(dissenting). I respectfully *368dissent. The trial court properly found no genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(0(10).
When asserting its own C(10) motion, defendant claimed that no genuine issue of material fact exists. However, in responding simultaneously to plaintiffs motion and later on appeal, defendant argues that there is a factual issue and that it involves the meaning of "internal rate of return.” Defendant claims that the court unjustifiably relied on the expert’s opinion when ruling in plaintiffs favor.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim. The moving party has the initial burden of supporting its position by "affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.” MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b); Ward v Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc, 186 Mich App 120, 134; 463 NW2d 442 (1990).
Although the predecessor rule, GCR 1963, 117.3, required the submission of an affidavit in support of the motion, MCR 2.116(0(10) is satisfied by submission of any form of documentary evidence. Michigan National Bank-Oakland v Wheeling, 165 Mich App 738, 742-743; 419 NW2d 746 (1988); 1 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice (3d ed), pp 304-305.
Under the current applicable court rule, the party opposing the motion is then required to respond with affidavits or other evidentiary materials to show the existence of a factual dispute. MCR 2.116(G)(4); McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 115-116; 469 NW2d 284 (1991). When the opposing party fails to submit such evidence, relying instead merely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings, summary disposition is proper. Id.
*369In this case, plaintiff adequately carried the initial burden of producing evidence that it had an obligation under the contract to pay only 14.5 percent interest, not 15.5 percent. Ward, supra, 134. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit and two letters in support of its position: (1) a letter-opinion from the court-appointed expert; (2) an affidavit of a partner in the plaintiff partnership; and (3) a letter from plaintiff’s accountant.
Defendant argues that the judge improperly delegated his authority and that it did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the expert as to his opinion. However, defendant did not object to the appointment of the expert. Nor did it attempt to cross-examine or depose him. Defendant raised no objections until the court ruled in plaintiff’s favor. The record reveals nothing improper about the appointment. See MRE 706(a). Defendant had ample opportunity to question the expert.
The expert’s opinion constituted reliable proof to which the expert could have testified supporting plaintiff’s position that "internal rate of return” was unambiguous and that defendant incorrectly applied it. Even assuming, as the majority stresses, that plaintiff’s supporting documents did not strictly satisfy the requirements of MCR 2.116(G) (3)(b), the trial court was familiar with the authenticity of the expert’s report. Under the unique facts of this case, the objectives of MCR 2.116(G)(3) (b) were met. Wheeling, supra, 743.
After submission of the expert’s letter, it became incumbent on defendant to respond with something in order to establish a genuine issue of fact. Defendant put forth nothing suggesting that the contract term was subject to any other reasonable interpretation than that advanced by plaintiff and endorsed by the court’s expert. Instead, it presented only the unsworn argument of its counsel *370that the disputed term was unambiguous and correctly applied by defendant.
The fact that the trial judge may not have known the meaning of the term did not render it ambiguous. A determination that ambiguity existed could only properly have been made, under MCR 2.116(G)(4), once defendant responded to plaintiffs motion for summary disposition with an affidavit, deposition, admission or documentary evidence.
If defendant had submitted evidence to the trial judge indicating that the expert’s opinion was flawed, summary disposition would have been improper. However, given defendant’s complete failure to meet plaintiff’s proofs, the trial court was left with no choice but to dismiss the case. McCart, supra, 115-116.
The decision should be affirmed.