Filed 8/25/23 In re K.G. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.G., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E080711
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPR12200201)
v. OPINION
J.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Shobita Misra, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) does not apply in this
case. Defendant and appellant J.G. (Mother) contends the juvenile court erred in its
finding because plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social
Services (the Department) failed to ask extended family members about possible Indian
ancestry. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 21, 2022, with protective custody warrants in hand, the
Department detained K.G. and R.G. (collectively, the children).
DISCUSSION
When a child welfare agency takes temporary custody of a child in an emergency
situation, without a warrant, then the agency “has a duty to inquire whether that child is
an Indian child.” (§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 306.) That duty includes questioning extended
family members. (25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(2).)
In the instant case, the Department did not take the children into temporary
custody without a warrant. Rather, the Department had protective custody warrants
when detaining the children. “That difference matters because the statutory provision
on which Mother relies says that it matters. [Citation.] The inquiry obligation
prescribed by subdivision (b) of section 224.2 was not triggered.” (In re Robert F.
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500 (Robert F.); contra In re Delila D. (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 953; and see In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 680.) In other
words, because the Department detained the children via protective custody warrants,
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the Department did not have a duty to question extended family members about their
ancestry. The juvenile court did not err in finding ICWA was inapplicable.
To avoid this court’s interpretation of section 224.2, subdivision (b), Mother
contends the Department had a duty to inquire of extended relatives under section
224.2, subdivision (a). Section 224.2, subdivision (a), provides, “The court, county
welfare department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 602 may
be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child. The duty to inquire begins with the
initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or
neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.”
(Italics added.) Other appellate courts have interpreted the “including, but not limited
to” language as imposing an obligation upon child welfare “agencies to ask all relevant
involved individuals whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(c);
see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
275, 290.)
In Robert F., this court concluded that section 224.2, subdivision (a), by its plain
language “does not require the county welfare department or the court to question
extended family members as part of the initial inquiry in every case. [However,] case-
specific circumstances may require the department to interview extended family
members under [subdivision (a)] . . . . For instance, if the parents deny any Indian
ancestry, but a family member later contacts the social worker and volunteers that the
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family has Indian ancestry, then the department cannot ignore that claim.” (Robert F.,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)
In the instant case, Mother does not assert that ancestral information was
volunteered by the children’s extended family members. Instead, Mother contends
there was “no obligation to volunteer information. [Citations.] The statute imposes on
the agency and the juvenile court, and not the parents, the duty of inquiry.” We follow
Robert F. In the absence of ancestral information volunteered by an extended family
member, the Department did not have a duty to inquire of extended family members
under section 224.2, subdivision (a). (Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)
DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON
J.
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[In re K.G. et al.; E080711]
McKINSTER, J., Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would follow In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
953. I would affirm the dispositional orders and findings but remand the case to the
trial court to comply with ICWA inquiry and any notice obligations, if applicable. (In
re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 568.)
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
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