(dissenting).
[¶ 25.] I respectfully dissent. Almost two years ago, the majority denied Degens the right to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceeding. See In re D.M., 2004 SD 34, 677 N.W.2d 578. The Legislature acted quickly to preclude such a result in the future. See 2005 SD Sess Laws ch 140, §§ 1-3 (amending SDCL 26-7A-19 and enacting SDCL 26-7A-19.1 effective July 1, 2005); see also SDCL 26-8A-29.1. Now, the same majority denies Degens the right to intervene in the adoption proceeding.
[¶ 26.] In the prior case, this Court had the opportunity to determine whether the Degens could intervene in a subsequent adoption proceeding. D.M., 2004 SD 34, ¶ 9, 677 N.W.2d at 582. It chose not to address that issue. Id. The dissent noted,
I would respectfully point out that refusing to consider whether the Degens can intervene in a subsequent adoption proceeding merely extends the “undue delay” the trial court was concerned about. Now [this] case can go back to the circuit court for consideration of the adoption, the Degens can attempt to intervene again, the court can deny intervention and the parties can once again bring this case before this court.
Id. at ¶ 21, 677 N.W.2d at 584 (Sabers, J, dissenting). Thus, had the Court either correctly decided this case in the first instance, or at least reached the adoption issue, any further delay would have been avoided.
[¶ 27.] Now, almost two years later, the Court addresses the adoption issue and again denies Degens an opportunity to adopt their grandniece. It does so by incorrectly concluding that Degens do not have the right to intervene and by permitting DSS to ignore its internal policies. The Court also overlooks the fact that the Legislature, by amending SDCL 26-7A-19, clearly intended that individuals in De-gens’ position have an opportunity to adopt *451their relatives.8 Because intervention standards are supposed to be flexible and construed liberally, Degens should have the opportunity to intervene and adopt D.M. if it is in her best interest.9
. The concurrence accurately points out that the Legislature has now precluded parties from intervening in adoption proceedings. However, that amendment does not apply to Degens as their case was filed and determined in 2004. See majority opinion n. 3. Moreover, by prohibiting intervention in adoption proceedings, it would be assumed that a party would have had the right to intervene and in fact be given preference in the abuse and neglect proceeding. See SDCL 26-8A-29.1. Degens were unable to avail themselves of that right because the legislation was enacted after and in response to this Court's first decision. The concurrence mentions that it is too little too late for Degens to receive the benefit of the amended statutes. However, it then goes on to apply the detriment of the amended statutes and notes that the Legislature has rejected intervention in adoption proceedings. In fairness, the detriment of an amended statute should be no more retroactive than the benefit. The only reason Degens are attempting to intervene in the adoption proceeding is because this Court put them in that position by refusing to allow them to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceeding.
. Degens have a legally protected right to intervene in the adoption proceeding just as they did in the abuse and neglect proceeding. See DM., 2004 SD 34, ¶¶ 24-27, 677 N.W.2d at 584-86 (Sabers, J., dissenting). The fact that the majority and the concurrence failed to recognize Degens’ legally protected right in the prior case is no justification for not acknowledging it in this matter.