[¶ 1.] Attorneys Glen Johnson and Gregory Eiesland (Johnson and Eiesland) petitioned for intermediate appeal from a circuit court decision that determined that the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations, rather than the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, governs wrongful death claims from medical malpractice. The petition was granted and we now reverse.
FACTS
[¶ 2.] In Peterson v. Hohm, 2000 SD 27, 607 N.W.2d 8, this Court affirmed a judgment holding that a wrongful death claim brought by Peterson’s estate was time-barred because the action was filed in state court after the statute of limitations had run. The pertinent facts of that case follow:
On March 22, 1995, Edward Peterson (Edward), who was sixty years old, went to the Tschetter and Hohm Clinic in Huron, South Dakota, complaining of headaches, nausea, vomiting and neck stiffness. He received a CT Scan of his head, was treated by Doctors at the clinic and released. On April 3, 1995, Edward suffered an undiagnosed cerebral hemorrhage that caused him to collapse. He died six days later.
At the time of Edward’s death, he and Ruby were residents of Beadle County, South Dakota. Shortly after Edward’s death, Ruby moved to Fairmont, Minnesota. On March 10,1997, the Honorable Eugene Martin, Third Circuit, Beadle County, granted Ruby’s petition for appointment as special administratrix of *560Edward’s estate. On March 21, 1997, Ruby filed a medical malpractice action on behalf of her husband’s estate against Doctors in the United States District Court for South Dakota based upon diversity of citizenship. In her complaint, Ruby alleged that Doctors were negligent in their failure to diagnose and treat Edward for his cerebral aneurysm. Doctor Knute Landreth (Landreth) asserted in his separate answer that no jurisdiction existed. After Doctors filed their answer, the parties undertook discovery, which included: depositions of the parties, exchange of interrogatories and production requests, and identification and disclosure of expert witnesses. Over one year after Doctors filed then-answer, they moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doctors argued that in determining diversity of citizenship under 28 USC § 1332(c)(2), the citizenship of the legal representative of the estate of a decedent is deemed to be the same as the decedent at the time of death. While Doctors’ motion to dismiss was pending, Ruby filed a state court action on June 23, 1998, in Beadle County, South Dakota, alleging issues identical to the federal action. On September 17, 1998, the federal court found that the decedent and Doctors were all residents of South Dakota; therefore, no diversity of citizenship existed and the suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Subsequently, Doctors filed a motion for summary judgment in the state court action on the grounds that the statutes of limitations had run. Doctors argued that under SDCL 15-2-14.1 the statute of limitations for medical malpractice is two years from the alleged malpractice. In addition, the statute of limitations under SDCL 21-5-3 for a wrongful death action is three years. The circuit court noted that Ruby filed the state court action 440 days after the expiration of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim, and 75 days after the expiration of the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action. The trial court found that both statutes of limitations had expired and granted Doctors’ summary judgment motion.
Id., 2000 SD 27 at ¶¶ 2-5, 607 N.W.2d at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
[¶ 3.] Attorney Robert Burns (Burns) filed the action for medical malpractice in federal court before the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations expired. On March 12, 1998, Burns withdrew and Johnson and Eiesland were substituted as counsel. Johnson and Eiesland did not institute an action in state circuit court until June 23,1998, after both the two-year medical malpractice and three-year wrongful death statutes of limitations had expired. On February 23, 2000, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the state action because it was time-barred by all statutes of limitations. Id., 2000 SD 27 at ¶ 19, 607 N.W.2d at 14.
[¶ 4.] Thus, Peterson’s estate was barred from bringing any action arising from his death except an action against the attorneys for legal malpractice. Ruby Peterson, individually and as special adminis-tratrix of her husband’s estate, filed this legal malpractice action against Burns, Johnson and Eiesland. The attorneys cross-claimed and raised the issue of the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court held that the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations applied. Johnson and Eiesland petitioned for intermediate appeal, which this Court granted. They raise a single issue:
[¶ 5.] Does the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations in SDCL 21-5-3 extend the two-year medical mal*561practice statute of limitations set forth in SDCL 15-2-14.1?1
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 6.] All of Peterson’s attorneys in the medical malpractice action applied the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. Burns commenced his action in federal court one day before two years had elapsed from the occurrence of the claimed medical malpractice. Once the federal case filed by Burns was dismissed, Johnson and Eiesland argued that the pen-dency of the federal action tolled the state medical malpractice statute of limitations, not that the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations applied. None took the position that the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations applied until this lawsuit was filed. If the applicable statute of limitations is two years, only Burns may be liable in a legal malpractice action. If the applicable statute of limitations is three years, Johnson and Eiesland may also be liable.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 7.] This is a case of first impression in South Dakota, requiring statutory interpretation. We interpret “statutes under a de novo standard of review without deference to the decision of the trial court.” In re Estate of Karnen, 2000 SD 32, ¶ 7, 607 N.W.2d 32, 35.
THE STATUTES
[¶ 8.] The statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions is set forth in SDCL 15-2-14.1, which provides in pertinent part that:
An action against a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, sanitarium, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, chiropractor, or other practitioner of the healing arts for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based upon contract or tort, can be commenced only within two years after the alleged malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure shall have occurred, provided, a counterclaim may be pleaded as a defense to any action for services brought by a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, sanitarium, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, chiropractor, or other practitioner of the healing arts after the limitation herein prescribed, notwithstanding it is barred by the provisions of this chapter, if it was the property of the party pleading it at the time it became barred and was not barred at the time the claim was sued or originated, but no judgment thereon except for costs can be rendered in favor of the party so pleading it.
The statute of limitations for wrongful death claims is provided by SDCL 21-5-3:
Every action for wrongful death shall be commenced within three years after the death of such deceased person.
*562SDCL 15-2-1 applies to civil actions generally:
Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title after the cause of action shall have accrued except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute. The objection that the action was not commenced within the time limited can only be taken by answer or other responsive pleading.
At issue in this case is whether a different limitation than the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations is prescribed by the wrongful death statute of limitations.
WRONGFUL DEATH
[¶ 9.] Two causes of action can arise from medical malpractice resulting in death. The first is an action by the representative of the deceased’s estate to recover damages for personal injury and medical expenses. Sander v. Geib, Elston, Frost Pro. Ass’n, 506 N.W.2d 107, 127 (S.D.1998). The second is the legislatively created wrongful death action in SDCL 21-5-1 that may be brought in the name of the executor or administrator on behalf of certain beneficiaries.2 SDCL 21-5-5; Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 127. These are separate and distinct causes of action and may have different plaintiffs, different remedies, different recipients of damages and different distributions of damage awards. Id.
[¶ 10.] Wrongful death (either survival of decedent’s tort claims or a new cause of action in favor of the statutory beneficiaries) was unknown at common law. Steckman v. Silver Moon, Inc., 77 S.D. 206, 209, 90 N.W.2d 170, 172 (1958). It took the passage of Lord Campbell’s Act3 in 1846 in England to create a cause of action in favor of certain survivors for wrongful death. South Dakota passed a wrongful death statute in 1909 creating a remedy that did not exist until the statute was passed. 1909 SD SessL ch 301, § 1. Even then, no survival action existed to recover damages for personal injury and medical expense resulting from medical malpractice. Ulvig v. McKennan Hosp., 56 S.D. 509, 521, 229 N.W. 383, 388 (1930). The only action available was the new cause of action in favor of the beneficiaries named in the wrongful death statute. Id., 56 S.D. at 522-23, 229 N.W. at 389. Survival actions for personal injury and- medical expenses could not be maintained until after the Legislature amended what is now SDCL 15-4-1 to provide in pertinent part that “[a]ll causes of action shall survive and be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same.” 1951 SD SessL ch 186, § 1.
[¶ 11.] Not every death is wrongful. Some people die from disease or natural causes. Only those deaths caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default can be the basis for a wrongful death claim. Steckman, 77 S.D. at 212, 90 N.W.2d at 173. A cause of action for wrongful death accrues at death because the survivors cannot sue before the person is dead. Although the infliction of the cause of death and death itself are frequently contemporaneous,4 sometimes death does not occur until much later. A patient can be in a coma for years while modern medicine keeps the body alive. The wrongful death *563statute of limitations begins to run when the person dies. SDCL 21-5-3. Yet there has to be a causal connection between the death and some wrongful act. Steckman, 77 S.D. at 212, 90 N.W.2d at 173. In Peterson’s case, the wrongful act was alleged to be medical malpractice.
OCCURRENCE RULE
[¶ 12.] SDCL 15-2-14.1 is an “occurrence rule” statute of limitations for medical malpractice. Beckel v. Gerber, 1998 SD 48, ¶ 21, 578 N.W.2d 574, 578. The cause of action for medical malpractice accrues when the malpractice occurs. Id., 1998 SD 48 at ¶ 9, 578 N.W.2d at 576. Prior to 1976, the medical malpractice statute of limitations was subject to a “discovery rule.”5 Shinabarger v. Jatoi, 385 F.Supp. 707, 711 (D.S.D.1974). In 1976, the Legislature repealed the discovery rule statute and enacted the current occurrence rule statute. 1976 SD SessL ch 145, § 4. Since that time, this Court has consistently recognized that the current medical malpractice statute of limitations is an occurrence rule and has rejected a discovery rule. Beckel, 1998 SD 48 at ¶ 21, 578 N.W.2d at 578; Alberts v. Giebink, 299 N.W.2d 454, 455-56 (S.D.1980).
DAMAGES RULE
[¶ 13.] Burns wants us to treat death as a statutory “date of damages” rule with death being the date of damages. He argues that if death is caused by medical malpractice and death occurs before the two-year statute of limitations has run, then the wrongful death statute applies and the decedent’s survivors get three more years to bring a medical malpractice action. Practically speaking, the estate could have almost five years to bring a medical malpractice action if death occurred one day before two years from the date on which the medical malpractice occurred.
[¶ 14.] However, even Burns’ proposed damages rule has a deadline. Under Burns’ argument, if death occurred two years and one day after the medical malpractice occurred, the decedent’s estate would be time-barred from suit because the medical malpractice claim was not viable at the time of death. Burns’ proposal would create injustice. The only difference between the two deaths would be two days. Nothing other than the passage of two days would change the two-year statute of limitations to a five-year statute of limitations for one estate and a two-year statute of limitations for the other estate. The deceased would be no more or less dead and the medical practitioner would be no more or less culpable in either case.
[¶ 15.] Burns’ argument would make better intellectual sense if he proposed that death recommenced the medical malpractice limitations period. Then, everyone who died as a result of medical malpractice would have three years from death to bring a claim no matter when the malpractice occurred. However, the problem is obvious. A person can be kept alive on life support for years. The two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice could expire while the body continued to exist on life support. Years later, when the life support is withdrawn or the body finally worn out, death could revive a medical malpractice action long after the statute ■ of limitations had run. Contingent liability could linger for years. The Legislature sought to limit just this type of contingent liability by passing the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations *564without a discovery rule when it enacted SDCL 15-2-14.1 in 1976.
[¶ 16.] Our decision treats all medical malpractice plaintiffs the same. Applying the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations from the date of the alleged malpractice, whether the action is for personal injury or death, is consistent with the Legislature’s policy to limit the exposure of medical providers to liability for malpractice. All plaintiffs are allowed two years whether they live or die. SDCL 15-2-14.1. If the plaintiff cannot bring the action within two years, the plaintiff is barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
[¶ 17.] This Court has also rejected discovery and damages rules in other professional malpractice cases. SDCL 15-2-14.2 provides an occurrence rule statute of limitations for legal malpractice identical to the occurrence rule in the medical malpractice statute of limitations. In Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, 1996 SD 146, 557 N.W.2d 396, this Court declined to deviate from the occurrence rule and rejected both discovery and damages rules. This Court said:
The statute of limitations runs from the date of the breach of duty and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is determined. Although this issue has been addressed numerous times by this Court, the Legislature has not amended either statute at issue here to reflect anything but a rule of occurrence in legal malpractice actions. If a discovery or damages rule is the appropriate basis to trigger the running of the statute, such arguments should be presented to the Legislature for its consideration as to what is the appropriate public policy for this State.
Id., 1996 SD 146 at ¶ 31, 557 N.W.2d at 404-05 (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 18.] Burns would have us rule that the Legislature conveniently provided the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations in SDCL 21-5-3 as a “date of damages” exception to the occurrence rule in SDCL 15-2-14.1. However, SDCL 21-5-3 was first enacted in 1909. 1909 SD SessL ch 301, § 3. No medical malpractice statute of limitations existed in 1909. The first medical malpractice statute of limitations was enacted in 1939. SDC 1939, § 33.0232(6)(c). The occurrence rule was added in 1976. It cannot reasonably be argued that the Legislature was able to “foresee (like a swami)”6 in 1909 and provided an exception to the occurrence rule sixty-seven years in advance.
[¶ 19.] Therefore, we reject the argument that the wrongful death statute of limitations is a date of damages exception to the occurrence rule in the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
[¶ 20.] When construing a statute, the court determines the intent of the Legislature from the words of the statute, giving them their plain meaning. Hagemann v. NJS Eng’g, Inc., 2001 SD 102, ¶ 5, 632 N.W.2d 840, 843; M.B. v. Konenkamp, 523 N.W.2d 94, 97 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 21.] The general purpose of statutes of limitations is to limit, not extend, claimants’ rights. This Court has often stated, “ ‘[t]he purpose of a statute of limitations is speedy and fair adjudication of the respective rights of the parties.’ ” Peterson, 2000 SD 27 at ¶ 14, 607 N.W.2d at 12 (quoting State of Minn. ex rel. Hove *565v. Doese, 501 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D.1993)). See Jiricek v. Woonsocket Sch. Dist. No. 55-4, 489 N.W.2d 348, 350 (S.D.1992); Merkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 16, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969). “[Statutes of limitations have allowed people, through ‘legislative grace,’ to be ‘freed from the consequences of their actions after a statutory period of time resulting in peace of mind for the individual, less docket congestion, fewer administrative problems for the courts, and less work for law enforcement agencies. Stale claims are eliminated.’ ” Peterson, 2000 SD 27 at ¶ 14, 607 N.W.2d at 12 (citation omitted). Some of the reasons for limiting the right to bring lawsuits are to require claimants to exercise their rights to sue so their claims can be promptly investigated,7 while witnesses are available, memories are fresh8 and insurance is still in place.9 They are regarded as statutes of repose designed to eliminate fraudulent and stale claims and operate against those who sleep on their rights. Chipperfield, 84 S.D. at 16, 166 N.W.2d at 728. A defense based upon a statute of limitations is meritorious and should not be regarded with disfavor, rather it should be treated like any other defense. Openhowski v. Mahone, 2000 SD 76, ¶ 11, 612 N.W.2d 579, 582; Chipperfield, 84 S.D. at 16, 166 N.W.2d at 728. Both the medical malpractice statute of limitations and the wrongful death statute of limitations are designed to limit lawsuits.
[¶22.] The medical malpractice statute of limitations provides that an action for medical malpractice can only be commenced within two years after the act of alleged malpractice occurred whether based on contract or tort. The statute is obviously intended to limit negligence actions for personal injury that could otherwise be brought within three years under the personal injury statute of limitations10 or contract actions for medical services that could otherwise be brought within six years under the contract statute of limitations.11 Just as obviously, the medical malpractice statute of limitations is intended to limit wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice to two years. If the statute can limit personal injury liability for malpractice to two years and contract liability for malpractice to two years, it can also limit actions for wrongful death based on medical malpractice to two years.
NATURE OF THE CLAIM
[¶ 23.] The nature of the claim determines which statute of limitations applies. Morgan, 450 N.W.2d at 785. In Morgan, a former client sued an attorney. The complaint sounded in both the tort of attorney malpractice and breach of a partnership contract. In determining which statute of limitations applied, this Court reasoned that “[t]he choice of which statute of limitations should apply ulti*566mately rests on a characterization of the essence of the claim.” Id.12 This Court further reasoned that if doubt existed regarding the basis of the claim, and therefore which statute applied, then “such doubt [should] be resolved in favor of the longer limitation period.” Id. at 786. Since the tort and contract claims in Morgan were inextricably intertwined, this Court applied the longer statute of limitations governing contracts.
[¶ 24.] In Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80, 85-86 (S.D.1995), a psychologist was sued for having a romantic relationship with a marriage counseling client. The medical malpractice statute of limitations had expired. The complaint alleged medical malpractice, negligence, breach of contract and fraud. First, this Court held that Lenz was not a medical practitioner when he performed marriage counseling. Then, applying the test from Morgan, this Court held that the three causes of action were intertwined and that the six-year contract statute of limitations, the longest period, should apply.
[¶ 25.] In Rehm v. Lenz, 1996 SD 51, 547 N.W.2d 560, the same psychologist was having a romantic relationship with a different client who was being treated for clinical depression. Again, the medical malpractice statute of limitations had expired. The complaint alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deceit, alienation of affections and breach of contract but did not allege medical malpractice. In a split decision on the issues, Chief Justice Miller, writing for the Court on the statute of limitations issue, adhered to the ruling in Richards that a psychologist performing marriage counseling was not a medical practitioner and characterized the claim as tort, fraud and contract and applied a six-year statute of limitations. Id., 1996 SD 51 at ¶ 17, 547 N.W.2d at 565-66. Justice Sabers, writing for the Court on the question whether Lenz was a medical practitioner, stated that a psychologist was a “practitioner of healing arts,” because the client was being treated for depression. Justice Sabers would then have dismissed the complaint because it was for medical malpractice. However, Circuit Court Judge Dobberpuhl, in his concurrence, opined that the medical malpractice statute of limitations did not apply because “intentional acts” should be outside the purview of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. Justice Sabers replied that “it does not make any difference [whether the act was negligent or intentional] because SDCL 15-2-14.1 provides a two-year statute of limitations for [actions] ‘whether based upon contract or tort.’ Even intentional acts are torts and are included.” Id., 1996 SD 51 at ¶ 40, 547 N.W.2d at 569. Characterizing the claim under Morgan is not easy.
[¶ 26.] In Bruske v. Hille, 1997 SD 108, 567 N.W.2d 872, this Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of an oral surgeon who was sued by a former patient who claimed fraud and deceit for failing to inform her of the dangers of a defective implant in her jaw. The medical malpractice statute of limitations had expired. Characterizing the nature of the claim, this Court found that “[m]edical malpractice characterized as fraud and deceit will not *567sanction a shift to a more beneficial statute of limitations.” Id., 1997 SD 108 at ¶ 13, 567 N.W.2d at 876. As a result, the action was governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, SDCL 15-2-14.1, and Bruske’s claim was not timely filed.
[¶ 27.] There was no claim in Peterson’s lawsuit against the doctors other than medical malpractice. He was not intentionally injured.13 The claim underlying the wrongful death action was based entirely on the doctors’ alleged failure to diagnose and prevent the stroke that killed Peterson. No other tort or other claim formed the basis for the lawsuit against the doctors. This was purely and simply a medical malpractice case in which the patient died. Therefore, since the characterization of the claim is medical malpractice, the medical malpractice statute of limitations governs.
THE MORE SPECIFIC STATUTE
[¶ 28.] A rule of statutory construction is that the more specific statute governs the more general statute. Faircloth v. Raven Indus., Inc., 2000 SD 158, ¶ 11 & 18, 620 N.W.2d 198, 202-03; Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539; Meyerink v. Northwestern, Pub. Serv. Co., 391 N.W.2d 180, 184 (S.D.1986). The wrongful death statute of limitations covers deaths caused by intentional homicide, reckless homicide, negligent homicide or by other wrongful act, neglect or default, not just wrongful deaths caused by medical malpractice. The medical malpractice statute of limitations only applies to medical malpractice. The medical malpractice statute of limitations is more specific than the wrongful death statute of limitations. Under this rule of statutory construction, the more specific two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations governs.
THE MORE RECENT STATUTE
[¶ 29.] Another rule of statutory construction is that the more recent statute supercedes the older statute. State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619, 622 (S.D.1993). The wrongful death statute of limitations has been three years since it was first enacted in 1909. The two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations was first enacted in 1939 and amended in 1963 to include nurses, lengthened to three years in 1976 and changed from the discovery rule to the occurrence rule and finally, shortened to two years in 1977. Under this rule, the more recent two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations governs.
THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE
[¶ 30.] Burns argues that the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not mention “death” so it does not cover wrongful death caused by medical malpractice. However, the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not mention “personal injury” either. Extending Burns’ argument, the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations would not cover personal injury because it is not mentioned in the statute. Consequently the three-year personal injury statute of limitations would apply. This line of argument would render the medical malpractice statute of limitations meaningless because it would cover neither personal injury nor death caused by medical malpractice. We should not adopt an interpretation of a statute that renders the statute meaningless when the Legislature *568obviously passed it for a reason. Faircloth, 2000 SD 158 at ¶ 9, 620 N.W.2d at 202. The more reasonable and meaningful interpretation is that the Legislature intended the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations to apply to all consequences of medical malpractice, including both personal injury and death.14 We are also mindful of the rule against supplying omitted language. South Dakota SIF v. CRE, 1999 SD 2, ¶ 17, 589 N.W.2d 206, 209. However, the term “an action” is broad enough to encompass both personal injury and death without additional language because the statute speaks to the nature of the cause of action and not the nature of the damages. On its face, the statute covers all damages requested in “an action.”
HARMONIZING THE STATUTES
[¶ 31.] When two statutes of limitations conflict, the statute providing the longer period of time applies. Zoss v. Schaefers, 1999 SD 105, ¶ 11, 598 N.W.2d 550, 553. The three-year wrongful death statute of limitations is longer than the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. Under this rule, the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations governs. However, in Faircloth, 2000 SD 158 at ¶ 11, n3, 620 N.W.2d at 202, n3, this Court held that this rule does not apply when the two statutes can be harmonized.
[¶ 32.] When we interpret a statute, “[n]o wordage should be found to be surplus. No provision can be left without meaning. If possible, effect should be given to every part and every word.” Maynard v. Heeren, 1997 SD 60, ¶ 14, 563 N.W.2d 830, 835. When construing statutes that are apparently in conflict, the court should read them together and harmonize them if possible to give effect to all words in the statute. Faircloth, 2000 SD 158 at ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d at 201. SDCL 15-2-14.1 provides that an action based on medical malpractice may only be brought within two years of the occurrence. SDCL 21-5-3 requires wrongful death actions to be brought within three years of death. Two years from occurrence will always be less than three years after death. Therefore, the statutes can be read in harmony and both be given effect by applying the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations to wrongful death caused by medical malpractice.
[¶ 33.] Failure to harmonize the statutes results in a ridiculous and unfair situation. Burns argues that if a person’s death is caused by medical malpractice and the person dies before the two-year statute of limitations has run, then the wrongful death statute applies and the survivors get three more years to bring a medical malpractice action. If the person died two years and a day after the medical malpractice occurred, the estate would be barred from suit because the medical malpractice claim was not viable at the time of the person’s death. Under Burns’ proposal, some survivors would get two years to sue, some would get almost five years and some would not get to sue. By harmonizing the statutes and by applying the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, every plaintiff is afforded two years whether the action is for personal injury or death.
LEGISLATIVE POLICY
[¶ 34.] The legislative policy regarding limitations on lawsuits against medical *569practitioners is set forth in Knowles v. US (In re Certif. of Question of Law), 1996 SD 10, ¶¶ 60-65, 544 N.W.2d 183, 195-97:
In the mid 1970s, our Legislature, along with many Legislatures throughout the country, became gravely concerned about the availability and cost of health care, especially in rural areas and small communities. Seeing a direct correlation between the availability of health services and skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance premiums, these state legislatures attempted to alleviate the increasing cost of such insurance by enacting statutes limiting the damages recoverable in medical malpractice suits. South Dakota’s Legislature prudently responded to this perceived crisis by first setting up a special fact-finding committee to study the problem. After considering public testimony taken over a period of months, the Legislature responded with a $500,000 cap on general (noneconomic) damages for medical malpractice awards for a period of ten years.
All things considered, the Legislature acted sensibly to meet a perceived crisis. Our elected representatives reasoned a cap on damages would lead to greater ease in calculating premiums, thus making the market more attractive to insurers, which could ultimately lead to reduced premiums, making insurance more affordable for individuals and organizations providing vital health services.
South Dakota faced unique problems in 1976. It had one of the worst doctor-patient ratios in the nation, with only five hundred doctors in the entire State. Availability and affordability of malpractice insurance, especially for solo practitioners in rural areas, was deemed essential to ensure an adequate number of doctors and other health care providers to serve the medical needs of South Dakota citizens.
An unsettled argument persists over whether a malpractice crisis ever actually existed. Yet there can be no doubt, for whatever reason, malpractice premiums were increasing at an alarming rate. Umbrella coverage for a general or family practitioner in South Dakota rose from a rate of $640 a year in 1970 to approximately $8,400 a year in 1976. The problem was especially acute in rural areas. The issue was cast as potentially a life-or-death situation for persons needing that care where its future availability was in doubt. Robert Johnson, Executive Secretary of the South Dakota Medical Association told the special committee “we can’t get insurance for solo practitioners. We’re the only state that I know of with the problem.” South Dakota’s hospitals faced similar increases: St. Luke’s Hospital in Aberdeen paid $4,060 for $10,000,000 in coverage in 1974; only three years later it paid $75,742 for $2,000,000 in coverage. In Mitchell, St. Joseph’s Hospital paid $3,008 for $10,000,000 coverage in 1974 and $40,420 for $2,000,000 coverage in 1977. Unable to afford the premiums during this time, two hospitals in South Dakota went without coverage altogether. In the end, whatever the cost, South Dakota citizens would bear the burden; either through higher medical bills and health insurance premiums; or by not having medical services available because doctors and other providers could not afford to obtain insurance.
Every time the courts have tampered with the special treatment of medical practitioners, the Legislature has closed the loophole.
[¶ 35.] In 1974, the federal district court construed the previous medical malpractice statute to include a discovery rule. *570Shinabarger, 385 F.Supp. at 711. In 1976, the Legislature repealed the previous statute and enacted the present medical malpractice statute of limitations, SDCL 15-2-14.1, with an occurrence rule. 1976 SD SessL ch 145.
[¶ 36.] In 1978, this Court held that the medical malpractice statute of limitations did not protect medical corporations. Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D.1978). In 1979, the Legislature enacted SDCL 15-2-14.3 to include medical corporations in the special treatment in SDCL 15-2-14.1.
[¶ 37.] In 1993, this Court held that the medical malpractice damages cap in SDCL 21-3-11 did not protect medical corporations, Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 124-25, and in 1996, declared the medical malpractice damages cap unconstitutional, Knowles, 1996 SD 10 at ¶ 33, 544 N.W.2d at 191. In 1997, the Legislature revived a prior damages cap by enacting SDCL 21-3-11.1.
[¶ 38.] The Legislature’s policy of protecting medical practitioners is clear.
TYPES OF LIMITATIONS
[¶ 39.] When the Legislature placed time limits on actions against medical practitioners, the Legislature could have chosen from at least four types of limitations. The first limitations are notice statutes. Peterson, 2000 SD 27 at ¶ 13, 607 N.W.2d at 12. If proper notice is not given within a certain limited time, then the injured party cannot sue. SDCL 3-21-2 is an example of a notice statute that requires a claimant to give notice to a public entity within 180 days of an injury.
[¶ 40.] The second limitations are statutes of limitations. “A statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived.” Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 129, n5 (S.D.1986).
[¶41.] The third limitations are statutes of repose.
A statute of repose bars all actions after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action. All statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts. However, since a statute of repose begins to run from a date unrelated to the date of an injury, it is not designed to allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action once it arises. Therefore, a statute of repose may bar the filing of a lawsuit even though the cause of action did not even arise until after it was barred and even though the injured person was diligent in seeking a judicial remedy. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).
Id.
[¶ 42.] The fourth limitations are survival statutes. In M.S. v. Dinkytown Day Care Center, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 587 (S.D.1992), this Court held:
The distinction between a survival statute and a statute of limitations,
‘is that a statute of limitations affects the time that a stale claim may be brought while a survival statute gives life for a limited time to a right or claim that would have been destroyed entirely but for the statute. These survival statutes arbitrarily extend the life of the corporation to allow remedies connected with the corporation’s existence to be asserted.’
Id. at 589 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). A survival statute cannot be tolled. Id. at 590.
*571STATUTE OF REPOSE
[¶ 43.] The Legislature has consistently limited the time during which medical practitioners are exposed to suits for malpractice and limited the damages available. As a matter of clear public policy, the Legislature has protected doctors from lawsuits by their patients and has diligently maintained the special considerations given to medical practitioners. The policy of the Legislature is clearly to make SDCL 15-2-14.1 a statute of repose.15 We recognize this policy and will not deviate from it. We hold that SDCL 15-2-14.1 is a statute of repose. If the policy is to be changed, the Legislature, not this Court, should make the change.
OPEN COURTS
[¶ 44.] Our decision holding that SDCL 15-2-14.1 is a statute of repose has the effect of barring some wrongful death claims before death occurs because some patients may not die within two years of the occurrence of the medical malpractice. This decision will prevent some survivors from suing for the damage of death. In Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. Supply Ass’n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 427 (S.D.1984), this Court held that a construction deficiency statute of repose and products liability statute of repose violated the South Dakota Constitution because the Legislature cannot completely abolish a right to sue under the “open courts” provision.16 However, in Green, 1996 SD 146 at ¶ 13, 557 N.W.2d at 400, this Court noted that the “open courts” provision only applies to rights recognized by the common law. Wrongful death actions are not a common law right. Steckman, 77 S.D. at 209, 90 N.W.2d at 172. In addition, the Legislature can put reasonable limits on remedies. Knowles, 1996 SD 10 at ¶ 83, 544 N.W.2d at 203; In re Estate of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356, 359 (S.D.1989). Here the right to sue for medical malpractice is not abolished, it is only limited to two years. Green, 1996 SD 146 at ¶ 33, 557 N.W.2d at 405.
TOLLING
[¶ 45.] While this Court has recognized that the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not begin to run when there is continuing treatment, Liffengren v. Bendt, 2000 SD 91, ¶ 13, 612 N.W.2d 629, 632; Beckel, 1998 SD 48 at ¶10, 578 N.W.2d at 576; Alberts, 299 N.W.2d at 456, or fraudulent concealment, Bruske, 1997 SD 108 at ¶ 19, 567 N.W.2d at 879, this Court has held that it cannot be tolled by the discovery rule, Beckel, 1998 SD 48 at ¶21, 578 N.W.2d at 578; Alberts, 299 N.W.2d at 455-56, or equitably tolled by filing an action in the wrong court, Peterson, 2000 SD 27 at ¶¶ 16-18, 607 N.W.2d at 13-14. Prior to oral argument, Peterson filed a request to submit late authorities which we granted. Peterson then argued that SDCL 29A-3-109 suspended the running of the statutes of limitations. SDCL 29A-3-109 provides:
The running of any statute of limitations on a cause of action belonging to a decedent which has not been barred as of the date of death is suspended for one year following the decedent’s death but resumes thereafter unless otherwise tolled.
This statute only applies to a claim by the decedent. This statute does not apply to the wrongful death action because it belongs to the statutory beneficiaries, not the decedent, and therefore it does not extend *572the statute of limitations on the wrongful death claim.17
CONCLUSION
[¶ 46.] After examining the language of the statutes, the legislative intent and policy, the rules of statutory construction and the precedent from South Dakota regarding statutes of limitations, we reverse the decision of the circuit court determining that the relevant statute of limitations is three years and that Johnson and Eiesland are proper parties to the suit. We hold that the applicable statute is the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶ 47.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, AMUNDSON, Justice, and MILLER, Retired Chief Justice, (who was a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted), concur. [¶ 48.] MARTIN, Circuit Judge, dissents. [¶ 49.] GORS, Circuit Judge, for SABERS, Justice, disqualified. [¶ 50.] MARTIN, Circuit Judge, for KONENKAMP, Justice, disqualified.. Burns argues that this Court's decision in Peterson implicitly resolved this issue. In Peterson, this Court stated that “[i]t is undisputed that SDCL 15-2-14.1 and SDCL 21-5-3 apply.” Peterson, 2000 SD 27 at ¶ 10, 607 N.W.2d at 11. However, that was dicta and the issue before this Court in Peterson was:
Whether the trial court erred in holding that the state statute of limitations was not tolled or deemed satisfied during the pen-dency of Ruby’s federal court action against Doctors.
Id., 2000 SD 27 at ¶ 6, 607 N.W.2d at 10. Absent a jurisdictional defect, this Court has repeatedly held that "[a]n issue may not be presented for the first time on appeal.” SD Subseq. Injury Fund v. Federated Mut. Ins., Inc., 2000 SD 11, ¶ 29, 605 N.W.2d 166, 172. The issue of which statute of limitations applied was not previously raised by the parties and was not previously before this Court.
. The surviving spouse and children or parents and next of kin are the statutory beneficiaries.
. This legislation was also known as the Fatal Accidents Act.
.In this case, there were eighteen days from the alleged malpractice to Peterson’s death.
. In re Midland Ventures, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 300, 302 (S.D.1982) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
. Moody v. L.W. Tyler, Custom Combiners, 297 N.W.2d 179, 180 (S.D.1980); Novak v. C.J. Grossenburg and Son, 89 S.D. 308, 317, 232 N.W.2d 463, 468 (1975).
. "[Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants because they prevent claims from being brought when the relevant evidence is so old that it is unreliable....” Morgan v. Baldwin, 450 N.W.2d 783, 787 (S.D.1990) (quoting Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 688 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Okla.1984)).
. See the problems created by cancellation of claims-made insurance policies in Cromwell v. Rapid City Police Dep’t, 2001 SD 100, 632 N.W.2d 20.
. SDCL 15-2-14(3).
. SDCL 15-2-13(1).
. The "characterization of the claim” is analogous to the "categorization of a problem.” As Justice Konenkamp wrote in his concurrence in Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 SD 85, ¶ 63, 612 N.W.2d 600, 613:
To decide a question, we first categorize the problem. If a tort, we ask, what type of tort? Both the rules and the consequences applying to one tort may not apply to another.
Just as in Martinmaas, the categorization of the claim in the case now before us will determine which statute to apply.
. In Martinmaas, 2000 SD 85 at ¶¶ 26-29, 612 N.W.2d at 607-08, this Court held that sexual misconduct fell within the definition of malpractice. The concurrence in result by Justice Konenkamp and the dissent by Justice Amundson point out that rape is an intentional tort and outside the ambit of medical malpractice.
. Another consequence of medical malpractice could be additional expense to rectify the results of the malpractice. Additional medical expense is not mentioned either. Although not a personal injury per se, additional medical expense is just as clearly within the ambit of the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations and not the six-year contractual statute of limitations.
. Justice Morgan referred to the medical malpractice statute of limitations as a statute of repose in Zacher, 396 N.W.2d at 144.
. SD Const. Art. 6, § 20.
. As to the claim for personal injury and medical expenses filed by the Estate on behalf of Edward Peterson which survived his death under SDCL 15-4-1, Peterson's argument is not a late authority but a new issue. This issue was not raised in the trial court and we will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. SD Subseq. Injury Fund, 2000 SD 11 at ¶ 29, 605 N.W.2d at 172.