(concurring). I agree that under Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1985), defendant Cruse, the DSS protective services worker, was individually immune from liability. As stated in the lead opinion, under Ross individual immunity is granted to individual defendants under MCL *127691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) when they are (1) acting in the course of their employment and within the scope of their authority, (2) acting in good faith, and (3) performing discretionary acts. The lead opinion correctly recognizes the discretionary nature of the acts defendant was alleged to have negligently performed. I would further note that the acts complained of were within the scope of defendant’s authority, were undertaken in the course of defendant’s employment, and were not alleged to have been performed in bad faith. Accordingly, all three Ross criteria were satisfied in this case so that the trial court’s order of summary judgment in favor of defendant Cruse was proper.
Additionally, I agree with the concurrence to the earlier opinion in this case insofar as it would hold defendant Cruse to be protected by the Child Protection Law’s immunity provision, MCL 722.625; MSA 25.248(5). I too read the language of that section to protect a DSS protective services worker who in good faith investigates a child abuse case pursuant to the mandates of the Child Protection Law. Thus, to the extent that the trial court found MCL 722.625; MSA 25.248(5) applicable to defendant Cruse, I would also affirm the court’s order.