State v. Booker

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

¶ 33. (concurring). I agree that the conviction should be affirmed. I write separately because two subjects raised by the majority opinion require further discussion. First, I discuss State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891, and its relevance to the instant case. Second, I discuss the original writing rule.

HH

¶ 34. The parties discuss the Trochinski case at length and debate its applicability to the case at hand.

¶ 35. In Trochinski, this court addressed the defendant's motion to withdraw a no contest plea. A no contest plea is treated for criminal law purposes the same as a guilty plea.

¶ 36. When an accused pleads guilty and admits guilt, the circuit court must determine whether a sufficient factual basis exists for the guilty plea.1 At a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after *67sentencing, an accused has the burden of showing "manifest injustice" by clear and convincing evidence. One of the grounds for finding manifest injustice is that no factual basis for the plea exists. In other words, an accused has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that no factual basis exists to support the conclusion that the conduct an accused admits actually falls within the charge. White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978).

¶ 37. It is within the discretion of the circuit court to determine whether an accused should be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea.2 Therefore, an appellate court will reverse a circuit court's denial of an accused's request to withdraw a guilty plea only if the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.3 Upon review of a circuit court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, an appellate court is required to determine whether the circuit court's order was based on the facts and on a correct interpretation and application of the law.

¶ 38. Trochinski was charged with showing a set of ten nude photographs of himself to a girl who was 17 years and three months old. In addition, the defendant gave the 17-year-old a questionable copy of a letter from Playgirl indicating that his nude photos would be published, and a letter to the 17-year-old inviting her to *68review the photos.4 The information charged Trochinski with the same offense with a 15-year-old girl. Pursuant to a plea agreement, (1) Trochinski pleaded no contest to the one charge relating to the 17-year-old; (2) the State dismissed the count relating to the 15-year-old; and (3) the count relating to the 15-year-old was to be read into the record for purposes of sentencing.5 At the plea hearing, the circuit court concluded, without looking at the photographs, that there was sufficient evidence to support the plea of no contest to the charge relating to the 17-year-old.6

¶ 39. This court concluded in Trochinski (1) that the circuit court could properly impliedly conclude without seeing the photos that the facts were sufficient to support the plea; and (2) that after viewing the nude photos this court could conclude as a matter of law that the facts were sufficient to support the plea. Thus, this court concluded that the circuit court had not erred.7

*69¶ 40. The instant case involves a guilty verdict. The parts of the videotape described in the testimony were of a more offensive nature than the photos in Trochinski and the minors were younger than the 17-year-old who was the basis of the charge to which Trochinski pleaded no contest. In the instant case the minors were 12, 13, and 14 years old.

¶ 41. An appellate, court reviews the jury verdict to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a jury guilty verdict, "the test is not whether this court is convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt but whether this court can conclude the trier of facts could, acting reasonably, be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of such guilt from the evidence it had a right to believe and accept as true.... [The] evidence, when considered most favorably to the state, must be so insufficient in probative value that it can be said that no trier of facts, acting reasonably, could be convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt."8

¶ 42. The State argues that the video in the present case was at least as offensive as the photographs at issue in Trochinski and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.9 I agree with the State.

*70¶ 43. As I see it, if the defendant in Trochinski could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that a description of the nude photos was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the variable obscenity statute in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant in the instant case could not show that the descriptions of the video, viewed most favorably to the State, are so lacking in probative value that no reasonable trier of fact could be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the elements of the variable obscenity statute were met.

¶ 44. Even without the Trochinski decision, I conclude that the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to support the guilty verdict reached by the jury.

II

¶ 45. I also conclude that the original writing rule (Wis. Stat. ch. 910) may apply to the videotape in the instant case, though the circuit court might have reasonably concluded that there is a valid exception to the rule had it considered the issue.

¶ 46. In the instant case, the defendant did not object to the testimony regarding the videotape based on the best evidence rule. The original writing rule was not raised on appeal, but was raised by this court.10

¶ 47. I write to remind counsel and the bench that Wisconsin does indeed have an original writing rule, even though the rule has not appeared in any recent appellate cases.11 For a discussion and explanation of *71chapter 910, see the Judicial Council Committee's and Federal Advisory Committee's Notes printed at 59 Wis. 2d R350-366.

¶ 48. Under Wis. Stat. § 910.02, "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in chs. 901 to 911, s. 137.21, or by other statute." A videotape is a photograph for the purposes of chapter 910.12

¶ 49. The original writing rule seems applicable in the instant case because the State sought to prove the content of the videotape. That is, the State was required to prove the content of the videotape and that the content is harmful to minors as defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.11(l)(b). I need not, and do not, resolve the question of whether the voluminous records exception or any other exception to the original writing rule would have applied in the instant case. See Wis. Stat. § 910.06 (content of voluminous writings, recording, or photographs may be presented in summary form).

¶ 50. In sum, I write separately to expand upon the majority opinion's discussion of the Trochinski case *72and to write about the original writing rule, a rule that may have been forgotten as we mouth the generally accepted proposition that Wisconsin does not have a "best evidence rule."

State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶ 14, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836. The purpose of this rule is to make sure that when a defendant is pleading guilty, he understands the charges against him and is not pleading guilty on facts insufficient to support the charges. White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969)).

See also Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) (2003-04), which states:

*67(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall do all of the following:
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged.

White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491.

Id.; Hatcher v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 559, 564, 266 N.W.2d 320 (1978).

State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶ 5, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891.

Id,., ¶¶ 8-9.

Id., ¶ 50 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).

I dissented in Trochinski, concluding that the circuit court committed an error of law that the facts were sufficient to support the plea. Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶ 51-58 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("The complaint and Statement of Probable Cause simply state that the defendant showed photographs of himself nude to a young woman who was then seventeen years and three months of age. That's it. Not all nude photos shown to a person over the age of seventeen but below the' age of eighteen violate the statute."). On reviewing the entire record, I further concluded that the facts were not sufficient,to support the plea. Id., ¶¶ 58-63 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). I still disagree with the result in Trochinski.

State v. Richardson, 44 Wis. 2d 75, 77, 170 N.W.2d 775 (1969). See also State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507-08, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).

The court of appeals concluded that without the whole tape, its literary, artistic, and educational value could not be ascertained. "Had the statute required only a finding that the tape contained offensive sexually explicit conduct, then perhaps the evidence would have been sufficient." State v. Booker, 2005 WI App 182, ¶ 34, 286 Wis. 2d 747, 704 N.W.2d 336. I do not *70address the interpretation and application of the statute when only explicitly sexual material (not the whole tape) is shown to the victim.

See majority op., ¶ 9 n.2.

7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 1001.1 (2006), discusses the "myth of the best evidence *71rule" and points out that neither Wisconsin nor federal law establishes a general hierarchy of evidence. Professor Blinka explains, however, that various provisions in chapter 910 of the statutes establish a rule of preference with regard to original writings, recordings, and photographs. He predicts that technological advances may create difficulties with this rule in the near future.

For further discussion of the original document rule, see 2 John W Strong, McCormick on Evidence ch. 23 (5th ed. 1999).

Wis. Stat. § 910.01(2) (" 'Photographs' include still photographs, X-ray films, and motion pictures."). A videotape is a form of motion picture. See 7 Blinka, supra note 11, § 1001.3. A videotape is also, presumably, a recording.