¶1. Julia M. Meyer (petitioner) seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals that reversed the circuit court's maintenance determination and concluded that the court erroneously exercised its discretion.1 She asserts that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion pursuant to the maintenance statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (1995-96),2 when it considered her premarital contributions to the education of her spouse, Joseph Meyer (respondent), while he was pursuing his undergraduate and medical degrees. Because we conclude that the consideration of premarital contributions by one spouse to the education of the other falls within Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9) and that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in making its maintenance determination, we reverse the court of appeals.
¶ 2. This case arises from a relationship between the parties that spanned twelve years. During that *734period of time, the respondent received his undergraduate and medical degrees, completed his residency program in internal medicine, and was at the threshold of beginning his career as a physician.
¶ 3. The Meyers met and began dating in 1985. In the spring of 1986 they began living together at her apartment in Green Bay. At that time, the petitioner was working as a nurse, and the respondent was pursuing his undergraduate education at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay.
¶ 4. During the time the parties lived together in Green Bay, a pattern was established that would last into the parties' subsequent marriage: the petitioner financially supported the household, and the respondent focused on his education. While she remained fully employed, first as a nurse and then as an insurance claims examiner, his employment was limited to irregular work and summer jobs. He funded his education primarily with student loans. In addition to her financial role, the petitioner also performed homemaking duties and assisted the respondent with his schooling by typing some of his college papers.
¶ 5. According to the petitioner's testimony, in late 1986 the respondent gave her a "promise ring" to symbolize the parties' commitment to one another. However, the parties did not become engaged to marry until 1989. Their engagement coincided with the couple's move to Milwaukee. The respondent decided to pursue a medical education in Milwaukee following completion of his undergraduate degree. In the autumn of 1989, he began his studies at the Medical College of Wisconsin.
¶ 6. During their four-year engagement, the petitioner continued to work while the respondent attended school. In Milwaukee, they lived together *735first in an apartment and then in a house purchased in 1990. This home was purchased by the respondent's mother, but payments were made to her from the parties' joint checking account. The couple purchased a duplex in 1992 and shared in the rental income.
¶ 7. In 1993 the parties married, and their wedding ushered in several years of rapid change in their lives. At the time of their marriage, the respondent was still in medical school and the petitioner continued to work. In the spring of 1994, the respondent graduated from medical school. Following graduation the couple moved again, this time to La Crosse where the respondent began his residency program.
¶ 8. In La Crosse, the respondent worked to complete his residency, and except for periods of maternity leave, the petitioner continued to work in the insurance industry. After a short time in La Crosse, their first child was bom. Soon thereafter, the petitioner became pregnant again and a second child was bom. This second child died of sudden infant death syndrome in October 1995, while only months old. The respondent completed his residency in mid-1997. He then began practicing as a physician at a La Crosse clinic. At that time his monthly salary was $10,400 while hers was around $2,000.
¶ 9. In June 1997, just as the respondent was beginning his new career, the petitioner filed for divorce. According to her testimony, around the time of the death of their second child the couple began having marital problems that left the marriage irretrievably broken. In her original divorce petition, the petitioner requested maintenance. She later amended the petition to include a cause of action for unjust enrichment. With this claim she sought compensation for the sup*736port given to the respondent during their period of premarital cohabitation.
¶ 10. At trial, the court heard evidence relating to both causes of action. In addition to the testimony of each of the parties, the circuit court heard the testimony of an expert witness called by the petitioner. This witness testified to the value of the respondent's medical education and the petitioner's contributions to that education as calculated under the various methods approved by this court in Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984).
¶ 11. At the close of evidence, the court granted a judgment of divorce and ordered the respondent to make maintenance payments in the amount of $1,700 per month for eight years. In support of its maintenance decision, the circuit court listed numerous factors.3 It cited the substantial energy the petitioner put into the birth and care of the parties' children. It also noted her continuous employment and homemaking contributions. In addition, the court was compelled by the fact that the respondent's student loans had been repaid during the marriage in part through a second mortgage on their La Crosse home, a mortgage that the petitioner assumed under the property division.
¶ 12. The primary focus of the court's findings, however, was the "very significant and substantial" contributions made by the petitioner to the respondent's "current status" and earning capacity, both before and during the marriage. The court explained:
*737The Respondent wanted to go to school, and the Petitioner made it easy for the Respondent to do that. She typed his papers and was there for him to do his laundry and make a home for. him. It was a relationship that the Respondent clearly benefitted from, and which enabled him to obtain his current education and resulting earning capacity as a practicing physician. . . .The Petitioner shared her bed, home, and income with the Respondent with the expectation that some day she would be . a doctor's wife, and that is what she did become.
The court acknowledged that a four-year marriage would normally result in a maintenance award of a short duration. However, invoking principles of "fairness and equity," it stated that the petitioner's contributions to the respondent's earning capacity warranted the award.4
¶ 13. Prior to ordering the maintenance award, the circuit court addressed the respondent's arguments that it could not consider the petitioner's contributions to his education that occurred prior to the marriage. The court looked to Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(f), which provides that a court may consider "[t]he contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other."5 Finding no language in *738the provision restricting its application to contributions arising only during the marriage, the court found that it could properly consider those premarital factors. It noted that other provisions of the same statute, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(d),6 contain language limiting application to the marital context.
¶ 14. The respondent appealed and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's award of maintenance. The court of appeals, relying on Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987), and Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 454 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990), held that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered the premarital relationship in making its maintenance determination. The court construed our holding in Watts that unmarried persons could not pursue a property division under the divorce statutes and our discussion of legislative intent in Watts to preclude application of the Family Code to the premarital relationship.
¶ 15. With this case, we are presented with a question of statutory construction as it arises during the review of a circuit court's exercise of discretion. The amount and duration of a maintenance award are matters within the sound discretion of the circuit court. King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 247, 590 N.W.2d 480 *739(1999). We will uphold a circuit court's maintenance determination unless it erroneously exercises its discretion. Id. at 248. An erroneous exercise of discretion may arise from an error in law or from the failure of the trial court to base its decision on the facts in the record. Id. Statutory construction presents a question of law which we review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 15, ¶ 9, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162.
¶ 16. We are asked today to decide whether the circuit court, in making its maintenance determination, erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered the premarital contributions by one spouse to the other spouse's education. In order to do so, we must examine the statute on which the compensation for such contributions is based.
¶ 17. In the interpretation of any statute, we look first to the statutory language. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996). If the meaning of the statute is plain, our inquiry is at an end, and we need not look beyond the language to ascertain its meaning. Id.
¶ 18. We begin our review of this maintenance award by examining Wis. Stat. § 767.26. In applying this statute, a court has broad discretion in reaching fairness and equity through its award. Achieving such fairness and equity is a goal of any maintenance determination. LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987).
¶ 19. Section 767.26 provides a list of factors that a circuit court is to consider when making a mainte*740nance award.7 These factors are the "touchstone of analysis" in maintenance cases. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 32.
¶ 20. The factor set forth in subsection (9) directs a circuit court to consider: "The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning *741power of the other." Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9).8 We find nothing in this language hmiting the contributions to those that arose only during the marital period. This lack of limiting language indicates to us, as it did to the circuit court when it examined an identical provision, that the court may freely consider the total contributions and not merely those arising during the marriage.9
¶ 21. We know from the language of § 767.26(4) that when the legislature saw fit to limit the temporal scope of a factor, it did so explicitly. For instance, subsection (4) instructs the court to consider "[t]he educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at.the time the action commenced." Thus, under subsection (4) the inquiry is specifically directed to the education obtained during the marriage.
¶ 22. Indeed, to read the contributions to education in subsection (9) to be limited to those rendered during the marriage would render subsection (9) largely superfluous, because subsection (4) already covers education obtained during the marriage. In interpreting a statute we must avoid a construction that results in a portion of a statute being rendered *742superfluous. Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶ 30, 234 Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467.
¶23. The respondent argues that legislative intent as embodied in Wis.. Stat. § 765.001(2) prevents any construction of the statute that allows for consideration of the petitioner's premarital contributions.10 Section 765.001(2) provides a general statutory statement of legislative intent applicable to the four statutory chapters that comprise the Family Code. The statute makes a strong statement regarding the importance of marriage and family. It begins by stating that *743the Family Code is intended to "promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family." Thereafter, the legislature offers a brief catalogue of generalized policy goals and concerns and a description of the mutual obligations of the parties to a marriage.
¶24. The respondent asserts that the second sentence of § 765.001(2) should control our reading of the maintenance statute: "It is the intent of the legislature to recognize the valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at termination of the marriage by dissolution or death." He reads the sentence as limiting the contributions that may be considered to those that arise "during the marriage."
¶ 25. At oral argument the respondent's counsel advanced that the legislature may have refrained from including a time limitation in the maintenance statute because such a limitation was clearly intended by this second sentence of § 765.001(2). However, the legislative history of the statutory language undermines such a position. This second sentence was not added until 1983, six years after enactment of the Divorce Reform Act and four years after the last revision of the maintenance statute. Ch. 105, Laws of 1977; § 33, ch. 196, Laws of 1979. Moreover, the sentence was added when the legislature enacted the Marital Property Act, with which it recognized, during the marriage, the contributions of both spouses. 1983 Wis. Act 186, § 46. We will not read a restriction into § 767.26(9) based on this postdated statement of legislative intent.
¶ 26. Additionally, while we recognize that in Wis. Stat. § 765.001(3) we are directed by the legislature to liberally construe the provisions of the Family Code to effect the objectives listed in § 765.001(2), we are not inclined to allow a generalized statement of *744intent to override the plain language of a specific, substantive statutory provision. The rules of statutory construction generally require that specific statutory provisions take precedence over general provisions. State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 595-96, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996).
¶ 27. We believe a similar principle is applicable in a case such as this. On the one hand, the substantive provision is a specific factor set forth in § 767.26. On the other hand, the statement of legislative intent covers in broad fashion the entire panoply of concerns addressed by the four statutory chapters comprising the Family Code.
¶28. Our refusal to restrict the application of § 767.26(9) based on § 765.001(2) is bolstered by the fact that the various statements of legislative intent that make up § 765.001(2) bear no historical relationship to the statutory provision at issue in this case. The legislature added the controlling provision in this case, Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), to the statutes in 1979. § 33, ch. 196, Laws of 1979. It added this particular provision independent of any other § 767.26 factor. The language of subsection (9) first appeared in the identically phrased provision of the property division statute, now numbered Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(f), as part of the 1977 Divorce Reform Act. § 41, ch. 105, Laws of 1977. In contrast, some of the language of Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2) predates subsection (9) or its analog in the property division statute by almost two decades. § 4, ch. 595, Laws of 1959. The legislature added other language of the intent provision after it added subsection (9). 1983 Wis. Act 186, § 46.
¶ 29. Our decision today is consistent with the limitations of liberal construction that we have discussed in the past. We have long stated that we would *745refuse to read language into the plain language of a statute under the guise of liberal construction. Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 467 N.W.2d 772 (1991); Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969). Furthermore, "[w]hat is called a liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes a statute apply to more things or in more situations than would be the case under a strict construction." R.W.S. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 862, 871-72, 471 N.W.2d 16 (1991). Thus, the restrictive interpretation of subsection (9) urged by the respondent seems inconsistent with the concept of liberal construction, as we have generally described the concept in the past.
¶ 30. Despite the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), the court of appeals held that Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987), precludes any reading of the maintenance statute that allowed for consideration of premarital contributions. In Watts, we held that a property division under Chapter 767 was not available to unmarried couples. Id. at 519-20. We based this conclusion on a lack of legislative intent to allow unmarried couples to proceed under the divorce statutes. Id. In the case at hand, the court of appeals extended this concept to forbid consideration of premarital contributions in making maintenance determinations between divorcing parties.
¶ 31. Watts does not dictate the result reached by the court of appeals in this case. The respondent's and the court of appeal's reliance on it ignores the fundamental distinction between the facts of this case and those in Watts: unlike the parties in Watts, the parties in this case did marry and were married at the time maintenance was sought under Wis. Stat. § 767.26.
¶ 32. In Watts, the parties lived together for twelve years, never marrying. Id. at 513-14. At the eiid *746of their relationship, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover a share of the couple's property and compensation for her contributions to the relationship. Id. at 514. Her suit entailed several causes of action, among which was a property division action brought under Wis. Stat. § 767.255. Id. at 514-15. The plaintiff argued that she, the defendant, and their children constituted a "family," and therefore she was entitled to proceed under § 767.255, as it was part of the Family Code. Id. at 515. We held that unmarried cohabitants could not proceed under Wis. Stat. § 767.255, although we also concluded that the plaintiff could proceed in her causes of action based on contract, unjust enrichment, and partition. Id. at 521-38.
¶ 33. The portion of Watts relied upon by the court of appeals addressed only the availability of a proceeding under the divorce statutes. In a sense, the issue was whether an unmarried person had standing to pursue a property division under the divorce statutes. This case concerns the scope of such a statute in an action properly brought under the divorce statutes. Indeed, the action was not only proper, but when the petitioner sought to dissolve her marriage she was required to proceed under Chapter 767. Once properly proceeding under the divorce statutes, those statutory provisions control.
¶ 34. We acknowledge that in Watts we relied upon portions of Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2) in limiting the availability of a Wis. Stat. § 767.255 property division to married couples. Id. at 518-19. However, in Watts we were concerned with defining "family" and the applicability of the Family Code provisions in general. We deal here, however, with a specific statutory provision, Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), addressing a specific *747concern, the factors for a circuit court to consider in awarding maintenance payments.
¶ 35. In addition to Watts, the court of appeals relied on its opinion in Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 791, 454 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990). In Greenwald, a party to a divorce action argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to consider her premarital contributions to her husband when making its maintenance and property division determinations under the "catch-all" provisions of Wis. Stat. § 767.26(10) and § 767.255(12).11 In upholding the circuit court, the court of appeals summarily concluded that the facts in Greenwald presented "the very situation addressed in Watts." Id. at 790. We disagree.
¶ 36. Again, a pivotal distinction exists between the facts in Greenwald and the facts in Watts. In Greenwald the parties married, and in Watts they never married. Yet, the court in Greenwald extrapolated the holding in Watts for the premise that even if the parties subsequently marry, nothing premarital may be considered. Such a premise is inconsistent with the property division statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.255, addressed in Watts.
¶ 37. Under a provision of § 767.255, a court is specifically instructed to consider "[t]he property brought to the marriage by each party." Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b). The consideration of premarital property required by this statute contravenes the Greenwald court's premise that nothing premarital may be considered even if the parties subsequently marry. Thus the Greenwald court, in relying on Watts, failed to acknowledge the critical factual distinction between the two cases and also incorrectly extrapo*748lated from Watts a premise that is inconsistent with the property division statute. Thus, to the extent that the language of the Greenwald court suggests that Watts, by extension, necessarily precludes premarital considerations, such language should not be relied upon as controlling authority.
¶ 38. Finally, we note that the dissent misconstrues the scope of today's holding. We stress that under this decision, it is not cohabitation which may justify a circuit court's discretionary decision to award maintenance, but rather it is the contribution to the education of the spouse which justifies the award.
¶ 39. Our opinion today is but another addition to a line of cases that we have described as "university degree-divorce decree" cases. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982). This court has described a university degree-divorce decree case as follows:
[Wlhile one spouse pursues an undergraduate, graduate, or professional degree or license, the other works to support the couple and foregoes his or her own education or career and the immediate benefits of a second income which the student spouse might have provided. The couple typically expects that the degree will afford them a higher shared standard of living in the future. That standard of living is never realized by the supporting spouse when the marriage breaks up just as the newly educated spouse is beginning the long-awaited career.
*749Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 206-07.12
¶ 40. In such cases, we have recognized "that the supporting spouse was entitled to be fairly compensated for the contribution to the support of the student spouse." Id. at 211. Further, we have stated that the maintenance and property division statutes "provide a flexible means by which the trial court may examine all the relevant circumstances of the particular case and can, in its discretion, award just compensation to a supporting spouse by using either maintenance or property division or both." Id. at 211.
¶ 41. In essence, these university degree-divorce decree cases are about discretionary application of the relevant statutory provisions, including § 767.26(9), and the objective of fairness and equity underlying the statutes. See Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 207-11; Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 12-15. In applying these statutes the circuit court has "broad discretion in rendering a fundamentally fair and equitable decision in each case." Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 211. When discussing fairness in the context of university degree-divorce decree cases, we have said "it is unfair. . .to deny the supporting spouse a share in the anticipated enhanced earnings while the student spouse keeps the degree and all the financial rewards it promises." Id. at 207.
¶ 42. Here the circuit court determined that the language of § 767.26(9) did not restrict its consideration of the petitioner's premarital contributions to the *750respondent's education in making its maintenance determination. Moreover, the circuit court concluded that fairness and equity required this award of maintenance. Because we find no error in this exercise of discretion, we uphold the maintenance determination.
¶ 43. In sum, because a circuit court's consideration of premarital contributions by one spouse to the education of the other falls within Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in making its maintenance determination. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Meyer v. Meyer, 2000 WI App 12, 232 Wis. 2d 191, 606 N.W.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1999) (reversing and remanding a judgment of the Circuit Court for La Crosse County, Ramona A. Gonzalez, Judge).
Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version.
The circuit court also relied on these same considerations when it ordered an unequal property division. The respondent did not challenge the property division on appeal.
The circuit court also suggested that the petitioner's unjust enrichment claim supported the award of maintenance. However, it declined to make any specific findings in that regard. Despite the fact that the circuit court did not base its decision on the unjust enrichment claim, the court of appeals proceeded to engage in a discussion of the issue. Because we uphold the circuit court's award of maintenance based on our reading of Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9), we do not address the unjust enrichment claim.
The circuit court based both its property division and maintenance determinations in part on these premarital contri*738butions. The statutory section cited by the circuit court is a provision of the property division statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3X0, and is identical to a provision of the maintenance statute, namely Wis. Stat. § 767.26(9).
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.255(3)(d) instructs that the court is to consider "[t]he contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care services."
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.26 reads:
767.26 Maintenance payments. Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or in rendering a judgment in an action under s. 767.02(l)(g) or (j), the court may grant an order requiring maintenance payments to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(3) The division of property made under s. 767.255.
(4) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(7) The tax consequences to each party.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage, according to the terms of which one party has made financial or service contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other compensation in the future, where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial support of the parties.
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other.
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.
The petitioner also argues that Wis. Stat. § 767.26(8) and (10) provide a basis for the maintenance award. Because we base our decision on subsection (9), we need not address these provisions.
The dissent suggests that the legislative directive to consider the "length of the marriage" in Wis. Stat. § 767.26(1) should apply to all subsequently listed factors. Dissent at ¶ 67. Nothing in the statute indicates that subsection (1) has primacy over the other enumerated factors. Indeed, such a suggestion effectively would require us to rewrite the enumerated factors by adding limiting language where none currently exists.
Wisconsin Stat. § 765.001 reads:
765.001 Title, intent and construction of chs. 765 to 768.
(1) TITLE. Chapters 765 to 768 may be cited as "The Fámily Code".
(2) INTENT. It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. It is the intent of the legislature to recognize the valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at termination of the marriage by dissolution or death. Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of the marriage contract are more significant to society than those of other contracts, and the public interest must be taken into account always. The seriousness of marriage makes adequate premarital counseling and education for family living highly desirable and courses thereon are urged upon all persons contemplating marriage. The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the parties immediately concerned. Under the laws of this state, marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband and wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and support. Each spouse has an equal obligation in accordance with his or her ability to contribute money or services or both which are necessary for the adequate support and maintenance of his or her minor children and of the other spouse. No spouse may be presumed primarily liable for support expenses under this subsection.
(3) CONSTRUCTION. Chapters 765 to 768 shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives of sub. (2).
The catch-all provision of the property division statute is now numbered Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(m).
Although the quoted passage from Haugan mentions foregone educational or career opportunities, the opinion later states that compensation under the divorce statutes may be had for contributions alone, where there is no evidence of foregone opportunities. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 219, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984).