(dissenting). In my view, this case involves classic questions of fact that should be decided by the trier of fact. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the summary disposition granted in favor of defendant.
*97I
Although defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the circuit court did not rule that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Rather, the circuit court held that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff because the alleged towel on the stairway was an open and obvious danger. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606; 537 NW2d 185 (1995); Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). With regard to defendant’s motion, plaintiff’s status as either an invitee or licensee was not litigated because it was not material.
At the outset, I agree with the majority that, as a social guest, plaintiff was a licensee, not an invitee. Preston v Sleziak, 383 Mich 442, 451-453; 175 NW2d 759 (1970). I also agree that this Court has the authority to affirm a judgment when the lower court reaches a clearly correct result albeit for the wrong reason. Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 488; 542 NW2d 905 (1995); State Mut Ins Co v Russell, 185 Mich App 521, 528; 462 NW2d 785 (1990).
Addressing the issue raised sua sponte by the majority, I am mindful of the appropriate standards for deciding motions brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10):
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Panich v Iron Wood Products Corp, 179 Mich App 136, 139; 445 NW2d 795 (1989). In deciding such a motion, the trial court must consider the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions, and other documentary evidence, MCR 2.115(G)(5), and must give the nonmoving party the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 373; 501 *98NW2d 155 (1993); Rice v ISI Mfg, Inc, 207 Mich App 634, 635-636; 525 NW2d 533 (1994); Morganroth v Whitall, 161 Mich App 785, 788; 411 NW2d 859 (1987). Although the court should be liberal in finding genuine issues of material fact, summary disposition is appropriate when the party opposing the motion fails to provide evidence to establish a material factual dispute. McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 115; 469 NW2d 284 (1991); Mascarenas v Union Carbide Corp, 196 Mich App 240, 243; 492 NW2d 512 (1992). [Porter, supra at 484-485.]
Regrettably, some cases such as Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan v Stark, 437 Mich 175, 184-185; 468 NW2d 498 (1991), continue to cite Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 371-373; 207 NW2d 316 (1973), for the proposition that
[w]hen ruling on a summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must determine whether the kind of record which might be developed, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [Emphasis added.]
With the greatest respect, I disagree with Farm Bureau and its author, Justice Griffin, regarding the construction of MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Rizzo was a 1973 decision that construed the then applicable General Court Rules of 1963 (GCR 1963). Although our current Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (MCR) are based in large part on the former rules, many significant changes exist between the former and present rules of practice. The standards for deciding motions for summary disposition are one area of substantial change. In particular, our present rules contain a new provision that requires a party opposing a motion for summary disposition brought *99pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) to submit documentary evidence to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(G)(4) provides:
A motion under subrule (C)(10) must specifically identify the issues as to which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him or her.
Under the present rule, and contrary to the former rule as construed by Rizzo, the court is not to determine “the kind of record which might be developed.” (Emphasis added.) Rather, the court must decide whether the party opposing the motion has established with documentary evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
During the same month that the Supreme Court decided Farm Bureau, the Court also acknowledged that Rizzo had been superseded by the Michigan Court Rules of 1985. In McCart, supra at 115, the Supreme Court stated:
In this case, plaintiff did not specify any facts in opposition to defendant’s motion in any “[affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence,” MCR 2.116(G)(3), instead simply stating in his responsive plead*100ing that he would produce at trial evidence that defendant’s economic necessity rationale was a pretext.4
The McCart Court held that a promise to develop a record in the future was insufficient to withstand a motion under subrule C(10). I agree with McCart and would follow it and Quinto rather than Farm Bureau.1
n
In the present case, there are genuine issues of material fact. These factual questions include whether the towel was on the stairway and whether defendant knew or had reason to know of the condition. See, generally, 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 342, p 210. These factual issues should be submitted to the jury, even if “the evidence that there was a towel at all is extremely slim,” (ante at 94, n 2), and plaintiffs testimony is “uncorroborated” (id. at 95).2 Questions of credibility are normally reserved for the trier of fact. Blase v Appicelli, 195 Mich App 174, 179; 489 NW2d *101129 (1992); Arbelius v Poletti, 188 Mich App 14, 19; 469 NW2d 436 (1991).
In deciding motions for summary disposition, “[t]he court may not make factual findings or weigh credibility,” Manning v Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 689; 509 NW2d 874 (1993). Further, “ ‘[t]he fact allegations in the affidavits [depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence] of the party opposing the motion must be considered to be true.’ ” Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472, 475; 444 NW2d 114 (1989), quoting with approval 7 Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed), § 43.12, p 30.
According to plaintiff’s testimony, the towel was not present when he ascended the stairs for the evening. Later, after defendant retired, plaintiff, while descending the stairs in the middle of the night, tripped and fell on a towel that was lying on the stairway. Under these facts, it is reasonable to infer that the towel was placed or came to rest on the stairs between the time that plaintiff retired and the time defendant retired. Whether defendant knew or had reason to know of the towel is a question of fact. Defendant’s testimony that she did not see the towel when she went to bed is not dispositive of the factual issue whether she breached her duty to plaintiff. White v Badalamenti, 200 Mich App 434, 437; 505 NW2d 8 (1993); see Restatement 2d, § 342. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis.
in
With regard to the issue argued by the parties and decided by the lower court, I agree with plaintiff that the towel lying on the dimly lit stairway was not an open and obvious danger as a matter of law. Only if *102the stairway were illuminated would the danger have been seen by casual observation. In Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Industries, Inc, 436 Mich 673, 695; 462 NW2d 348 (1990), quoting American Law of Products Liability, 3d, § 33:26, p 56, the Supreme Court defined an open and obvious danger as follows:
“What is ‘open and obvious’ has been defined as [1] what is visible, [2] what is a well known danger, or [3] what is discernible by casual inspection.”
Here, accepting plaintiffs testimony as true, the danger was not visible. In addition, there was no evidence that the danger was well known to plaintiff or anyone else. Accordingly, the issue becomes whether the danger was discernible by casual inspection. Defendant would construe the term “casual inspection” to include the affirmative act of using artificial lighting. Plaintiff, however, would define the term as inspecting in a casual manner the condition as it then existed. I agree with plaintiffs position. While a detailed or thorough inspection would entail the use of available lighting, a casual inspection implies no such affirmative action other than to see what is there to be seen. See, generally, Knight v Gulf & Western Properties, Inc, 196 Mich App 119; 492 NW2d 761 (1992). In my view, plaintiffs failure to activate the stairway light is evidence relevant and material to the issue of plaintiffs comparative negligence, not defendant’s duty.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Such a mere promise to offer factual support at trial was categorized as a “pleading” under the pre-1985 court rules, see, e.g., Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 377; 207 NW2d 316 (1973), and, as such, is precisely what is now insufficient under the new requirements of MCR 2.116(G)(4), enacted in 1985. See Staff Comment to MCR 2.116: “Subrule (G)(4) is new. . . . [L]anguage ... is added, requiring the party opposing the motion to respond with affidavits or other evidentiary materials . . . , rather than relying on the allegations or denials in pleadings.” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, I note that in Farm, Bureau the recited subrule C(10) standard was dicta.
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of plaintiffs testimony as “ever-changing.” Ante at 95. Plaintiffs sworn deposition testimony is consistent.