with whom STEADMAN, Associate Judge, joins as to part II, concurring:
I join reluctantly in the court’s decision to order a remand for a statement of reasons. In this court’s landmark ease on trial court discretion, Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354 (D.C.1979), we said that in some cases “the facts may leave the trial court with but one option it may choose without abusing its discretion....” Id. at 364. I am strongly tempted to conclude that this is one of those cases, but I must resist that temptation because there are not quite enough facts established in the record, or even alleged, to support such a conclusion.
I
In deciding how to rule on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, the trial court must consider both the private interests of the litigants and the public interest of the forum. Asch v. Taveres, 467 A.2d 976, 978 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted). A defendant seeking dismissal bears the heavy burden of showing that both public and private interests favor dismissal. Unless the defendant meets this burden, the trial court should rarely disturb the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Id. In particular, when the plaintiff elects to file suit in the defendant’s place of residence, as SMB ltas done here, the plaintiff’s choice of forum “should be disturbed only upon a strong showing that [dismissal] is required by the balance of convenience.” Daquila v. Schlosberg, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 367, 253 F.2d 888, 889 (1958). Finally, we must remember that whether Texas is a more convenient place for this case to be tried is really beside the point. The issue is not whether Texas is the more convenient forum but, rather, whether the District of Columbia is a seriously inconvenient forum. See Cresta v. Neurology Center, supra, 557 A.2d at 161.
The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at 508-509, 67 S.Ct. at 843, listed several factors to be considered in assessing these public and private interests, and this court has repeatedly held that its review of trial court rulings on forum non conveniens motions must include an independent evaluation of those factors. See Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C.1987) (en banc) (citing cases). Given the shortcomings of the record, I offer a few thoughts on these matters.
A. The private interest
The private interest is the litigants’ interest in the ease, expedition, and expense of the trial. Asch v. Taveres, supra, 467 A.2d at 978. Factors relevant to that interest include the relative ease of access to proof, the availability and cost, of compulsory process, the enforceability of a judgment once obtained, and the likelihood (if any) that the plaintiff has sought to vex or harass the defendant by his or her choice of forum. Id. (citations omitted).
1. Access to proof and availability of compulsory process
Beard’s principal argument is that the trial court should have ruled that the factors of access to proof and availability of compulsory process required dismissal of this action. He contends that the District of Columbia is a seriously inconvenient fo*209rum because it is impossible for him to present his affirmative defense to SMB’s claim here. Because Marvin Joubert and Derrick Beard are necessary witnesses to establish his defense of fraud, he maintains, he is precluded from raising his only defense to SMB’s claim because the District of Columbia courts cannot compel the attendance of either witness.
■ The unavailability of a defense in the plaintiff’s chosen forum may, in some cases, be a compelling reason for dismissing the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. A prerequisite for any forum non conveniens dismissal, however, is the availability of an alternate forum in which the plaintiff’s action “may more appropriately be entertained.” Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Co., 511 A.2d 8, 13 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted); accord, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. v. Rose, 583 A.2d 156, 160 (D.C.1990). The alternate forum cannot be a “more appropriate” one if the defense that is allegedly precluded in the plaintiff’s chosen forum is also unavailable in the alternate forum. Although Beard asserts that he is precluded from raising his defense of fraud in the District of Columbia, he has not made even a rudimentary showing that he can raise it in Texas.1
In the trial court, Beard relied solely on the unsworn allegations of his counsel to substantiate his claim that a trial in the District of Columbia would seriously inconvenience him by precluding him from raising a defense of fraud. Counsel alleged that Joubert and Derrick Beard were in Texas and that he needed their trial testimony, which would consist of their denial of Beard’s allegations. Counsel never even tried, however, to demonstrate that Joubert and Derrick Beard were actually in Texas or were otherwise subject to the compulsory process of the Texas courts. No mention was made of any other witness who might be available in Texas but not in the District of Columbia. This court said in Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C.1987) (en banc), that the “empty assertions of appellant’s counsel” were entitled to very little weight in deciding a forum non conveniens motion. I think the same can be said here.
This is the sort of case in which one would expect to find at least some evidence in the record, actual or proffered, to support Beard’s claims of fraud. Beard claims that large sums of his money were mistakenly placed in Derrick Beard’s account on two separate occasions, and that when he discovered this, he complained to Joubert about the error. It seems likely that there would be some sort of documentation to support this defense — such as, for example, a letter from the bank acknowledging that the loan proceeds had mistakenly been deposited in the wrong account. Yet Beard has not furnished the court with any documents (aside from his own pleading), nor has he even alleged that any exist. By contrast, SMB has produced a letter from Beard and other bank records showing that Beard personally authorized the transfer of other funds in June and July of 1982, shortly before the loans at issue here, to Derrick Beard’s account.2 Beard has not proffered even a shred of evidence, other than the anticipated testimony of Joubert and Derrick Beard, which might be relevant to his claim of fraud. Beard conceded in his motion to dismiss, moreover, that their testimony would amount to nothing more than a denial of his allegations. I do not see how such testimony could support his defense of fraud.
Moreover, there is no assurance that either Joubert or Derrick Beard would be available to testify. SMB contends that if Beard can locate these witnesses in Texas, D.C.Code § 14-104 (1989) and Super.Ct.Civ.R. 45(d)(2) would allow him to depose them in Texas and use their deposition testimony at trial. Beard argues that *210because the witnesses will deny his allegations of fraud, their depositions will not be sufficient; he needs their live testimony at trial so that the trier of fact “would have the benefit of observing their demean-or_” Both arguments miss the mark. I find it doubtful at best to expect that Joubert and Derrick Beard, even if they can be found and subpoenaed, will testify anywhere. The allegedly fraudulent conduct that Beard ascribes to them is undoubtedly criminal under the laws of Texas, just as it is in the District of Columbia,3 so that they would almost certainly have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Texas courts recognize that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies in civil as well as criminal trials. Ex parte Butler, 522 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex.1975). Thus, even if we were to allow dismissal of this case in favor of trial in Texas, it is extremely unlikely that Beard would be able to compel the testimony of these two witnesses. On the other hand, as Chief Judge Rogers points out, ante at 207, there was nothing before the trial court to suggest that Joubert and Derrick Beard would not be available in Texas, or that, if available, they would claim their privilege and refuse to testify.
In the last analysis, this court cannot base its decision on the possibility that Joubert and Derrick Beard may have a Fifth Amendment privilege when we do not know whether the trial court even considered that possibility. I raise the point here mainly for the trial court’s consideration on remand. Unless Beard can show that these witnesses are available (i.e., in Texas and subject to subpoena) and willing to testify despite the possibility of self-incrimination, the court could reasonably conclude that the factors of access to proof and availability of compulsory process do not justify dismissal of this case in the District of Columbia. But that is a conclusion that the trial court must make in the first instance; this court cannot do so on the assumption that the trial court would so rule.
2. Enforceability of a judgment once obtained
The next private interest factor to be considered is the enforceability of a judgment once it is obtained. Asch v. Taveres, supra, 467 A.2d at 978. When the defendant’s principal source of income is in the District of Columbia, this factor weighs heavily against granting a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Creamer v. Creamer, 482 A.2d 346, 353-354 (D.C.1984).
SMB alleges, without contradiction, that the only assets which could be used to satisfy any judgment against Beard are located in the District of Columbia. Beard does not claim that the fact that the judgment would ultimately be enforced here somehow inconveniences him; he notes only that a judgment obtained in Texas would be enforceable here as well. While this is true, enforcement of a foreign judgment would require further proceedings in the District of Columbia courts. See D.C.Code § 15-352 (1992 Supp.); Super.Ct.Civ.R. 72. This would be an additional burden for SMB, but it would not inconvenience Beard.
3. Evidence of the plaintiffs attempt to vex or harass
The final private interest factor to be considered is whether the plaintiff seeks to vex or harass the defendant by his or her choice of forum. Asch v. Taveres, supra, 467 A.2d at 978. This court has recognized that “dismissal may be warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular forum, not because it is convenient, but solely in order to harass the defendant or take advantage of favorable law.” Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Co., supra, 511 A.2d at 14 (citation omitted). I see no sign of such harassment here.
Beard claims that SMB brought this suit in the District of Columbia to vex and harass him. He concedes that the action was not originally brought for that purpose, but he maintains that once he raised his defense of fraud, SMB had an obli*211gation to refile the suit in Texas instead. His argument seems to be that his filing of the motion to dismiss somehow converted SMB’s properly brought action into an action brought solely to vex and harass. There is no legal or factual basis for such an argument.
The purpose of the rule stated in Mills (and elsewhere) is to penalize the plaintiff who intentionally chooses to bring suit in an inconvenient forum solely to harass the defendant. The court’s inquiry, therefore, must begin and end with an examination of the plaintiffs motives at the time the action was filed. Beard concedes that SMB did not file its complaint in the District of Columbia solely to harass him; as he says in his brief, “the suit started out with good intentions_” Indeed, the record suggests that SMB chose the District of Columbia in an effort to bring about a fair, speedy, and inexpensive end to this litigation. There is no evidence in the record, or even a proffer, that SMB chose to sue in the District of Columbia in an attempt to vex or harass Beard. The trial court could not reasonably have concluded otherwise.
B. The public interest
The public interest is the interest of the plaintiff's chosen forum in hearing — or not hearing — the case. Factors relevant to a determination of the public interest include administrative difficulties caused by the congestion of local court dockets with foreign litigation, the imposition of jury duty on citizens of a community having no relationship to the litigation or the parties, and the inappropriateness of requiring local courts to interpret the laws of another jurisdiction. Asch v. Taveres, supra, 467 A.2d at 978.
The defendant’s failure to show serious inconvenience will not require the court to honor the plaintiff’s choice of the District of Columbia as a forum when the District “lacks substantial contacts with the cause of action. . .” Dunkwu v. Neville, 575 A.2d 293, 296 (D.C.1990). When that happens, the public interest usually outweighs the private interest of the plaintiff and may justify a dismissal on the theory that it “would be unwise and unfair ... to clog the crowded dockets of our courts with ... imported litigation, absent good reason for doing so.” Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Co., supra, 511 A.2d at 12. While it could be argued that a defendant’s residence in the District is always a “substantial contact,” we have declined to adopt a per se rule which would prohibit a forum non conveniens dismissal whenever one of the parties is a District of Columbia resident. Carr v. Bio-Medical Applications of Washington, Inc., 366 A.2d 1089, 1093 (D.C.1976).
This court has held that when the District of Columbia’s sole contact with the litigation is that it is the corporate residence of the defendant, the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing of some connection between the District and either the plaintiff or the cause of action in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Mills, supra, 511 A.2d at 12; District-Realty Title Insurance Corp. v. Goodrich, 328 A.2d 93 (D.C.1974); Pitts v. Woodward & Lothrop, 327 A.2d 816, 817 (D.C.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911, 95 S.Ct. 832, 42 L.Ed.2d 841 (1975). However, we have distinguished cases involving corporate “residence” from those in which the District is an individual defendant’s personal residence. Pitts, supra, 327 A.2d at 817. When the defendant is a private individual and the plaintiff elects to sue in the defendant’s state of residence, the plaintiffs choice of forum should be disturbed only upon a strong showing that dismissal “is required by the balance of convenience.” Daquila v. Schlosberg, supra, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 367, 253 F.2d at 889, cited in Pitts, supra, 327 A.2d at 817.
Beard contends that the District of Columbia has no substantial contacts with this litigation, but that Texas does. He asserts that the notes were executed in Texas, that the collateral for the loans is located there, and that Texas law will determine the outcome of the case. While these assertions are all correct, they are not dispositive. Our courts, like most urban courts, are severely congested; nevertheless, the District of Columbia is Beard’s residence, and that very fact gives this *212case a substantial contact with the District. This is not a suit between two non-residents (like Dunkwu v. Neville, for example), nor does it involve a corporate defendant who is merely licensed to do business here (as was the case in Pitts). While the trial court will have to apply Texas law to this dispute, the case does not appear to present any complex legal issues.4 It is a simple action on a pair of promissory notes involving an unpaid debt.5 The fact that the District is Beard’s residence is a sufficient contact to support SMB’s choice of forum and would justify denial of Beard’s forum non conveniens motion unless Beard can show that the “balance of convenience” favors dismissal. Daquila v. Schlosberg, supra, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 367, 253 F.2d at 889.
C. Conclusion
In my judgment, most of Beard’s arguments are meritless on their face. His claim that this suit was brought in the District of Columbia to vex and harass him is essentially frivolous, as is his assertion that this case involves “foreign real estate” and therefore should be tried in Texas, where that real estate is located. His contention that this case lacks any substantial contact with the District simply ignores the fact that he is himself a District resident and has assets here from which a judgment in SMB’s favor can be satisfied. The fact that the Texas statute of limitations has run may also be sufficient to require that the case remain here. I vote for a remand, however, because the trial court failed to state its reasons for denying the motion to dismiss, and because I cannot discern from the record what those reasons were. Specifically, I cannot conclude that the facts left the trial court “with but one option [to] choose without abusing its discretion,” Johnson v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 364, in assessing the viability of Beard’s fraud defense in Texas and the availability of his witnesses there. I think the odds are in favor of keeping the case in the District of Columbia, especially since the burden is on Beard to justify dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, but at this point I cannot be sure.
II
I cannot end this opinion without expressing the view that this appeal really should not be here. A few years ago this court en banc, dividing 5 to 4, declined to overrule a prior holding6 that the denial of a forum non conveniens motion was immediately appealable as a “collateral order.” Jenkins v. Smith, 499 A.2d 128 (D.C.1985), supplemental opinion, 535 A.2d 1367 (D.C.1987) (en banc). I was among the dissenters in Jenkins, believing strongly that review of any such ruling should await a final judgment in the case. I see no need to state my reasons here, for they are set forth in my dissenting opinion in Jenkins, 535 A.2d at 1372, and they have not changed.
With seven more years of experience since Jenkins was decided, I think it may be appropriate for the en banc court to consider this matter again. We held in Frost, supra note 6, that the denial of a motion to dismiss in these circumstances was appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). In the last decade or so, the Supreme Court has been rather strict in its application of that doctrine. See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 *213L.Ed.2d 288 (1984); Richardson-Merrell, Inc., v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985). Most significantly, the Court held in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988), that the denial of a forum non conveniens motion was not appealable under the federal “final order” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), as a collateral order. The District of Columbia has a “final order” statute, D.C.Code § 11-721(a)(1) (1989), which was modeled on the federal statute and, in all material respects, is identical to it. Our holding in Frost was based on that District of Columbia statute.
With Van Cauwenberghe on the books, I think this court might appropriately take another en banc look at Frost and Jenkins. For several reasons, the case at bar may not be the best vehicle for doing so, but I suspect that one of these days, sooner rather than later, a case will present itself that offers us an opportunity to reconsider those two unwise decisions and to reconcile our collateral order jurisprudence with that of the Court where it originated.
. I note also that Texas may not be available as an alternate forum, as Mills requires, because the Texas statute of limitations expired in January 1989, while Beard’s motion to dismiss was pending before the trial court.
. In response to Beard's motion to dismiss, SMB filed an affidavit from one of its employees, as well as documentary evidence, which supported its claim on the notes. This evidence remains uncontroverted.
. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 22-3821 (1989) (criminal fraud statute). It may also be a crime under the federal bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
. In saying this, I assume that Beard is unlikely to come up with any evidence of fraud beyond what he has already mentioned, and that he therefore will be unable to rely on a defense of fraud.
. Beard argues that the District is a seriously inconvenient forum because this litigation involves “foreign real estate.” While it may well be true that the District is often an inconvenient place to litigate claims over foreign real estate, that is not what this case is about. Simply stated, this is an action on two promissory notes to collect a debt; it does not present any issues of Texas real property law. Consequently, I think Beard's "foreign real estate” argument is without merit.
. Frost v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 327 A.2d 810, 812-813 (D.C.1974).