(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal. I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and no factual assessment is re*17quired.1 In the instant case, as indicated in the per curiam opinion, factual and legal assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
The majority "hold[s], as a matter of law, that the 'sudden and accidental’ exception to the pollution exclusion is inapplicable in this case.”2 That holding, "as a matter of law,” is based on the factual findings indicated by the words emphasized in the following paragraphs of the per curiam opinion:
While the city’s expectation of environmental contamination does not come from daily measurements as in Upjohn [Co v New Hampshire Ins Co, 438 Mich 197, 207; 476 NW2d 392 (1991)], it is equally clear that the City of Clare must have expected the release of pollutants into nearby lands and waters. For years, the dnr had been telling the city that the landfill did not satisfy the *18requirements of law and that the better course would be to close and seal the site. When, after interminable delay in obtaining the necessary test results, it was finally conñrmed that both ground water and surface water were contaminated, it was far too late for the city to prevail on a claim that the release was unexpected, or that it was "sudden and accidental.”
It had long been evident that this landfill was not a proper site for the disposal of waste materials. In such a situation, it is not necessary that one be able to identify the hour when release first occurred, or the precise spot within the affected ■ region where material first escaped. Here, there is no issue regarding the source of the contamination. Neither, for the reasons previously explained, is there any doubt that the city must have expected these problems to occur.[3]
The Court of Appeals did not err in remanding the case to the circuit court to address the question "whether there are genuine issues regarding the temporal element required for a discharge to be sudden.” I would, again, deny leave to appeal.
Cavanagh, C.J. I concur with Justice Levin and would deny leave to appeal.People v Wright, 439 Mich 914, 914-915 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872, 872-873 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Rochester Hills v Southeastern Oakland Co Resource Recovery Authority, 440 Mich 852, 852-856 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Eston (Grievance Administrator v Eston), 440 Mich 1205, 1205-1207 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207, 1207-1209 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); McFadden v Monroe Civil Service Comm, 440 Mich 890, 890-891 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Holly Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources (Holly Twp v Holly Disposal, Inc), 440 Mich 891, 891-893 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting).
Ante, p 15.
Ante, pp 14-15.