dissenting.
A fundamental purpose of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act1 (MVRA) is to “provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate the inequities which *295fault-determination has created.”2 Allowing exclusions from minimum coverage contravenes the purpose of the MVRA.3 The MVRA requires procurement of insurance covering basic reparations and legal liability for the ownership, operation or use of motor vehicles. Kentucky law and public policy considerations mandate that we find coverage in cases involving the injury of an innocent third party.
The MVRA “require[s] owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth to procure insurance covering basic reparation benefits and legal liability arising out of ownership, operation or use of such motor vehicles.”4 Consistent with this requirement of the MVRA, this Court has denied any exclusion that would “dilute or eliminate the minimum security required by the Act.”5 In Progressive Northern Ins. Co. v. Corner, we held that “[t]he public policy expressed in the Act [MVRA] is that every victim of a motor vehicle accident will be able to recover the statutory minimum towards satisfaction of any judgment obtained.”6 Applying this rule, the insurance contract must be construed in favor of coverage.7
The language of Appellant York’s policy clearly states that Appellee, Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, would “pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any insured becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.” The policy defines an insured as “you or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer.” (Emphasis Added). As this policy was maintained by Appellant York’s father, Appellant York qualifies as an insured during his use of any automobile.
The Court of Appeals held in State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ellis that an unlicensed fourteen year old child of an insured was covered by her father’s policy even though the truck was taken without his permission.8 The facts of Ellis were clear that the fourteen year old child took her father’s truck “without a reasonable belief’ that she was permitted to do so. In Ellis, the same non-permissive user exclusion was present, but the Court of Appeals held that an ambiguity arose when that exclusion was applied to a family member.9 As an ambiguity was present, the insurance contract was “liberally construed in favor of the insured and the exclusion was strictly construed to make insurance effective.”
In this case two polices were paid for and an innocent party was injured, but coverage is being denied. Such a result subverts compulsory liability insurance.
*296The trial judge, Judge Maride, was correct when he stated that the exclusionary language did not apply to the York policy because “the public policy of Kentucky requires liberal construction in favor of coverage for injury to a third party” and “[t]he aforesaid exclusion did not specifically reference insureds.” Moreover, the majority disregards the holding in Ellis in contravention to our long established policy of interpreting insurance contracts so that injured victims have a remedy.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the Court of Appeals. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Kentucky Farm Bureau’s contract was not ambiguous, and that it should be construed to deny minimum statutory insurance coverage to an innocent victim.
SCOTT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.
. KRS 304.39-010.
. KRS 304.39-010(2).
. Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky.1981) (holding that “[a]n exclusionary clause in an insurance contract which reduces below minimum or eliminates either of these coverages effectively renders a driver uninsured to the extent of the reduction or elimination. Because the stated purpose of the MVRA is to assure that a driver be insured to a minimum level, such an exclusion provision contravenes the purpose and policy of the compulsory insurance act.”).
. KRS 304.39-010. See also McGrew v. Stone, 998 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Ky.1999).
. McGrew, 998 S.W.2d at 6 citing Beacon Ins. Co. of America v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Ky.1990).
. 15 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky.2000).
. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273 (Ky.1991).
. 700 S.W.2d 801 (Ky.App.1985).
. Id. at 802.