Gen. Motors, 503 U.S. at 187. The Court has consistently held that a state cannot create a binding contract to which Article I, Section 10 protections attach when the subject matter of the contract *177comes within the scope of the state's legislation in areas affecting public morals, as does gambling. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 888; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23; Atlantic Coast Line, 232 U.S. at 558; Marvin, 199 U.S. at 225; Douglas, 168 U.S. at 502-03; Stone, 101 U.S. at 819.
¶ 320. The contract provisions the Governor seeks to protect pertain to the operation of certain types of gambling and the potential for amendment of the compact to add additional types of gambling. State action in regard to gambling is within the state's sovereign police power; this right cannot be abrogated by contract, now or in the future. Stone, 101 U.S. at 819. Therefore, it does not matter whether the court examines the contracts as a whole, as the majority does, or whether the court examines the contracts in regard to the new provisions that affect the types of games permitted. They are contracts that affect public morals and therefore, the U.S. Constitution does not afford protection to them.
¶ 321. The majority opinion puts the cart before the horse, when it relies on Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), U.S. Trust Co. and Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807 for its impairment of contract analysis. Majority op., ¶¶ 55-58. As explained above, those cases, with the exception of a portion of U.S. Trust Co. that the majority opinion chooses to ignore,16 have no *178application to the initial contract question presented here. Accordingly, the majority opinion errs when it concludes that Wisconsin has bargained away its sovereign right to establish the types of gambling that are prohibited within its borders.17
¶ 322. In countering the conclusion that the State maintains its sovereign authority under its police power to legislate in areas affecting public morals, the majority opinion asserts that the State has no jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws on tribal land unless such jurisdiction has been granted by the federal government. Majority op., ¶ 73.1 have no quarrel with this assertion; however, it has absolutely no relevance to whether the State of Wisconsin can enforce its criminal laws that prohibit gambling on tribal land. The compacts themselves recognize the authority of the State to enforce the State's criminal laws in regard to gambling on tribal land.
XVIII. ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION
B. Criminal jurisdiction.
1. The State, except as provided in par. B.2. and sec. XXIII, shall have jurisdiction to prosecute such crimi*179nal violations of its gambling laws, including amendments thereto, as may occur on tribal lands. This jurisdiction may be exercised in a similar manner as the State exercises general criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. section 1162. Consent of the Attorney General of Wisconsin shall be a condition precedent to commencement of any prosecution. This provision shall not survive the term and termination of this Compact.
Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992 (1992 Gaming Compact), Section XVIII, B. 1.
b. The 1991-92 compacts created no contractual obligation to add new types of gambling.
¶ 323. The majority opinion also assumes that the compacts contain an obligation to amend the compacts to permit the addition of new types of gambling that were not permitted under the 1991-92 compacts. Majority op., ¶ 82. The majority then assumes that the application of Article IV Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution to the compacts impairs this obligation of contract contrary to Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. Majority op., ¶ 91.
¶ 324. The majority opinion's assumptions are incorrect. It misses the first step in basic contract analysis, which is: did the 1991-92 compacts create a contractual obligation to add new types of games? The creation of a property right in a contract is determined under state law. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 519 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Under Wisconsin law, an agreement to reach an agreement in the future imposes no contractual obligation on either party. Dunlop v. Laitsch, 16 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 113 N.W.2d 551 (1962). In order to have a contractual right, the parties' agreement must be *180"definite" and "certain." Petersen v. Pilgrim Village, 256 Wis. 621, 624-25, 42 N.W.2d 273 (1950). However, the 1991-92 compacts create no contractual obligation to amend the compacts to add new types of gambling because no provision creates a "definite and certain" obligation in that regard. The majority opinion ignores this basic principle of contract law, i.e., it never concludes that the State had a contractual obligation to add any new types of games to those that are listed in the 1991-92 compacts.
¶ 325. To explain why there is no obligation to add new types of games, I review the compact provisions that conceivably could be interpreted to relate to amending the types of Class III gambling that were permitted in the 1991-92 gaming compacts:
IV. AUTHORIZED CLASS III GAMING.
B. The Tribe may not operate any Class III gaming not expressly enumerated in this section of this Compact unless this Compact is amended pursuant to section XXX.
1992 Gaming Compact, Section IV B.
XXX. AMENDMENT.
This Compact shall not be modified, amended or otherwise altered without the prior written agreement of both the State and the Tribe.
Id., Section XXX. These provisions are too indefinite to create a contractual obligation to add additional types of games. For example, Section IV B. of the compacts is a prohibitory provision that expressly restricts the types of gambling that the Tribe may offer. It says that the *181Tribe cannot operate any type of Class III gambling that is not "expressly enumerated" in Section IV of the compact. It creates no state obligation to permit any new type of game, and it creates no tribal obligation to operate any type of game that is not listed in Section IV
¶ 326. Section XXX provides that only written alterations of the compact that are signed by both the State and the Tribe are binding. It is a standard clause in most written contracts. Neither Section TV nor Section XXX is a definite provision that creates an obligation to add new types of games in the future; therefore, neither provision could give rise to a breach of contract action in that regard. At most, those sections imply, but do not even promise, the possibility of mutually agreeing upon other unspecified games in the future. Those provisions do not create a contractual obligation to add additional types of games. As we have explained:
To be enforceable a contract must be definite and certain as to its basic terms and requirements. It must spell out the essential commitments and the obligations of each party with reasonable certainty.
Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 297, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962); see also Shetney v. Shetney, 49 Wis. 2d 26, 39-40, 181 N.W.2d 516 (1970) (concluding that discussions between the parties that they would mutually assist one another in continuing their educations were insufficient to spell out a contractual obligation to do so).
¶ 327. That the amendment provisions of the compacts are too vague to create an enforceable obligation is important because in order to have an impairment of contract claim, there must be a contract obligation under state law and federal law that is being impaired. See Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi*182cago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996). Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution speaks to interference with contract obligations. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, when a court is faced with a claim of impairment of a constitutional guarantee, "we begin by identifying the precise contractual right that has been impaired." Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 504. There is no "precise contractual right" to add any new types of games to those included in the 1991-92 compacts.
¶ 328. The "obligation of contracts," to which Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution refers, has been described as having two parts: (1) the obligation to perform the terms of the contract; and (2) the obligation to pay damages due to nonperformance. Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897)). Therefore, in order to have a claim under the constitution for "impairment" of an "obligation of contracts," the state law that prevents performance must also prevent a remedy for the breach of nonperformance. Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (concluding that in order to have a takings claim under the United States Constitution, there must be no ability to maintain a suit for compensation against the government)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit so clearly explained:
[W]hen a state repudiates a contract to which it is a party it is doing nothing different from what a private party does when the party repudiates a contract; it is committing a breach of contract. It would be absurd to turn every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a violation of the federal Constitution.
Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1250.
*183¶ 329. What is apparent from the discussion' above is that even if one were to assume, arguendo, that refusing to add a new type of game after the term of the 1991-92 compacts expired was a breach of the tribal compacts, that fact cannot form the basis for a constitutional claim of interference with a contractual obligation unless the State has prevented the Tribal Nations from recovering damages for the breach. However, the circuit court, whose summary judgment we are reviewing, made no determination about whether the State breached its contract with the Tribal Nations by enacting Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution; the circuit court made no determination about the damages for a breach. However, before an impairment of contract claim will lie, there must be a breach of contract and a preclusion of damages for that breach. Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251.
¶ 330. Nevertheless, in order to permit the expansion of Indian gambling, the majority opinion completely ignores basic precepts of constitutional law. It never explains how the State became obligated to the Tribal Nations to permit additional games or what those games are. In addition, because we are reviewing a 2001 decision of the circuit court, the majority opinion could not identify whether the State has breached its contract with the Tribal Nations and yet it concludes that Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution interferes with a contractual obligation under the U.S. Constitution. As we have explained above, before there can be an interference with a contract within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, there must be an "obligation"; there must be a breach of that obligation; and the State must have precluded a remedy for the breach. None of those conditions has occurred here.
*184c. Controlling the scope of gambling in Wisconsin is a significant and legitimate public purpose.
¶ 331. And finally, even if I were willing to ignore all the foundational requirements for the commencement of an impairment of contract analysis set out above and move into the majority opinion's three-part analysis, Article 1\£ Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not run afoul of the United States Constitution for at least two reasons: (1) Article I\£ Section 24 does not operate as "a substantial impairment"; and (2) the State has a "significant and legitimate public purpose" behind its prohibition of all types of gambling. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.
¶ 332. When we evaluate whether a state law constitutes a substantial impairment of a contract right, we are "to consider whether the [] (enterprise) the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past." Id. (citing Allied Structural, 438 U.S. at 242 n.13.)
When he purchased into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to further legislation upon the same topic.
Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 (quoting Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)).
¶ 333. Here, gambling has long been subject to prohibition under the criminal laws of Wisconsin. The Tribal Nations acknowledge in the compacts that the State may enforce its criminal gambling statutes on tribal lands. Therefore, there has always been an expectation that the "enterprise" of gambling could be subject to further legislation. In addition, as we explained above, the Tribal Nations could not mount a breach of *185contract action against the State if the Governor chose not to agree to additional types of games. Therefore, the prohibition of new types of games is not a substantial impairment of an enforceable right.
¶ 334. In addition, the State has a "significant and legitimate public purpose" behind Article IY Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits compacting for types of games that were not permitted in the 1991-92 compacts. The State's prohibition is done in the exercise of its police power in the area of public morals, which is always a legitimate subject for state laws. Douglas, 168 U.S. at 502-03. Therefore, even if I were to employ the contracts clause analysis the majority opinion sets out, Article IY Section 24 is not in conflict with Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.
¶ 335. The majority opinion justifies its reversal of our decision in Panzer by asserting that the contract impairment argument was not discussed in Panzer. Majority op., ¶ 94. It laments, "We find it disingenuous that some members of the Panzer majority refused to reach the Contract Clause analysis that was properly before it, and now criticize the Dairyland majority opinion for deciding the issue." Id. The majority opinion is recreating history as it would like it to be, rather than as it was. The contract impairment issue was never before the court in Panzer. Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶ 102. No party briefed or argued contract impairment in Panzer; therefore, we did not decide it. As various members of this court have said, we should not "reach out and decide issues" that were not presented to the court by the parties. Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶ 72, 259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). However, in Panzer, the dissent did not follow that rule. Instead, it created and then decided the contract impairment issue, without *186the benefit of briefing or argument. Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶ 210-218 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
¶ 336. Panzer turned on whether the Governor had the power to enter into compacts for types of games that were not included in the 1991-92 compacts. We concluded that the constitutional amendment, Article IY Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, withdrew that power from both the legislature and the Governor. Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶ 83-86, 96-97. Based on this lack of power to validly compact for the new types of games that were added in the 2003 compacts, we concluded those games were unlawful. Id., ¶ 96. The majority opinion never overrules this holding of Panzer. Majority op., ¶ 80 n.61.
¶ 337. In the case before us, no party has argued that the people of Wisconsin, by enacting the 1993 constitutional amendment, did not withdraw from the legislature and the Governor the power to authorize new types of gambling. All that has been argued is that invalidating the new types of games added in 2003 would violate Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The majority opinion ignores the Panzer limitation on the power of the Governor as though it were the same issue as whether the State has a contractual obligation to add new types of games. Analytically, the two issues are very different. Compare Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶ 83-102 with ¶¶ 304-34 of this concurrence/dissent. Accordingly, because I do not agree with the analysis set out in the majority opinion or its decision to overrule Panzer, I respectfully dissent.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 338. In 2004, we decided the effect of the 1993 constitutional amendments on the new types of games *187that were added to the Indian gaming compacts in 2003; the new games violate Wisconsin's criminal statutes. Panzer; 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶ 96. The decisions of this court are final, if not set aside on a motion for reconsideration made within 20 days in the case in which the ruling was issued, Wis. Stat. § 809.64, or overturned by a federal court on a federal question, see Lobermeier, 120 Wis. 2d at 421-22; Webster, 114 Wis. 2d at 426 n.4. The Governor exercised neither option, but instead he asserts that Article TV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, enacted by the people of Wisconsin, cannot be applied to the Tribal Nations that have gambling operations in Wisconsin.
¶ 339. The majority opinion adopts the view of the Governor, wherein he argues on behalf of the Tribal Nations that Article iy Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution cannot be applied to Indian gambling operations in Wisconsin. I conclude that the majority opinion is in error because: (1) in acceding to the Governor's request on behalf of the Tribal Nations, the majority opinion surrenders this court's judicial independence so necessary to protect the people of Wisconsin in a tripartite system of government; (2) the gaming compacts are not the type of contract that is protected by either Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution or Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution; (3) there is no obligation to contract for new types of games that were not permitted under the 1991-92 compacts; therefore, there can be no impairment of a contractual obligation in that regard; and (4) the State has a significant and legitimate public purpose in controlling the type of gambling that occurs within Wisconsin's borders, which Article I, Section 10 does not affect.
*188¶ 340. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and DAVID T. PROSSER join this concurrence/dissent.
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.
The majority opinion asserts that I do not discuss the prohibition of Article IY Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution with regard to the casino games that were agreed upon in the 1991-92 compacts, and that failing to do so undermines the argument that new types of games added in 2003 are unconstitutional. Majority op., ¶ 20 n.23.1 do not discuss the casino games of the 1991-92 compacts because I agree with the concurrence/dissent of Justice Prosser: Article IY Section 24 is prospective in its prohibition of the types of casino games that can be lawfully operated.
Although the number of slot machines and blackjack tables increased in 1998, no new types of games were added to the compacts.
The 1998-99 compacts contain an opportunity to give notice of non-renewal every five years. As no notice was given in 2003, the compacts are in effect until at least 2008.
For purposes of ease of expression, I refer to the Governor and the Secretary of the Department of Administration as "the Governor."
It is a longstanding rule that this court "is bound by its own precedent." State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶ 52, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195 (citation omitted). Failing to abide by stare *162decisis raises serious concerns as to whether the court is implementing "principles... founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 853 (1991) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) created three classes of gaming, which classes are based on types of games. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6)-(8). The types of games that Indian tribes may offer under Class I are traditional Indian social gaming, § 2703(6), and whether to offer those games is determined solely by the tribes, with the states having no control over those decisions, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). Class II gaming includes bingo, whether or not it is electronically or computer assisted and if played in the same location, pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other similar games, as well as card games that are explicitly authorized by the state; however, it does not include any banking card games, such as baccarat, chemin de fer, blackjack, electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of the same or slot machines. § 2703(7). Class II gaming may be operated in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose. § 2710(b)(1). Class III gaming includes all types of games that do not fall within Classes I or II, § 2703(8), and Class III games are the types of games that the states generally regulate most heavily and may be operated only pursuant to a tribal-state compact, § 2710(d).
The records at the clerk of the supreme court show that the court file in Panzer was closed on July 13, 2004, without the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
See Oneida Nation Pays State $20 Million, Capital Times, June 30, 2004, at 5A.
I sincerely appreciate the respect shown to Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 by the *166Ho-Chunk Nation. It is the type of mutual respect between the courts of the Tribal Nations and the courts of Wisconsin we sought to facilitate through the State Court/Tribal Court Forum, first begun in 1997.
Article V, Section 4 provides in relevant part:
The governor. .. shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
While the Tribal Nations might have been able to make this argument, the Tribal Nations have chosen not to be parties to this lawsuit.
While a state's police power may be exercised in many substantive areas, no case cited in the majority opinion, or that I could find, holds that Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides protection when the contract at issue is affected by a state law that regulates in the area of public morals.
"FIRREA" is the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 856 (1996).
Instead of analyzing the cases cited above or other cases it deems controlling on this question, the majority opinion simply cites one paragraph from a commentator, James M. McGoldrick, Jr. Majority op., ¶ 53. However, McGoldrick does not dispute that when a state exercises its police power to regulate public morals, Article I, Section 10 does not apply.
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), explains, "The initial inquiry concerns the ability of the State to enter into an agreement that limits its power to act in the future. ... In short, the Contract Clause does not require a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty." Id., 431 U.S. at 23. The *178court also explained that the inability of a state to limit its own sovereign powers depended on the subject matter of that limitation. For example, in areas of public morals, the state could not create a binding contract that gave up its power to act in the future, but a state could enter into effective financial contracts that will restrict future state action. Id. at 23-27.
Only if the contract is of a type that may be protected by the United States Constitution, does the analysis shift to whether there has been a substantial impairment of a contractual obligation. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).