concurring.
I join the Court’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction and the sentence of death imposed by the jury.
However, I also believe that the comments made by the prosecutor in his closing statement were both intemperate and improper. They appear to be an inappropriate effort to point out to the jury that human acts are not determined by impersonal factors, but that we. have the capacity to do evil of our own free will and that an individual who chooses to do evil should be punished according to the degree of his evil.
On the facts of this case, however, I do not believe these remarks justify our overturning the death penalty. Our death penalty act directs us to affirm a death sentence imposed by a jury unless it is the product of passion, prejudice or some other arbitrary factor. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h). A jury is under a duty to act based on the facts, not the arguments of counsel. We should not presume that juries are so unsophisticated that they will abandon this duty when exposed to an overzealous prosecutor’s argument. The heinous facts in this case, which are fully recited in the majority opinion, are more than adequate to warrant the death penalty. Against the background of these facts, I believe the prosecutor’s comments were harmless error. The verdicts arose from and are justified by the *259facts, not any passion or prejudice generated by the prosecutor’s ill-advised and unnecessary comments.
Prosecutors with strong cases would be well advised, however, to let the facts speak for themselves. Juries can be trusted to appreciate them.