(dissenting in part, concurring in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of the governmental immunity issue. I concur with the majority’s disposition of the other issues raised by defendant.
MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) provides:
"Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed.”
A governmental agency is "engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function” when it is engaged in activities that are "sui generis governmental — of essence to governing”. See Parker v City of Highland Park, 404 Mich 183, 193, 199; 273 NW2d 413 (1978). A county, through its board of county road commissioners, is required by statute to keep all roads, bridges, and culverts within its jurisdiction and under its care and control in reasonable repair. MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121. While roads may occasionally be constructed by private entities, maintenance of a county-wide system of roads is an activity of such magnitude and public importance that it can only be effectively carried out by the government. Such an activity is, therefore, "of essence to governing”. Compare Davis v Detroit, 98 Mich App 705; 296 NW2d 341 (1980).
By MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), the Legislature waived the immunity which would otherwise *270arise under MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) in certain situations:
"Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him from such governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in section 21, chapter 4 of Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909, as amended, being section 224.21 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. No action shall be brought against the state under this section except for injury or loss suffered on or after July 1, 1965. Any judgment against the state based on a claim arising under this section from acts or omissions of the state highway department shall be payable only from restricted funds appropriated to the state highway department or funds provided by its insurer.” (Emphasis added.)
Note that under the emphasized language the immunity of a county road commission, such as defendant here, is not waived for installations which are not part of the improved portion of a highway but which are nevertheless part of maintaining a county-wide system of roads.
Plaintiff would have us hold that the maintenance of the gravel pit here was not sufficiently .related to the maintenance of a county-wide sys*271tem of roads to be regarded as part of the latter activity. However, the undisputed testimony indicated that all quarrying of gravel had ceased several years previously. At the time the accident took place, the quarry was merely the site of defendant’s stockpile of gravel for use according to the requirements of future construction or maintenance. Roads cannot be maintained in a vacuum; the county road commission must create, equip, and supply an organization for that purpose. I would hold that the gravel stockpile here was a necessary support installation for the activity of maintaining a county-wide system of roads and thus part of an activity "of essence to governing”.
My resolution of the foregoing issue requires me to address an issue which the majority does not reach. Plaintiff has cross-appealed and argues that the trial court erred by declining to place the question of intentionally created nuisance in fact before the jury. The judicially created nuisance exception to governmental immunity was reexamined by the Supreme Court in Rosario v City of Lansing, 403 Mich 124; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978). Although no majority emerged in those cases, it is clear that at least five justices agreed that an exception existed for intentionally created nuisances in fact. Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333; 283 NW2d 739 (1979). A nuisance in fact is an act, occupation, or structure which becomes a nuisance because of circumstances and surroundings. Whether a particular thing is a nuisance in fact is a question for the trier of fact. Id., 335-336. An intentional nuisance is intentional only in the sense that defendant created or caused the nuisance with full knowledge that harm to plaintiff’s interests was substan*272tially certain to follow. Rosario, supra, 143, fn 2. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion here, the term "nuisance” is not limited to conditions or activities which threaten injury to persons outside defendant’s premises. See id., 139-140, and the cases cited therein. Since my review of the record convinces me that plaintiffs pleadings and proofs were sufficient to place the question of intentional nuisance in fact before the jury, I would reverse and remand for trial on that question.