concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the Majority’s reasoning and disposition of the standing and separation of powers/political question issues. I respectfully dissent, however, from the Majority’s ruling that the Pennsylvania Constitution, in particular Article IV, § 14, allows Respondent Robert C. Jubelirer to occupy three offices simultaneously: two legislative branch offices as Pennsylvania Senator and President pro tempore of the Senate and an executive branch office as Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania. Respondent became the Commonwealth’s permanent Lieutenant Governor when former Lieutenant Governor Mark Schweiker became the Commonwealth’s Governor on October 5, 2001. The Majority concludes that relevant constitutional provisions are clear and unambiguous and that they mandate the result in this case. In fact the provisions invite a contrary and very rational interpretation, and I would therefore overrule Respondent’s demurrer to Petitioners’ complaint for declaratory judgment.
Petitioners John A. Lawless, Charles A. Pascal, Jr. and Joseph H. Wiedemer seek a declaratory judgment from this Court determining whether Respondent may occupy simultaneously the three positions that he now holds.1 They assert that the fundamental issue in this case is whether *834the Constitution requires the President pro tempore to vacate his Senate offices upon permanently becoming the Lieutenant Governor. Petitioners argue that Article II, §§ 6 and 9 and Article IV, §§ 6 and 14 of the Constitution do not contradict one another and that they clearly distinguish between temporary and permanent vacancies in office and the differing results attendant to each such vacancy. When read together they support the conclusion that Respondent was required to vacate his Senate offices upon his permanent accession to the office of Lieutenant Governor.
It is well settled that courts must interpret constitutional language in its popular sense as the voters must have understood it when they voted on it. Zemprelli v. Thornburg, 47 Pa.Cmwlth. 43, 407 A.2d 102 (1979). In cases where the courts of this Commonwealth have not had occasion to consider and to rule upon an issue, decisions of other state courts may be relied upon for their persuasive value. In Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 522 n. 5, 738 A.2d 427, 430 n. 5 (1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that it “created a four-part methodology to aid in the analysis of state constitutional claims” in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991). Specifically, the court will look at the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; related case law from other states; and policy considerations unique to Pennsylvania.2 Id. The court must look not only to the letter of the words but to the spirit behind them as well in determining the meaning of a constitutional provision. Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 565 Pa. 526, 776 A.2d 971 (2001).
Petitioners invoke the following constitutional provisions. They govern, inter alia, the prohibition against the appointment of legislators to any other salaried office, the duties of the President pro tempore in the absence of the Lieutenant Governor, the disqualification from service as Lieutenant Governor or Governor and temporary and permanent vacancies occurring in those offices.
Art. 2, § 6 Disqualification to hold other office
No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under this Commonwealth to which a salary, fee or perquisite is attached. No member of Congress or other person holding any office (except of attorney-at-law or in the national guard or in a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States) under the United States or this Commonwealth to which a salary, fee or perquisite is attached shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.
Art. 2, § 9 Election of officers; judge of election and qualifications of members
The Senate shall, at the beginning and close of each regular session and at such other times as may be necessary, elect one of its members President pro tern-*835pore, who shall perform the duties of the Lieutenant Governor, in any case of absence or disability of that officer, and whenever the said office of Lieutenant Governor shall be vacant. The House of Representatives shall elect one of its members as Speaker. Each House shall choose its other officers, and shall judge of the election and qualifications of its members.
Art. 4, § 6 Disqualification for offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General
No member of Congress or person holding any office (except of attorney-at-law or in the National Guard or in a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States) under the United States or this Commonwealth shall exercise the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General.
Art. 4, § 14 Vacancy in office of Lieutenant Governor
In case of the death, conviction on impeachment, failure to qualify or resignation of the Lieutenant Governor, or in case he should become Governor under the preceding section, the President pro tempore of the Senate shall become Lieutenant Governor for the remainder of the term. In case of the disability of the Lieutenant Governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office shall devolve upon the President pro tempore of the Senate until the disability is removed. Should there be no Lieutenant Governor, the President pro tempore of the Senate shall become Governor if a vacancy shall occur in the office of Governor and in case of the disability of the Governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office shall devolve upon the President pro tempore of the Senate until the disability is removed. His seat as Senator shall become vacant whenever he shall become Governor and shall be filled by election as any other vacancy in the Senate. (Emphasis added.)
Respondent succeeded to the office of Lieutenant Governor by virtue of the Lieutenant Governor becoming Governor pursuant to the resignation of the Governor, which makes the first sentence of Article IV, § 14 clearly applicable. Nevertheless, the Majority focuses on the fourth sentence of that Section which applies when the President pro tempore succeeds to the office of Governor. The Majority notes and relies on the rule that any mention of a specific matter in a statute or constitutional provision necessarily implies that other matters not mentioned are excluded. Reciting the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Majority states that the fourth sentence in Section 14 is unambiguous and agrees with Respondent that it compels the conclusion that the President pro tempore resigns his senatorial seat only if he becomes the Governor.3
Petitioners argue that Article II, § 9 addresses temporary vacancies in the office of Lieutenant Governor and that permanent vacancies are addressed in Article IV, § 14, and those provisions permit the Senate’s President pro tempore to retain his Senate offices only when assuming the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor during a temporary vacancy in that office. Respondent relies upon an 1898 Minnesota Supreme Court decision in State ex rel. Marr v. Stearns, 72 Minn. *836200, 75 N.W. 210 (1898), rev’d on other grounds, 179 U.S. 223, 21 S.Ct. 73, 45 L.Ed. 162 (1900), to justify his arguments while at the same time ignoring the full import and holding of that court. The Minnesota court ultimately ruled that the Minnesota constitution did not require the president pro tempore of the senate to vacate his senate seat when he assumed the duties of the lieutenant governor due to the resignation of the governor.
The reasoning suggests the opposite result here because of the significant distinctions that exist between Steams and this case. One distinction is the Minnesota court’s determination that the duties of its lieutenant governor and president pro tempore were identical, both belonging strictly to the legislative department of government — neither of them had any power or duty belonging to the executive department. However, the Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor is a member of the executive department whereas the President pro tempore’s duties are solely legislative.4 Further, the Minnesota court noted that its constitution only implied that vacancies may either be permanent or temporary. The court reasoned that “if the Constitution recognizes both permanent and temporary vacancies in the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, such fact has an important bearing on the question whether the president pro tem-pore ceases to be a senator when he becomes a lieutenant governor.” Id., 72 Minn, at 211-212, 75 N.W. at 212.
Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution declares when and under what circumstances a vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor shall be permanent or temporary. The first sentence of Section 14 expressly provides for the succession in office in the event of a permanent vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor. Obviously death, impeachment, failure to qualify or resignation of a Lieutenant Governor connotes a permanent occurrence. Likewise, the succession is permanent when the Lieutenant Governor becomes the Governor due to the Governor’s resignation. In the event of a permanent vacancy, the President pro tempore “shall become” the Lieutenant Governor for the remainder of the term. Hence, the President pro tempore shall succeed to the office of Lieutenant Governor and hold the title rather than merely serve in an acting capacity. Otherwise, the second sentence in Section 14, which employs different language, would have no meaning.5
*837The second sentence in Article IV, § 14 plainly states what shall occur when the Lieutenant Governor is disabled and thus temporarily unable to perform his duties. In the event of a vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor due to disability, the powers and duties of the office shall “devolve upon” the President pro tempore until the disability is removed. The Lieutenant Governor’s disability may end at any time whereupon the Lieutenant Governor shall resume his duties. Evidently, when such disability ends the President pro tempore no longer serves in the dual capacity. Because constitutional provisions should be construed in a sensible and reasonable manner, see Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959), it would be illogical to suggest that the President pro tempore should vacate his Senate offices when he temporarily assumes the Lieutenant Governor’s powers and duties. This interpretation comports with the first sentence and reinforces the dissenting view that the fourth sentence does not clearly and unambiguously dispose of the issue as the Majority would hold.
The Majority reasons that the fourth sentence of Article IV, § 14 ultimately clinches its holding and that the debates from the 1873 constitutional convention expressly demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution intended for the President pro tempore to vacate his seat only upon becoming the Governor. In rejecting constitutional debate as irrelevant when construing and interpreting constitutional provisions, the Court reiterated the following principles in Zemprelli:
Both briefs here have offered for consideration some of this constitutional amendment’s legislative history, which we may consider even where a statute is unambiguous. United States ex rel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir.1961). Although committee and legislative commission reports may be considered, the remarks of individual legislators in debate are not relevant for the obvious reason that they represent only one person’s view and not that of a proposing body or an enacting body. Martini’s] Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 283, 74 A.2d 120, 122 (1950); National Transit Co. v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239 (1938); Tarlo’s Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934). See also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939.
Id., 407 A.2d at 109.6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not equivocate on this subject in Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Lawrence, 326 Pa. 526, 532, 193 A. 46, 48-49 (1937):
The constitutional debates of 1873 were quoted to sustain that case [Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 A. 263]. See No. 5 Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1873, pp. 9-14. Such statements must be understood to be merely the personal opinion of individual members of the Convention. What the Convention adopted, and what the electors of the commonwealth accepted, is the Constitution as it is written, and its clear meaning cannot be distorted to fit the views of those particular delegates. It must be assumed that the people who voted upon the Constitution gave to the words employed their common and ordinary significance. Justice Paxson in Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 *838Pa. 365, at page 380, 3 A. 220, 229 pointed this out forcefully:
‘In the consideration and discussion of this section of the constitution we throw out of view the copious citations which have been furnished us from the debates in the convention. They are of value as showing the views of individuals members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes; but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk; much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.’
Even if the Court were permitted to consider the delegates’ statements, as the Majority presumes, they merely represent isolated and conflicting expressions which do not resolve the issue in this case. Specifically, the Majority latches onto one delegate’s reference to “then only” shall the President pro tempore vacate his Senate seat, when discussing his accession to the office of governor. This language was not included nor otherwise incorporated into the final version of the amendment voted upon by the people. In addition, one delegate questioned whether a senator would not vacate his office if he is “acting as Lieutenant Governor merely,” after which unanimous consent was made. This statement supports the view that a temporary devolution of the Lieutenant Governor’s powers and duties upon the President pro tempore does not and should not require him to vacate his Senate seat. Nonetheless, the fourth sentence pertains in the event no Lieutenant Governor exists and the President pro tempore is required to become Governor as specified in the third sentence. When that event occurs the President pro tempore must then vacate his Senate seat. This case, however, does not involve the President pro tempore becoming Governor.
The framers of the Constitution intended for the President pro tempore to permanently become the Lieutenant Governor under specified circumstances, and they provided for this to occur by the language that they used. Compare People ex rel Parks v. Comforth, 34 Colo. 107, 81 P. 871 (1905) (constitutional provision used the same language [“duties and powers shall devolve on”] to require president pro tem-pore to act as lieutenant governor in case of temporary or permanent vacancy in the lieutenant governor’s office, and if framers had intended for president pro tempore to “become” lieutenant governor de jure upon resignation of the governor, then framers would have said so). Thus, under the standard enunciated in Cleckley, if the President pro tempore becomes the permanent or de jure Lieutenant Governor the President pro tempore should vacate his senatorial offices.
The Majority’s ruling, for the first time in Pennsylvania history, permits a person to hold permanently more than one high public office in separate branches of government in direct contravention of the Constitution. Moreover, even the Senate recognized the improbability of one Senator holding the offices of President and President pro tempore when the Senate determined the procedures it would follow in the absence of both of these officers. See n.4 supra. Notwithstanding its own rules, it is highly conceivable that the Senate, under the Majority’s view, could allow a Senator serving simultaneously as President pro tempore, Lieutenant Governor and President of the Senate to cast a vote as Senator and President pro tempore on the one hand and in the event of a tie vote to cast a second vote as Lieutenant Governor and President of the Senate to break that tie. The Majority does not fully ap-*839precíate the consequences of its decision and the potential harm that it may cause to the established constitutional form of government in this Commonwealth.
In its response to this dissent, the Majority adds more text from the 1873 constitutional debates on Article IV, § 6. It then proclaims: “[I]t is clear from these debates that, ... the delegates were concerned with the problem of certain individuals using predominately federal office to be nominated as candidates and ‘elect themselves’.... Slip op. at 15, n6. Aside from the Supreme Court’s admonition that debates from the 1873 constitutional convention hold no value or relevancy when construing provisions of the Constitution, Margiotti, the Majority’s conclusion is wholly unsupported. Article IV, § 6 unambiguously precludes a person holding state office from exercising the office of Governor or Lieutenant Governor.
The Majority takes further liberty with the Constitution in responding to the dissent by injecting the rule that the Lieutenant Governor as President of the Senate may vote to break a tie only on procedural rather than substantive matters. Thus the potential for dual voting is of no moment. Nowhere in the text of Article IV, § 4 or in any other constitutional provision do the framers articulate the construction announced by the Majority. The Lieutenant Governor’s duties have been enumerated in relevant part. See n4 supra. The Constitution specifies three exceptions to the tie-breaking rule, clearly involving substantive matters but leaving a wide variety of other questions both substantive and procedural that the Lieutenant Governor may vote upon in the event of a tie. The Majority implies that no situation could ever occur involving the Lieutenant Governor’s vote on a substantive matter.
This Court recognized the possibility that the President of the Senate could have broken a tie vote that would have occurred in the event a newly elected Senator had not voted on his own seating. Jubelirer v. Singel, 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 55, 61 n. 4, 638 A.2d 352, 355 n. 4 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1994). It is beyond debate that a vote to break a tie on the seating of a Senator represents a substantive as opposed to a procedural question. Thus the Majority’s declaration that the Lieutenant Governor as President of the Senate may only break a tie in procedural matters is once again wholly unsupported by the Constitution and represents yet another example of the Majority’s attempt to rewrite the Constitution.
. Respondent in actuality occupies four offices. In addition to those mentioned, he serves as President of the Senate.
. In Bryant v. English, 311 Ark. 187, 843 S.W.2d 308 (1992), the Supreme Court of Arkansas observed that when construing constitutional amendments, courts may look to the history of the times and to those conditions existing at the time of the adoption of an amendment in order to ascertain the mischief to be remedied and the remedy adopted. The court interpreted pertinent constitutional provisions so as to allow the lieutenant governor to succeed to the office of governor rather than to act as governor to eliminate separation of powers and dual office-holding problems and to avoid the mixing of executive and legislative powers.
. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alter-ius is generally interpreted to mean that the mention of specific matters in a statute implies the exclusion of others not mentioned, but the doctrine is only an aid in statutory construction or constitutional interpretation and may not be applied to defeat legislative intent. Knecht v. Medical Service Ass'n of Pennsylvania, 186 Pa.Super. 456, 143 A.2d 820 (1958).
. Under Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution, the Lieutenant Governor serves as a member of the executive department of the government. In that capacity the Lieutenant Governor chairs the Board of Pardons under Article IV, § 9. He also serves as President of the Senate and may vote in the case of a tie on any question except the final passage of a bill or joint resolution, adoption of a conference report or concurrence in amendments made by the House of Representatives. Article IV, § 4. As President of the Senate he chairs Senate sessions and maintains decorum, signs bills and joint resolutions passed by both Houses of the legislature, signs resolutions, orders, writs, warrants and subpoenas issued by the Senate and submits points of order involving the constitutionality of any matter to the Senate for decision. The President pro tempore possesses the power among other things to appoint members, chairs and vice-chairs of standing committees of the Senate, to fill vacancies in standing and special committees, to refer to the appropriate Senate committees bills and resolutions which may be introduced in the Senate or received from the House of Representatives, to appoint and direct Senate employees and lastly to name any Senator to preside in the absence of the President. If both the President and the President pro tempore are absent, the Majority Leader or his designee shall preside. See Rules of the Senate of Pennsylvania, Session of 2001, attached as Exhibit A to the complaint.
. See State v. Heller, 63 N.J.L. 105, 42 A. 155 (1899) (constitutional provision required that in case of resignation of governor the "pow*837ers, duties and emoluments of office shall devolve upon” the president of the senate and not that he "shall thereby become" the governor and hold the title of the office; the language used was not ambiguous).
. See modified view expressed in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), citing Commonwealth v. DePasquale, 509 Pa. 183, 501 A.2d 626 (1985), which relied on Martin’s Estate.