We granted leave to decide whether the Michigan Vehicle Code’s seat belt statute, which makes evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt admissible and imposes a five-percent cap on reduction in comparative negligence, is applicable in a products liability action against an automobile manufacturer. We conclude that the Michigan Vehicle Code statute, with its five-percent cap on damages reduction, is not applicable in a products liability action and affirm the Court of Appeals.
i
On June 25, 1988, plaintiff’s twenty-three-year-old daughter, Kimberly Marie Klinke, was killed in a one-car rollover accident. Testimony at trial indicated that the left front tire of the decedent’s Dodge Colt collapsed while she was traveling at highway speeds. Emergency workers found the decedent with her lap belt on, but with the Colt’s shoulder harness behind her, unused.
Plaintiff brought a products liability suit against Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of *586the vehicle.1 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged defects in seat belt design and defective manufacture of the left front steering knuckle. The trial judge granted Mitsubishi’s motion for summary disposition regarding the claim that the seat belt had been defectively designed, but denied summary disposition regarding the defective manufacture claim.
The defective manufacture claim was tried by a jury. The parties presented substantial testimony about the steering knuckle at trial. Plaintiff’s expert testified that there were small fractures in the metal of the steering knuckle. Plaintiff’s theoiy was that the knuckle collapsed, causing the car to roll over and killing plaintiff’s daughter.
Defense experts testified that the crash was not caused by the collapse of the steering knuckle, but that the reverse was true: The steering knuckle collapsed as a result of the force of the rollover accident. The defense argued that the crash resulted from a sudden and violent correction in the direction of the vehicle by the driver. Defense experts also testified that, had the decedent worn her shoulder harness, she would not have sustained a head injury.
The jury returned a $5,104,000 verdict against Mitsubishi, but found that the decedent was ninety percent negligent for not properly using her seat belt. The trial judge applied the statutory five-percent cap on comparative negligence for nonuse of a seat belt *587and awarded plaintiff $4,848,800. MCL 257.710e(5); MSA 9.2410(5)(5).2
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge’s decision regarding the seat belt-cap issue, and held that the seat belt cap did not apply in products liability actions. 219 Mich App 500; 556 NW2d 528 (1996). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for recalculation of damages, consistent with this opinion.
n
The parties call upon us to decide whether the seat belt statute, MCL 257.710e(5); MSA 9.2410(5)(5), applies in a products liability action brought under MCL 600.2949; MSA 27A.2949.
As always, we first examine the language of the statute itself when interpreting its meaning:
“The cardinal rule of all statutory construction is to identify and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The first step in discerning intent is to examine the language of the statute in question.” [Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998), quoting Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 611; 566 NW2d 571 (1997) (citations omitted).]
The Legislature enacted the products liability statute in 1978.3 It provided:
In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or ii\jury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contribu*588tory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s legal representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. [MCL 600.2949(1); MSA 27A.2949(1).]
In 1985, the Legislature adopted a mandatory seat belt law that punished failure to use seat belts, making it a civil infraction for front seat passengers in automobiles not to wear seat belts. MCL 257.710e; MSA 9.2410(5). The act also, and for the first time,4 allowed evidence of failure to use a seat belt to be admitted in a court proceeding to prove comparative negligence. It provides:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%. [MCL 257.710e(6); MSA 9.2410(5)(6).]
Shortly after the statute was enacted, this Court held that under the common law, for purposes of comparative negligence, “evidence of a plaintiffs failure to use an available seat belt may raise a factual issue to be submitted for jury consideration.” Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439; 410 NW2d 706 (1987).
*589m
Defendant Mitsubishi argues that the five-percent cap found in § 710e(4) of the Michigan Vehicle Code does not apply in products liability actions. We agree.
The Michigan Vehicle Code, as set forth in the title of the act, is designed, inter alia, “to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles . . . ,”5 Nowhere in the title of the code does it say that the act provides for the manufacture of motor vehicles or is concerned with the civil liability of manufacturers. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that “express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.” Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 142; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).
The instant case concerns the liability of a manufacturer, rather than the liability of an owner or operator of a vehicle. The decedent’s failure to use her *590seat belt could cause her damages to be reduced, but could not subject her to any liability in this suit. Section 710e both allows consideration of nonuse of a seat belt as evidence of negligence and limits the reduction for such comparative negligence to five percent. If § 710e were applied to the present products liability action, it would affect the liability of the manufacturer.6
It is a well-recognized principle that an act shall not exceed the scope of its title. Maki v City of East Tawas, 385 Mich 151; 188 NW2d 593 (1971). As long ago as 1888 this Court quoted from Judge Cooley’s treatise on Constitutional Limitations:
“As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in the act which might, with entire propriety, have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are invested with no dispensing power. The constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so.” [In re Hauck, 70 Mich 396, 403; 38 NW 269 (1888).]
*591We are to construe statutes in a constitutional manner if possible. Gora v Femdale, 456 Mich 704, 710; 576 NW2d 141 (1998). As a matter of statutory interpretation, we must not, and under constitutional principles we cannot, apply statutes in the motor vehicle code to cases involving the civil liability of manufacturers.7 Accordingly, § 710e’s cap on the reduction for comparative negligence for failure to wear a seat belt, which is part of the motor vehicle code, does not apply in the present action, which involves the liability of a manufacturer. Rather, under Lowe, supra, plaintiffs decedent’s failure to properly use her seat belt was properly submitted to the jury,8 which found her ninety percent comparatively negligent. Under § 2949, the jury award should be reduced by the full amount of plaintiff’s decedent’s comparative negligence.
*592iv
We note that although the motor vehicle code does not directly apply to products liability actions, some portions of the code may be relevant in products liability actions under other theories of law. Specifically, this Court has held that violation of a safety or penal statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence.9 Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78; 393 NW2d 356 (1986). In determining whether the violation is relevant to the facts presented at trial, the court must consider the following factors: “1. the statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation; 2. the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute; and 3. the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate contributing cause of the occurrence.” Id. at 87. Where these factors are met, the violation of a safety statute would be admissible as evidence creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence, even where the statute does not directly apply to the type of action at issue because of its title.10
CONCLUSION
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the seat belt statute does not apply in *593products liability actions. Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to address the remaining assignments of error raised by defendants. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for recalculation of damages, consistent with this opinion.
Taylor, J., concurred with Weaver, J.She also sued the distributor of the vehicle, Chrysler Corporation, and John Colone Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., the dealership that sold the car. Mitsubishi is the only remaining defendant.
The five-percent cap now appears at MCL 257.710e(6); MSA 9.2410(5)(6).
1978 PA 495, effective December 11, 1978. This act was repealed by 1995 PA 161, § 2. Today, the act appears at MCL 600.2957-600.2959; MSA 27A.2957-27A2959.
Although comparative negligence had already been adopted by case law and statute, evidence of failure to use a seat belt had not before been admissible in negligence actions. Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439; 410 NW2d 706 (1987).
The title to the Vehicle Code provides:
An act to provide for the registration, titling, sale, transfer, and regulation of certain vehicles operated upon the public highways of this state or any other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles and distressed vehicles; to provide for the licensing of dealers; to provide for the examination, licensing, and control of operators and chauffeurs; to provide for the giving of proof of financial responsibility and security by owners and operators of vehicles; to provide for the imposition, levy, and collection of specific taxes on vehicles; and the levy and collection of sales and use taxes, license fees, and permit fees; to provide for the regulation and use of streets and highways; to create certain funds; to provide penalties and sanctions for a violation of this act; to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles and service of process on residents and nonresidents; to provide for the levy of certain assessments; to provide for the enforcement of this act; to provide for the creation of and to prescribe the powers and duties of certain state and local agencies; to repeal all other acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act or contrary to this act; and to repeal certain parts of this act on a specific date.
The dissent correctly points out that, at the time § 710e was enacted, its application in a products liability action would have decreased the liability of a manufacturer by allowing nonuse of a seat belt to be considered as evidence of comparative negligence. Now that the common law allows consideration of nonuse of a seat belt as evidence of comparative negligence (without any cap on the reduction in damages), application of § 710e would increase the liability of a manufacturer. The bottom line is that application of § 710e to a products liability action would affect the liability of the manufacturer. The issue before us is whether the title of the motor vehicle code allows application of § 710e to products liability actions.
The dissent incorrectly suggests that our holding (that application of the motor vehicle code to products liability actions would violate the Title-Object Clause) compels a conclusion that applying the code to pedestrians, bicyclists, passengers, or the state would similarly be unconstitutional. This critique ignores the fact that the title of the code includes provisions that address these examples, e.g., the title states that it provides for “regulation and use of streets and highways” and for the “regulation of certain vehicles operated upon the public highways of this state.” Further, as discussed below, violation of a safety statute is admissible as evidence creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence even where the statute does not directly apply because of its title.
Further, the dissent apparently reads our opinion to hold that the motor vehicle code does not apply to manufacturers. This is incorrect. Rather, we hold that statutes in the motor vehicle code do not apply in products liability cases involving the civil liability of manufacturers. The question whether any of the myriad statutes of the motor vehicle code would apply to manufacturers in certain circumstances is not before us, and it is not appropriate for us to predetermine the issue.
This issue was appropriately submitted to the jury as a matter of common law. The dissent incorrectly indicates that we are applying § 710e’s provision allowing consideration of nonuse of a seat belt as evidence of comparative negligence, but ignoring its concomitant limitation of the reduction in damages therefor.
The comparative fault doctrine is applicable in all products liability actions. The principles of negligence are the same for establishing comparative negligence. Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
The dissent impliedly raises the question whether, under Klanseck, when a safety statute is applied outside the scope of the statute’s title, any concomitant conditions on liability contained in the statute also apply. The present case does not require us to resolve this question because this case turns on common law, not a statutory provision.