¶ 16. {dissenting). The controversy in this case surrounds the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 350.09(1) which requires, in part, "Any snowmobile operated during the hours of darkness . . . shall display a lighted head lamp and tail lamp." Burg urged the trial court to find that Zimmerman had violated this safety statute and, consequently, was negligent per se. The trial court disagreed, finding that the definition of the verb "operate" found in the statutes did not encom*157pass the facts presented here. Those facts are that Zimmerman, while keeping the keys in the ignition, decided to stop his snowmobile by turning off the ignition, which resulted in the extinguishment of the head and tail lamp, in order to chat with his fellow snowmobiler. By contorting the statute and borrowing phrases from other cases, the majority opinion has redefined the word "operate" to place Zimmerman's conduct within the statute. I disagree and respectfully dissent.
¶ 17. The interpretation of a statute is a question of* law which this court reviews de novo. State v. Ambrose, 196 Wis. 2d 768, 776, 540 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1995). The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Hackl v. Hackl, 231 Wis. 2d 43, 47, 604 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 538, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998). The primary source for statutory construction is the language of the statute itself. Wisconsin Envtl. Decade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 350, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978). In determining the meaning of any single phrase or word in a statute, it is necessary to examine it in light of the entire statute. State v. Board of Trs., 253 Wis. 371, 373, 34 N.W.2d 248 (1948). Where the statute is ambiguous, we may look to the legislative intent found in the language of the statute in relation to its scope, history, context, subject matter, and objective intended to be accomplished. Wisconsin Envtl. Decade, 81 Wis. 2d at 350; State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 324-25, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976); Ortman v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 225 N.W.2d 635 (1975); State v. Automatic Merchandisers, 64 Wis. 2d 659, 663, 221 N.W.2d 683 (1974); Wisconsin Southern Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 57 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 205 N.W.2d *158403 (1973). The objective to be accomplished must be given great weight in determining legislative intent. Town of Menomonee v. Skubitz, 53 Wis. 2d 430, 437, 192 N.W.2d 887 (1972). If the statute's language is clear, we look no further and simply apply the statute to the facts and circumstances before us. See Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996). An interpretation of a statute is unreasonable if it directly contravenes the language of the statute, is plainly contrary to the legislative intent underlying the statute, or lacks a rational basis. Trott v. DHFS, 242 Wis. 2d 397, 409, 626 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 2001). Here, the majority's interpretation contravenes the clear statutory language and lacks a rational basis.
¶ 18. The legislature's definition of "operate," found in Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r), reads: " 'Operate' means the exercise of physical control over the speed or direction of a snowmobile or the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a snowmobile necessary to put it in motion. 'Operate' includes the operation of a snowmobile." There is nothing ambiguous about the language found in the statute which requires us to resort to other aids in interpreting the statute. Clearly, one operates a snowmobile when one controls either the speed or direction of the snowmobile or when one physically manipulates or activates the controls. A snowmobile stopped without the engine running or any controls activated, by virtue of the definition, is not being "operated" by the person sitting on it.
¶ 19. Here, Zimmerman was neither running nor moving his snowmobile when Burg was injured. While sitting on a snowmobile, stopped and turned off in the middle of a well-used snowmobile path on a dark night while wearing dark clothes surely must be negligent *159conduct, it does not constitute "operating" the snowmobile. Evidence was presented that in order to start the snowmobile, Zimmerman was required to both turn the key and pull a rope. When a person sits on a snowmobile that is not on, has the keys in the ignition in the off position, and, further, needs to pull a rope to start the engine, one is not exercising physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile. There was neither a speed nor a direction. In addition, Zimmerman was not physically manipulating or activating the controls necessary to put it in motion.
¶ 20. While the majority would make it appear that Zimmerman was in the process of slowing down and turning off the engine when the accident occurred, no evidence supports this conclusion. The record states that Zimmerman's engine had been turned off for five minutes before the accident. Therefore, the interpretation given by the majority opinion, that because Zimmerman once exercised physical control over the speed of the snowmobile by stopping it and turning it off some time before the accident occurred, but remained seated on the snowmobile, he was still "operating" the vehicle when the accident occurred, twists and distorts the interpretation of "operate."
¶ 21. Were the majority's definition to be adopted, there would be no logical stopping point. How much time need expire for someone seated on the snowmobile, after turning off the ignition and leaving the keys in the ignition, in order to no longer be "operating" the snowmobile? Is a person operating a snowmobile if he turns off the snowmobile and removes the keys, but remains seated on the snowmobile? What if someone stops the snowmobile, leaves the keys in the ignition, walks away from the snowmobile but returns and sits on it — is he still "operating" the snowmobile? Consider *160whether an underage person, who sits on a snowmobile stored in a garage with the keys in the ignition, is guilty of operating a snowmobile contrary to Wis. Stat. § 350.02. Clearly, the majority's attempt to reshape Zimmerman's conduct so as to fit within the definition of "operate" in order to find Zimmerman negligent is misguided and fraught with problems.
¶ 22. Moreover, contrary to the majority's contention, both the Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980), and State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996), cases support the legal conclusion that Zimmerman was not operating the snowmobile when the accident occurred. As noted in the majority opinion, Proe-gler was found guilty of operating his vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant when he was found sleeping in a car with the motor running. The holding of the case states that one is operating a vehicle when "a defendant starts the motor and/or leaves it running." Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d at 614. Zimmerman was doing neither when the accident occurred.
¶ 23. Modory was convicted of operating while intoxicated when he was discovered in his pickup truck, seated in the driver's side of the car with the engine running and the wheels spinning. The truck, was not moving, however, because it was resting on a mound of dirt which prevented the tires from making contact with the ground. In affirming his conviction, this court said:
We agree with the State's argument. Section 346.63(3)(b), Stats., does not require movement. The statute only requires that the defendant physically manipulate or activate any of the controls "necessary to put [the motor vehicle] in motion." There is little doubt from the evidence in this case that Modory performed *161the requisite acts under this statute. He was behind the wheel of a vehicle with the engine running and was attempting to free the vehicle from its stuck position.
Modory, 204 Wis. 2d at 544. Again, the undisputed facts are that Zimmerman's snowmobile engine was off, had been off for some time, and he was not attempting any movement when the accident occurred. Under both holdings, Zimmerman clearly was not operating the snowmobile.
¶ 24. I suspect the real concern behind the majority opinion's ill-conceived definition of "operate" is its objection to the jury's finding that Zimmerman's acts were not negligent at all and to the jury's award of inadequate damages to Burg. If true, then the majority should have questioned whether they were "satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sustain [the jury's verdict]," Kuklinski v. Rodriguez, 203 Wis. 2d 324, 331, 552 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1996), and, depending on the answer, remand for a new trial. Attempting to squeeze this factual situation into the definition of "operate" will only serve to obfuscate the law and result in additional litigation.
¶ 25. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.