¶ 55. (concurring) . I agree with the result reached by the court: The repeater enhancement to the defendant's sentence *379must be vacated. The State's significant amendment of the repeater allegation after a guilty verdict is prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).
¶ 56. I write separately to express my disagreement with the court's rewriting of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) to allow significant amendments to the charging documents after a guilty verdict.
¶ 57. I also write separately to explain that CCAP data are not an official report under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and therefore CCAP data alone are insufficient to make a prima facie case of repeater status required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). Furthermore, CCAP data are not sufficient for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the repeat offense allegation.
1—
¶ 58. This court and the court of appeals have been chipping away for over a decade at the requirements in Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) (2003-04)1 that prior convictions forming the basis for sentence enhancement based on repeater status must be alleged in the complaint, information, or indictment before or at arraignment and before acceptance of any plea.
¶ 59. I say, enough already. The thrust of the statute is that the State must allege the prior offenses before the accused pleads. If the State cannot figure out *380the prior offenses before a plea is accepted, the statute allows the court to give the district attorney a reasonable time to investigate prior offenses before the court takes the plea. What else can the legislature say to require that the State make the allegations of prior offenses before the accused pleads?
¶ 60. Previous cases have permitted the State to make minor amendments to its pleading alleging prior convictions in support of a repeat offender sentence enhancement slightly after arraignment and after a plea has been accepted. Here, the court extends the rule of amendments and, for the first time, declares that the pleading may be significantly amended after the trial is complete and when the defendant does not admit to the allegations of habitual criminality.
¶ 61. The present case differs significantly from the post-State v. Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), line of cases, in which the court held that the State's post-plea amendments did not violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). In those cases, the court decided that even though the State complied with the statute, the court must nevertheless determine whether the amendment prejudiced the accused. Considering prejudice is required whenever a State's pleading is amended.
¶ 62. In the instant case the State did not comply with the statute. No way! After a jury trial, the State significantly changed the repeater allegation from three misdemeanors to one felony. This fact pattern cannot be squeezed into the statute or prior case law.
¶ 63. The case law has already accorded the State more than sufficient flexibility to be able to amend its pleading to allege properly a defendant's repeater status. The State should not be able to completely revise the penalty enhancement allegation after the guilt *381phase of the trial is complete. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) does not permit such an amendment. The legislature has established a rule. A rule is a rule. The rule should be followed.
¶ 64. I divide this part of the opinion into three parts. First, I discuss the text and statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). Second, I discuss the case law and explain why this case can be distinguished from cases that interpret Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) to permit the State's post-plea amendment. Third, I set forth my proposed approach to applying Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).
A
¶ 65. I begin with the text of the statute. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) states that "any applicable prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea."
¶ 66. The statute does not explicitly prohibit the State from alleging prior convictions after a plea is accepted. Rather, it sets forth when an allegation of prior convictions may be made: before arraignment and the acceptance of any plea. Because Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not clearly set forth an exclusive procedure by which to allege prior convictions, it could be interpreted to allow the State to allege prior convictions at other times.
¶ 67. This court has, however, previously concluded that the statutory history does not support this reading of the statute. After an exhaustive discussion of the history of the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), in State v. Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), the court concluded that "[t]he statutory changes *382make clear that the legislature has established the time of arraignment and of any plea acceptance as the cut-off point after which time a defendant can no longer face exposure to repeater enhancement for the crime set forth in the charging document and pleaded to by the defendant at arraignment."2
¶ 68. In the instant case, prior to the plea, the State alleged three misdemeanors as the factual basis for the defendant's repeater status. In the complaint, the State did not allege any prior felony conviction as the factual basis for its repeater allegation. By the time the State finally alleged the prior felony conviction (at the sentencing hearing), the defendant had been arraigned, plead not guilty, and been found guilty by a jury.
¶ 69. In the instant case, in rejecting the defendant's objection to the State's shift to the felony conviction, the circuit court stated that "[t]he criminal complaint is a notice document to give the defendant notice ... that the State intends to ask the [cjourt to find that the defendant is a habitual criminal under the law." This statement is, of course, not an accurate statement of the law. Were this an accurate statement, the State would merely have to put forth in its complaint that it intended to seek repeater status under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.
¶ 70. The State must do more than merely give notice that it will ultimately bring forth a showing of *383previous offenses justifying sentencing as a repeater. The State must give notice so that an accused can determine the increase in penalty and determine whether the State can prove the particular prior convictions. With this notice an accused can determine how to plead to the present offense.3 Depending on whether an accused thinks the State can prove the prior convictions, an accused may be more or less willing to enter a guilty plea to the present charge or to seek a negotiated plea. That is why the statute requires notice before the plea. Without this notice an accused is deprived of the chance to meaningfully assess the likelihood of the State's ability to prove the prior conviction and does not have an adequate basis on which to enter his plea and prepare his defense.4
¶ 71. It seems clear that the State's significant amendment of its pleadings after the jury verdict is not authorized by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).
B
¶ 72. In examining the case law applying Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), I begin with Martin/Robles, in which this court considered two cases regarding an amendment to a repeat offender allegation. In one case, the *384defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After the arraignment, but before trial, the State was granted leave to amend the complaint to add a repeater allegation.5 In the other case, the complaint also did not contain the repeater allegation. In that case, the repeater allegation was added to the complaint on the first day of trial, but before the trial began.6
¶ 73. In Martin/Robles, this court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not permit the addition of an allegation of repeat offender status after arraignment and acceptance of a plea when none was originally pleaded by the State. The court also stated that proof of prejudice is irrelevant under § 973.12(1).7 The court explained:
[P]roof of prejudice is an irrelevant consideration under sec. 973.12(1), Stats. The legislature has established a rule. Regardless of the kind of plea entered in response to the charges alleged at arraignment, the defendant's plea will be more meaningful if he or she is aware of the extent of potential punishment which ensues from a conviction of the crime.8
¶ 74. Notwithstanding the fact that the court held the State to the text of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) in Martin/Robles, the ipost-Martin/Robles case law suggests a view of the statute more lenient to the State. In cases after Martin/Robles, the State pleaded repeater status before the arraignment and acceptance of the plea, but later sought to amend the repeater allegations.
¶ 75. On several occasions, this court and the court of appeals have permitted post-plea amendments *385to the prior convictions alleged in a complaint in support of a repeat offender sentence enhancer as satisfying Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). While the cases ease the restrictions on amendments to the State's allegations of repeater status — a post-plea amendment is not a per se violation of the Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) — the cases can he distinguished from the instant case, in which the court keels over, bending backwards in favor of leniency to the State.
¶ 76. In State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995), the complaint described the prior convictions but erroneously stated the penalty enhancer for one of the charges against the accused as six years when the maximum enhancement was only three years. The accused pleaded not guilty. Nine days after the plea was entered, and before trial, the accused moved to strike the enhancer on the basis of the error. The State conceded the error and moved for leave to amend the information to correct the error; the motion was granted. The accused was tried, convicted, and sentenced with the amended enhancer. The accused appealed the sentence, arguing that the amendments to the penalty enhancer violated Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).9 This court unanimously affirmed Gerard's sentence. The court concluded that the mistake did not affect the sufficiency of notice and that the amendment complied with Wis. Stat. § 973.12G).10
¶ 77. The Gerard court turned to the issue of prejudice, concluding that prejudice is always a consideration with regard to amending a charging docu*386ment.11 Thus, even when the court concludes that the State's amendment is authorized by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), the court must consider whether the defendant was prejudiced.
¶ 78. In considering prejudice, this court emphasized that the accused, fully aware of the actual prison sentence he faced if convicted, failed to move to withdraw his not guilty plea and plead again. The court therefore concluded that the accused was not prejudiced by the State's clerical error in stating the maximum penalty faced by the defendant.12
¶ 79. The instant case is unlike Gerard in two important respects. First, the amendment in Gerard was a correction of an error in calculating the maximum sentence resulting from the enhancement. The State, presumably by clerical error or error in interpreting the law, overstated the accused's maximum exposure because of the enhancer as six years instead of three years.
¶ 80. In the instant case, on the other hand, the State completely changed the basis of the sentence enhancer, dropping the three prior misdemeanors originally relied upon and replacing them with a felony conviction.
¶ 81. Second, in the instant case, the amendment occurred after the verdict; it occurred at sentencing. In Gerard, in considering prejudice, the court emphasized the accused's failure to move to withdraw his not guilty plea before sentencing so he could plead again. The defendant in the instant case had already been tried and found guilty. Withdrawal of the plea is not an *387alternative here. I need not reach the issue of prejudice here because I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not allow the amendment.
¶ 82. In State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996), the State alleged three prior misdemeanor convictions for the repeat offender sentence enhancement. A plea of not guilty was entered. The accused and the State then entered into plea negotiations whereby the accused agreed to plead no contest to certain charges in exchange for other charges being dropped. The State amended the information and added a fourth misdemeanor as part of the repeater enhancement because one of the misdemeanors was on appeal and the State wanted to be sure that if that conviction were reversed three convictions remained. The amended information was filed and the accused entered a plea of no contest to the amended information, objecting to the amendment but stipulating to the facts of the four convictions.
¶ 83. In other words, the accused in Campbell was allowed to withdraw his initial not guilty plea, the State was allowed to amend the information, and the accused was allowed to enter a new plea to the amended information. Similarly, in State v. Fields, 2001 WI App 297, ¶¶ 2-3, 8, 11-14, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 636 N.W.2d 897, the court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) was satisfied when the State amended the pénalty enhancement before the plea of no contest was accepted. In effect, a second arraignment occurred after the amendment.
¶ 84. Even though the statutory requirements were met, the court of appeals in both Campbell and Fields (adhering to Gerard's rule that prejudice is always a consideration with regard to amending a charging *388document) went on to determine that the accused was not prejudiced by the amendment.13
¶ 85. Although both the instant case and Campbell involve a new allegation of a prior conviction, the two cases are easily distinguished. Campbell addressed an amendment after the accused pleaded not guilty, and the accused was allowed to replead after the amendment. In the instant case, however, the defendant does not have the option to replead.
¶ 86. This court revisited Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) in State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115. In Stynes, the complaint alleged prior convictions dated March 18, 1998. The accused's prior convictions were actually dated March 17, 1998. The accused pleaded not guilty and a jury found him guilty of all the charges. After he was sentenced, the accused moved to have the enhanced sentence commuted because he was not provided notice of the prior convictions under § 973.12(1). The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and reduced the defendant's sentence to a sentence without the penalty enhancement.14
¶ 87. Observing that the "error of one calendar day did not mislead or confuse Stynes" and that the erroneous conviction date did not violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1),15 this court reversed the court of appeals and held that the defendant was "provided with the information necessary to identify which of his prior *389convictions would be used to establish his repeater status."16
¶ 88. In Stynes, this court made clear that an accused must be provided with information to identify which of his prior convictions would he used to establish repeater status. It is clear in the instant case that the defendant was not provided notice of which of his prior convictions would be used to establish his repeater status because the only prior conviction relied upon by the State was not alleged until the sentencing hearing.
¶ 89. In the instant case, the majority opinion makes much of the fact that the amendment after the jury verdict did not prevent the defendant from assessing his maximum potential penalty before he pleaded because the enhanced sentence was the same under the felony as it was under the three misdemeanors.17 I disagree with the majority opinion.
¶ 90. Part of an accused's calculus in determining how to plead includes a meaningful assessment of the maximum penalty to which he or she could be subjected as a result of the enhancer and a meaningful assessment of whether the State can prove the predicate prior convictions to justify an enhanced sentence. Thus, an accused might be relying on the fact that the State cannot prove the alleged prior convictions at sentencing.18 When the State significantly amends the alleged *390prior convictions after a jury verdict, the State has altered the accused's assessment of the maximum penalty to which he or she could be subjected as a result of the penalty enhancement.
¶ 91. State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991), differs from the other cases. In Wilks, the court of appeals did not allow the State's amendment of the repeater allegation. In Wilks, the State alleged a May 24, 1986 forgery conviction as the basis for the accused's repeater status. The defendant pleaded no contest to the offense, believing that the State could not convict him as a repeater.19 During an adjournment before sentencing, and after the accused entered a no contest plea, the State conceded that the May 24, 1986, forgery conviction did not exist and instead moved to use a July 3, 1985 forgery conviction *391as the basis for repeater status; the motion was granted.20
¶ 92. The court of appeals in Wilks did not allow the State to correct the error. Rather the court of appeals commuted the enhanced sentence, concluding that the accused did not have notice prior to the entering and acceptance of his plea of the prior conviction upon which the State would rely.21 The court of appeals in Wilks interpreted Martin/Robles "to bar post-plea repeater amendments which meaningfully change the basis upon which the defendant assessed the extent of possible punishment at the time of plea."22
¶ 93. In Stynes, this court distinguished Wilks based on the obvious fact that the error in Stynes was a misstatement of the prior conviction by one day, whereas in Wilks there was no obvious connection between the date of the crime alleged and the date of the prior conviction the State ultimately relied upon.23
¶ 94. The instant case is more like Wilks than it is like Stynes. Unlike Stynes, in which the accused clearly had notice prior to trial of the prior convictions to be relied upon by the State, the accused in the instant case had no such notice. Prior to sentencing, there was no *392way for the defendant in the instant case to know that the State would rely on allegations of a prior felony conviction.
¶ 95. Indeed, the notice in the instant case was probably less effective than the notice in Wilks. In Wilks, the accused was at least aware that the State was going to rely on a prior forgery conviction, even though the year of the conviction was erroneous. In the instant case, the State shifted from relying on three misdemeanors to relying on an unrelated felony. Surely, if the State cannot change from a felony listed in one year to a similar felony listed in another year, the State cannot change from three misdemeanors to a previously unmentioned felony.
¶ 96. Because the defendant in the instant case was not informed of the prior offenses on which the repeat offender sentence enhancement ultimately relied, Stynes dictates that the defendant was not provided with adequate notice to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) or due process. Stynes makes clear that an accused has the right to have notice of the prior offenses upon which the State relies before the accused enters a plea. Without explanation or discussion, the majority abandons this rule.
¶ 97. As I see it, allowing the State to change completely the factual basis for its repeater allegation during sentencing in the instant case "is yet another example of the lower burden this court places on the State when depriving a person of his or her liberty than it places on private litigants in civil actions."24 The State should not be permitted such leniency when the *393deprivation of a person's liberty is at stake. As I stated in my concurring opinion in Stynes:
This court's jurisprudence thus upsets a bedrock principle in our Constitution that because "the accused dining a criminal prosecution has at stake an interest of immense importance" the burden on the State in a criminal prosecution is the highest burden required of any litigant and the margin of error allowed is the lowest.25
c
¶ 98. I therefore once again propose a bright-line rule adhering to the text of the statute and the case law. If an accused pleads guilty or no contest, and the circuit court accepts that plea, if the State thereafter wants to amend the pleadings on the repeater enhancement, the circuit court shall allow the amendment and allow the accused to replead. If an accused pleads not guilty, the State may amend the charging document to accurately and precisely recite all predicate convictions, including the offenses of convictions alleged, whether the offense was a felony or misdemeanor, and the date of the conviction, prior to the impaneling of the jury and the start of a trial. If the State amends the charging document, the circuit court shall allow the accused to replead. If an accused pleads not guilty, the State may not amend its pleadings on the sentence enhancement after the impaneling of the jury and the start of trial.
¶ 99. Such a rule would encourage the State to take great care in the charging documents, would assist accuseds in determining their plea, would reduce use*394less litigation, and would ensure that enhanced repeater sentences are based only on qualifying convictions.26
¶ 100. From where I sit, it appears that prosecutors could avoid the "amendment problems" caused by repeater allegations by attaching, as standard practice, certified copies of prior judgments of conviction to the charging documents when repeater status is alleged. Similarly, as I see it, circuit courts ought to make it standard practice not to accept a plea on a sentence enhancer without certified copies of prior judgments of conviction on record with the court.
¶ 101. In sum, I do not agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the State may just completely change the allegation of prior convictions at the sentencing phase of a trial. The State's amendments after the jury verdict that occurred in the instant case are prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). I therefore write separately.
r — l HH
¶ 102. I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion that CCAP data are not an official report under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and therefore are insufficient to make a prima facie case of repeater status required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). Furthermore, the State has failed to prove repeater status under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) beyond a reasonable doubt. I rest my analysis on this court's opinion in State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263.
*395¶ 103. Contrary to the statements in the majority opinion and Justice Crooks's concurrence/dissent,27 this court did not hold in Saunders that an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of conviction is an "official report" under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).
¶ 104. Similarly, I conclude that CCAP data are not an official report under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). I agree with the majority opinion: CCAP data alone are insufficient to make a prima facie case of repeater status as required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).28
¶ 105. Saunders held that an official report is not the only means available to the State to prove a defendant's repeater status.29 While an official report alone makes out a prima facie case of repeater status under § 973.12(1), other evidence may also suffice. If the State chooses not to use an official report, "[t]he question ultimately becomes whether the state has submitted enough evidence to satisfy the sentencing judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the requisite number of qualifying prior convictions. To answer this question the court must look to the totality of the post-trial evidence presented by the state, including copies of prior judgments of conviction, be they certified or uncertified."30
*396¶ 106. Thus, in Saunders, the court considered the uncertified copy of the judgment of conviction, defense counsel's representation that there was no dispute as to the fact that there was a judgment of conviction entered into the record, and the undated but otherwise accurate information in the presentence report. The Saunders court therefore concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove the repeater allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.31
¶ 107. In Saunders, Justice Bradley dissented and, in an opinion that I joined, concluded that the uncertified judgment of conviction was insufficient to prove repeater status.32
¶ 108. In the instant case, I conclude that the CCAP data are insufficient evidence to prove the repeater allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 109. For the reasons set forth, I concur.
¶ 110. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) states in relevant part:
Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version.
State v. Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 900, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
In Martin/Robles, this court explained that prior to 1965, the statute permitted a repeater enhancer to a sentence at any time prior to the execution of the sentence. In 1965, the statute was amended to create the current language of the relevant portion of the statute. Id.; see § 2, ch. 422, Laws of 1965; see also majority op., ¶ 19 n.6.
State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, ¶ 34, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115.
The criminal defense manual published by the State Bar of Wisconsin contains a long list of factors that affect a defendant's plea decision, some of which are relevant here. The most relevant factor is the defendant's belief that he actually committed the act with which he was charged (in this case, whether the defendant was convicted of the prior offenses within the statutory time frame alleged by the State in the complaint). L. Michael Tobin & Patrick J. Devitt, Wisconsin Criminal Defense Manual § 6.33 (4th ed. 2005).
Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d at 888-89.
Id. at 890-91.
Id. at 902-03.
Id.
State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 509-11, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995).
Id. at 512-14.
Id. at 517 n.9.
Id at 517-18.
State v. Fields, 2001 WI App 297, ¶ 13, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 636 N.W.2d 897; State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 790-93, 549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996).
Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶ 6-9.
Id., ¶ 21.
Id., ¶ 32.
Majority op., ¶ 31.
It is unclear in the instant case why the State switched from the misdemeanors to the felony. One explanation at oral argument was that the State feared that its clerical error in the misdemeanor conviction date would cause it problems. Clearly, a total substitution of an offense creates more problems than a clerical error when certified copies of the conviction had been attached to the complaint.
*390A reasonable inference is that both the State and the defendant had doubts about the State's ability to place the misdemeanors within the five-year statutory time period. The misdemeanors were for crimes committed in 1997 with dates of conviction listed as April 15,1998 and varying sentencing dates from April 15,1998 to August 20,1999. The criminal complaint in the present case alleged that the defendant committed a battery on July 25, 2003.
If the defendant doubted that the State could prove the repeater convictions, the defendant assessed the extent of the possible punishment in one way. If the defendant concluded the State could prove the convictions, he assessed the extent of possible punishment another way. Either assessment might affect his plea. By the time the case came before this court, the State and defendant probably had determined whether the State could have proved the misdemeanors.
State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 110, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 110, 112.
Id. at 111 ("The supreme court has appropriately noted the due process considerations which underpin this portion of the repeater statute. The state's 'changing of the rules' after Wilks had pled offends these considerations.").
Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶ 22-28 ("In the case at bar, however, there is no question that the State was intending to refer to Stynes' convictions that occurred on March 17, 1998, convictions that actually existed.").
Id., ¶ 41 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (citing State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶ 38, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting)).
Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 42 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)).
See Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 37 (Abráhamson, C.J., concurring).
See majority op., ¶ 41; Justice Crooks's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶ 121, 123.
See majority op., ¶ 49.
State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶¶ 26, 34, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263 ("Moreover, the portion of s. 973.12(1) that speaks of official government reports constituting prima facie evidence of prior convictions supports the inference that the state may use other forms of evidence — ones not entitled to prima facie deference — to meet its proof requirements under the subsection.").
Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶ 53.
Id., ¶¶ 59-69.
See id., ¶¶ 72, 85-95 (Bradley, J., dissenting).