concurring in result.
I concur in result but respectfully disagree with the majority's discussion of te-phens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 986 (Ind.2004).
In Stephens, our Supreme Court clearly held, "a trial court has the statutory authority to order executed time following revocation of probation that is less than the length of the sentence originally suspended, so long as, when combined with the executed time previously ordered, the total sentence is not less than the statutory minimum." Id. at 942 (emphasis added). However, the majority concludes, "we simply cannot contemplate that our Supreme Court meant that the sentencing formula announced in Stephens must so rigidly apply in every probation revocation." Slip op. at 9.
In its interpretation of Stephens, the majority quotes the Supreme Court's statements concerning the importance of Indiana's trial judges having "the flexibility both to use and to terminate probation when appropriate." Slip op. at 6 (quoting Stephens, 818 N.E.2d at 941-42). I believe that flexibility language was a response to our court's vacated opinion in Stephens, which held that under Indiana Code seetion 85-38-2-3(g) a trial court must ordér execution of the entire amount of the suspended sentence imposed at the time of initial sentencing.
*204Therefore, contrary: to the majority's conclusion, I believe the language in Stephens is unambiguous. Unless and until our Supreme Court modifies or clarifies its Stephens holding, under the current state of the law, I believe that when a trial court revokes a defendant's probation, any executed time imposed, when combined with any executed time previously ordered and served, must at least equal the statutory minimum sentence.