dissenting.
I dissent. I cannot accept the distinction between the bare skin of the touchee and the bare skin of the toucher which is used in the majority opinion for the purpose of creating an ambiguity in order to justify looking beyond the words of the statute to divine legislative intent.
Judicial construction of legislative enactments is narrowly restricted by well-defined parameters. “The primary principle and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the General Assembly from the words used in the statute in order to effectuate the true intent of the legislature.” State ex rel. Peach v. Bloom, 576 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Mo. banc 1979). Words must be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Burnau, 642 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Mo. banc 1982). While criminal statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of defendants and strictly against the State, nevertheless “[t]he rule of strict construction is not violated by according the language used by the legislature its full meaning in support of the policy and aim of the enactment. The rule does not compel a narrow or forced construction, out of harmony with the manifest purpose and intent of the statute or one which would exclude cases from it that are obviously within its provisions.” State v. Shell, 571 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Mo.App.1978).
The manifest purpose and intent of the prostitution statute is to outlaw the commercialization of the arousal or gratifica*641tion of sexual desire. As noted by the majority; the present statute is broader than the prior judicial definitions of prostitution in that the statute is gender-neutral in application and in that the prohibited conduct is not limited to sexual intercourse. A further addition made by the statute was the inclusion within the statutory proscription of the patronizing of a prostitute, § 567.030, RSMo 1978. Thus, not only is the selling but also the buying of sexual gratification now prohibited. The comment to 1973 Proposed Code following Volume 40A VAMS § 567.030, noting that this provision is new to Missouri Law; sets forth among the reasons for its adoption that it is unjust to punish the prostitute alone; the patrons should be subject to the same punishment. Since both are participating in the purchase and sale of sexual gratification, they are equally guilty. I submit the same equality should be applied to the clothed and the unclothed who indulge in commercialized sexual touching for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. The core of the statutory condemnation of both prostitution and patronizing is the purpose, the culpable mental state, with which both parties enter into and carry out a financial transaction. I cannot accept the conclusion that the legislature intended to base a distinction between guilt and innocence of those who engage in sexual conduct with such a culpable mental state upon who wore what and where. Such a conclusion can only be reached by the very “narrow or forced construction, out of harmony with the manifest purpose and intent of the statute” which is condemned by State v. Shell, 571 S.W.2d at 800.
I also disagree with the interpretation given in the majority opinion to the statutory phrase “any touching, manual or otherwise” as being limited to the touching of genitals by a contrivance. Such emphasis upon the accoutrements with which the parties accomplish the touching renders insignificant what is the real gist of the offenses — the giving and receiving of something of value as a consideration for sexual arousal or gratification.
I see nothing intrinsically ambiguous in the phrase “any touching, manual or otherwise” when read in the context of a statute proscribing a commercial transaction undertaken to fulfill a particular purpose. Where the touching is performed for the purpose of arousal or gratification of sexual desire and in exchange for something of value, to read into the words “any touching” a distinction between direct or indirect conduct is, in my judgment, an unnecessary and uncalled for complication of plain, ordinary language. To exclude a touching through what the evidence describes as “a real thin satin-type material” is to overlook the word “otherwise.”
It seems to me the majority opinion has approached the task of determining legislative intent from the wrong direction. Only by first observing that other sections of the Criminal Code use different language can limits and qualifications be imposed upon the plain, ordinary meaning of simple words such as “any” or “otherwise.” The entire phrase, “any touching, manual or otherwise,” is neither limited, qualified nor ambiguous unless and until we look beyond the words themselves and the context in which they are used by the legislature. But to do so where there is no intrinsic ambiguity is to use a rule of statutory construction intended to resolve ambiguities as a means of begetting an ambiguity which does not exist. When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face “this court should ... abstain from foraging among various peripheral rules of construction for the purpose of rewriting a statute under the guise of construing it.” Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo.App.1979). Since the language of § 567.-010(4)(c), given its plain, ordinary meaning, is intrinsically clear and unambiguous, I would hold we are precluded from comparing it to other legislative enactments.
Further, I would reject the contention of defendant, not reached by the majority, that the evidence failed to show that the sexual conduct was “in return for something of value” because there was no dis*642cussion of money until after the completion of the dance.
“[I]t is not necessary that illicit promises or arguments [agreements] to engage in unlawful sexual activities be in any form of expression or words, but such illicit promises or agreements may be inferred from all the attending circumstances. City of St. Louis v. Long, 395 S.W.2d 481 (Mo.App.1965)”
State v. Linder, 613 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Mo.App.1981).
The inferences which the jury could reasonably draw from the evidence amply support the conclusion that defendant’s performance of the “table” dance was in return for money. The evidence that each and every patron who was subjected to such intimacies was seen to tender money to the performer was sufficient to create an inference of a custom and an expectation on the part of the performer that she would be compensated for her endeavors. The costume with the zippered pocket containing currency also leads to an inference that defendant expected to receive payment following her performance.
Commercial exploitation of sexual desire and gratification has been denounced throughout the recorded history of mankind because of its disruptive affect upon the family, the basic unit of society. Because I believe the Missouri Legislature intended to proscribe such commercial exploitation by whatever means and in whatever manner it may be accomplished, I dissent.