(dissenting). At the time plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit under MCLA 211.53; MSA 7.97, that provision of the General Property Tax Act provided:
"A person may protest any tax or special assessment which is paid within 60 days of such payment, whether levied on personal or real property, to the treasurer, specifying in writing, signed by him, the grounds of the protest, and the treasurer shall minute the fact of the protest on the tax roll. The person may, within 30 days after such protest, sue the township or city for the *366amount paid, and recover, if the tax or special assessment is shown to be illegal for the reason shown in the protest. In cities where, by special provision, state and county taxes are collected by the county treasurer, suits for the recovery of state and county taxes only shall be brought against the county, and any such suit against a county for the recovery of taxes or special assessments so paid to the county treasurer shall proceed in all respects as provided herein for suits against townships.”
Effective October 25, 1976, after the trial court had entered its opinion and order in the instant case, the Legislature deleted the quoted language from the statute. 1976 PA 292. The quoted language of the statute did not specify in which court a protest action could be instituted, but plaintiffs are correct in assuming that prior to the Tax Tribunal Act, MCLA 205.701 et seq.; MSA 7.650(1) et seq., MCLA 205.731; MSA 7.650(31), MCLA 205.741; MSA 7.650(41), the circuit court was a proper forum to bring the action. Xerox Corp v Kalamazoo, 76 Mich App 150; 255 NW2d 797 (1977), Mohawk Data Sciences Corp v Detroit, 63 Mich App 102; 234 NW2d 420, lv den, 395 Mich 778 (1975), MCLA 211.53; MSA 7.97.
It is true as the majority says, that the Tax Tribunal Act provides for exclusive and original jurisdiction of the appeal by the plaintiffs for refund of their taxes paid under protest. MCLA 205.731; MSA 7.650(31), MCLA 205.741; MSA 7.650(41). The act further provides that a protest proceeding must be brought "within 30 days after the receipt of a bill for a tax he seeks to contest”. MCLA 205.735(2); MSA 7.650(35X2). This time limit in which to institute an action is much less than the potential 90-day time limit found under the General Property Tax Act, MCLA 211.53; MSA 7.97, as provided during the time relevant to this lawsuit. Furthermore, the time limit provided in *367MCLA 211.53; MSA 7.97 begins once a person has "protested”, whereas under the Tax Tribunal Act the time limit begins to run after the "receipt of a bill for a tax he seeks to contest”. MCLA 205.735(2); MSA 7.650(35)(2).
The Supreme Court has stated:
"[W]here the Legislature really intends to amend previous statutes so that their operation is narrower or broader than stated or previously construed to be, then this intent as expressed is not amendment by implication and cannot be rendered amendment by 'implication’ by the device of failing to point out the specific section intended to be altered or amended.” Alan v Wayne County, 388 Mich 210, 282; 200 NW2d 628, 663; 67 ALR3d 1079, 1116 (1972). (Emphasis in original.)
In the instant case plaintiffs were misled to their prejudice by relying on the General Property Tax Act, MCLA 211.53; MSA 7.97, which prior to the Tax Tribunal Act had allowed them to initiate an appeal in circuit court, and provided them with a potential 90-day time limit for instituting the action. As a result of their justifiable reliance on that provision in the General Property Tax Act, plaintiffs have lost a chance to protest a tax because the law was not clear and readily discoverable. The cited provisions of the Tax Tribunal Act "revised, altered or amended” the section of the General Property Tax Act, MCLA 211.53; MSA 7.97, without a contemporaneous reenactment or republishing of the provision. This was in violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 25. See Alan v Wayne County, supra. Later the Legislature deleted the conflicting passage in the General Property Tax Act, thus indicating its awareness of the conflict with the Tax Tribunal Act. 1976 PA 292.
If the Legislature had deleted the passage when *368it passed the Tax Tribunal Act we would have nothing to decide. I think it erred by not doing so.
I would find that the plaintiffs here have been denied their right to seek a refund of taxes paid under protest because of reliance on the then existing conflicting provision of the General Property Tax Act. The conflicting provision was in effect during plaintiff’s action in the circuit court and this Court should grant them relief to have their protest tried on the merits. Since the appropriate forum for that relief is the Tax Tribunal I would construe MCLA 205.773; MSA 7.650C73)1 as permitting this Court to remand the case to the Tax Tribunal with direction to allow plaintiffs to try the merits of their appeal for a refund of the tax. I would do so under the authority vested in this Court by GCR 1963, 820.1(7).
The section provides:
"When a matter is decided by a forum described in Section 41 [including circuit court] and the decision is appealed, and when, after the effective date of this act, the matter is remanded, the remand shall be to the tribunal for such action as the appellate court may direct.”
MCLA 205.741; MSA 7.650(41) provides:
"A person or legal entity which, immediately before the effective date of this act, was entitled to proceed before the state tax commission or circuit court of this state for determination of a matter subject to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, as provided in section 31, shall proceed only before the tribunal.”