(dissenting). Delay in civil trials in the trial court is the most serious problem in the administration of justice.1 Despite knowledge of that fact, the court today refuses to adopt a simple housekeeping measure which would end litigation in a small group of cases and instead adds to the delay and congestion in the Superior Court.
General Laws c. 231, § 109, as amended through St. 1975, c. 377, § 108A, provides that a party may appeal to this court from “the final decision of the appellate division of any district *64court.” Contrary to the court’s decision today, the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the report, combined with the defendant’s failure to move for transfer of the case to the Superior Court, makes the Appellate Division’s decision final and therefore appealable to this court.
Where, as here, the only remaining question for the court is one of law, there is no justification for requiring Superior Court action.2 See Pilotte v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 384 Mass. 805, 805 n.1 (1981). The resolution of factual disputes is what the trial court does best. The resolution of legal issues is our function.
If the plaintiff had lost the Appellate Division decision, it could have brought an appeal before this court. See Third Nat’l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 240, 241-242 (1983). Or, if the defendant had waived its right to jury trial in the Superior Court before the Appellate Division’s decision, it also could have appealed to this court without first retrying the case in the Superior Court. See Joseph Freedman Co. v. North Penn Transfer, Inc., 388 Mass. 551, 551-552 n.1 (1983). I think that once the defendant allowed the ten-day period to remove the case to pass, the Appellate Division’s decision became final and appealable. The fact that the defendant elected to waive its right to a jury trial in the Superior Court after the Appellate Division decision, rather than before, should not determine the case’s procedural status. This court’s decision merely prolongs litigation, increases the costs to litigants, and makes it more difficult for citizens to enforce small claims even though such claims are valid, or makes it economically disadvantageous to defend against invalid claims.
“The controlling ideas [of court reorganization, see St. 1978, c. 478, are] unification, flexibility, conservation of judicial power, and responsibility.” R. Pound, Organization of Courts 275 (1940). Today’s decision neither conserves judicial power nor is it responsible. Adherence to old procedures does not *65serve the purposes of reorganization, but merely continues the strangulation of the trial courts by adding another layer of decisionmaking before appellate review. Such a procedure merely adds to spiraling litigation costs and increases delay between entry and final disposition.
The court’s conclusion that “[considerations of judicial economy” justify its decision not to decide an issue of law is unfair.3 The courts are not created for the convenience of judges and lawyers but are created to serve litigants and the public interest in securing “the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” See Mass. R. Civ. P. 1, as appearing in 385 Mass. 1213 (1982).
The court today departs from its recent holding that even if appellate review “increases [appellate] judicial business, that result must be accepted. Courts exist to vindicate important rights. We cannot withhold from [litigants] important protections merely because granting them may place some additional burden on the courts.” Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 799 (1985). Today’s decision does not improve the administration of justice for litigants, the public, or for the court system as a whole.4 I dissent.
From June, 1983, to June, 1984, the number of civil cases pending in the Superior Court increased from 72,854 to 79,603. Quarterly Caseflow Report, Office of the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court (2d Quarter 1984).
The issue is whether the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of an essential element of its prima facie case — that upon delivery of goods to the carrier, the goods were in good condition.
If the court is concerned with the number of appeals, it has the authority to transfer cases to the Appeals Court, see G. L. c. 211, § 4A, and to select from its caseload an appropriate number of cases.
It is not clear that there will be an increase of business because relatively few cases involve only an issue of law. Rather, most cases involve issues of law and fact or just factual disputes and would go to the Superior Court.