dissenting.
I adhere to my recent dissent in Basin Electric Power Coop. v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 541 N.W.2d 685, 690 (N.D.1996). See also Boyko v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 638, 641-42 (N.D.1987) (Meschke, J., concurring) (noting that NDCC 27-02-05.1(5) authorizes the supreme court to make rules for the “transfer of any matter to any proper court when the jurisdiction of any court has been improvidently invoked.” (emphasis added)). Because I believe the trial *69court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter this judgment, I would not dismiss Transys-tems’ appeal. I respectfully dissent.
The general appeal statute in the Administrative Agencies Practice Act allows the “appeal of an order [to] be taken to the district court designated by law, and if none is designated, then to the district court of the county in which the hearing or a part thereof was held.” NDCC 28-32-15(3)(a). The specific appeal statute in the Workers Compensation Act provides:
[T]he claimant may appeal to the district court of the county wherein the injury was inflicted or of the county in which the claimant resides. An employer may also appeal a decision of the bureau in any injury case in the manner prescribed in this section. An appeal involving injuries allegedly covered by insurance provided under contracts with extraterritorial coverage shall be triable in the district court of Burleigh County. Any appeal under this section shall be taken in the manner provided in chapter 28-32_
NDCC 65-10-01. For an appeal by an employer, then, the specific statute only states that an “employer may also appeal a decision of the bureau in any injury case in the manner prescribed in this section.” Id. As I explained in my Basin dissent, NDCC 65-10-01 thus permits (“[a]n employer may”), but does not compel, the employer to file an appeal in the same places that the claimant “may” file an appeal.
I continue to disagree, as I did in Basin, “with the majority’s narrow interpretation of the ambiguous term, ‘in the manner,’ to selectively choose the places allowed for an appeal by a claimant as the only places of appeal for an employer, as well.” 541 N.W.2d at 691 (emphasis in original). Simply put, with one exception not applicable here, NDCC 65-10-01 does not “designate” a mandatory venue for either party for purposes of NDCC 28-32-15(3)(a). Absent such a designation, the district court of the county where the hearing was held has subject-matter jurisdiction under NDCC 28-32-15(3)(a) to hear an employer’s appeal.
We should harmonize NDCC 28-32-15 and NDCC 65-10-01 to “facilitate review of agency decisions, not to avoid or impede their review.” Basin, 541 N.W.2d at 692 (Mesehke, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would interpret NDCC 65-10-01 to expand, rather than to restrict, an appellant’s venue choices. I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of this case.