(dissenting).
[¶ 41.] I dissent. The majority opinion goes out of its way to frustrate the intent of the parents to keep the farm in the family.
*851[¶ 42.] The contract for deed (CFD) provided in part:
It is understood by the parties that [Dean] is purchasing the real estate in question for the purpose of farming it; however, if [Dean] subsequently decides to quit farming, is incapacitated so he cannot farm said land, or becomes incompetent or predeceases [parents] during the life of this contract, then it is agreed between the parties that [Donald] ... shall have the first chance to buy the above-described property[.]
(emphasis added).
[¶ 43.] The majority opinion unduly exaggerates Donald’s alleged admission at oral argument. Donald’s counsel simply stated at oral argument that the provisions of
the warranty deed [were not] consistent with the contract for deed ... although that’s what was intended by the parties. And now there’s a judge saying that the warranty deed trumps the contract for deed and I think that is wrong.
The intent of the parents was to keep the farm in the family and not allow it to be sold by Dean to anyone other than Donald or another family member.
[¶ 44.] John and Florence Fisher’s conduct expressed their intent to keep the farm in the family. John’s will provided that “it is also my wish and I so direct that if Dean desires to sell the real estate that is the subject of the Contract for Deed, that my son, Donald 0. Fisher, have the first right to purchase^]” Florence’s will provided that “if my son, Dean D. Fisher ... ever desires to sell the farm real property ... my elder son, Donald 0. Fisher, shall have the first right to purchase the property[.]” The will also provided that the right of purchase would extend to Donald’s children.
[¶ 45.] Because the parents intended for the farm to stay in the family, Dean’s purported payoff of the balance due under the CFD did not extinguish Donald’s right to purchase. This is especially so because Dean’s payoff of the CFD resulted from the violation of the provision providing Donald the first right of purchase. In other words, the majority opinion is allowing Dean to violate the CFD provisions and Donald’s first right of purchase as long as he pays off the CFD with the proceeds of the purchase. Nonsense. The CFD does not give Dean the right to sell the land to a stranger to finance the payoff because the sale is in violation of Donald’s first right of purchase. One should not get the benefit of ending “the life of the contract” by violating it.
[¶ 46.] In addition, Donald should have had the opportunity to buy the land when Dean quit farming. The majority opinion states that “renting the land is sufficient to constitute farming.” While this statement may be true under some circumstances, it is not true under these circumstances. Dean moved to Watertown in 1982, sold all of his farming equipment, and “rented” the land to his neighbors from 1982-1987. Clearly, he decided to quit farming. Even-after he returned to Marshall County, he continued to “rent” the land to others.
[¶ 47.] In fact, Dean did more than rent the land to others, he sold it to others. Here, Dean quit farming, quit paying on the CFD and sold the land to Landreths in violation of his parents’ intent and condition. Because of financial difficulties, he was delinquent in his payments on the contract for deed. To avoid a foreclosure action on his interest in the CFD, Dean essentially sold the land to his neighbors, the Landreths, who arranged for or did all of the farming and received all the profits. *852Dean’s actions are inconsistent with an intent to farm the land. Therefore, Donald’s right to purchase the land was triggered when Dean quit farming and upon the sale of the land to the Landreths.
[¶ 48.] The trial court erred in its determination that, once Dean paid Donald the balance due under the CFD, Donald had “no further rights, title, encumbrance, or interest [in] the real estate set forth in the Contract for Deed whatsoever[.]” As stated: One should not get the benefit of ending “the life of the contract” by violating it.
[¶ 49.] I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this writing.