In Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976), released today, we examined the legislative grant of immunity to the state per 1964 PA 170; MCLA 691.1401 et seq., MSA 3.996(101) et seq.
In the instant case, we are called upon to examine the common-law doctrine of state governmental immunity. We hold that the common-law doctrine of state governmental immunity is abrogated. This ruling is prospective, with the exception of the instant case and any cases now pending in which an express challenge to the common-law defense of state governmental immunity has been made and preserved.
I.
According to plaintiffs’ complaint, Paul Pittman, then a 16-year-old student in the Taylor Public Schools, was provided with chemicals by the individually named teachers to construct a rocket as a science project. On April 24, 1969, Paul began to mix the chemicals at his home. An explosion resulted and he was severely injured.
On April 20, 1972, suit was filed against the City of Taylor, the Taylor Board of Education, the individual teachers and the chemical manufacturer.
The City of Taylor moved for summary judgment arguing that the Taylor Board of Education *46was an agency of the state over which the city had no control, thus they could not be liable for its actions. Summary judgment for the city was granted on July 21, 1972. This order was not appealed.
The Taylor Board of Education moved for summary judgment on grounds of state governmental immunity. Summary judgment for the board was granted on July 17, 1972. It is that judgment which we are called upon to review.
II.
Unlike Thomas, supra, which raised issues of immunity under the terms of the governmental immunity act, MCLA 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq., this case must be resolved according to common-law governmental tort immunity extant in 1969.
The governmental immunity act was originally enacted in 1964. The specific section granting immunity, 1964 PA 170, § 7 (MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]), was found to exceed the scope of the title of the act. Consequently, it was declared an unconstitutionally enacted provision under Const 1963, art 4, § 24, Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151; 188 NW2d 593 (1971), and was void from the date of its original passage. Briggs v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon, 379 Mich 160; 150 NW2d 752 (1967). The Legislature did not cure the constitutional defect until the enactment of 1970 PA 155, effective August 1, 1970. Thus, as appellant claims, any claim arising prior to August 1, 1970, is subject to the common-law governmental tort immunity.1
*47In determining what that common law was, we see no purpose in reviewing the extensive list of cases that have followed this Court’s initial attempt at abolishing governmental tort immunity and which did in fact abolish immunity for municipal corporations.2 Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).
We acknowledge that on April 24, 1969, the state, including school boards, enjoyed immunity from tort liability under common-law principles. Sayers v School District No 1, Fractional, 366 Mich 217; 114 NW2d 191 (1962).
However, we are now persuaded that those principles should no longer be given effect.
An examination of the origins of common-law governmental immunity in this country would show that the importation of the principle was the product of an unfortunate "misunderstanding”3 *48more appropriate to life and government in the early 19th century than to the age of pervasive governmental activity we know today.
In Michigan, the doctrine of governmental immunity was shaped in its early days by the "experience and environment” of our esteemed forebears on the bench. In later days the courts all too often applied the outmoded forms of the past.4 The distinction present in our case law between the immunity of the state and that of other governmental units seems particularly anachronistic in today’s society.
Government "instituted for [the] equal benefit, security and protection [of the people]”5 must accept responsibility for misfeasance causing injury to its citizens during the course of normal governmental operations.6 "It is plainly unjust to refuse relief to persons injured by the wrongful conduct of the State. No one seems to defend that refusal as fair.” Willis v Department of Conservation & Economic Development, 55 NJ 534, 537-538; 264 A2d 34, 36 (1970).
The reasons given by this Court for abolishing the common-law defense of governmental immunity for municipal corporations are equally relevant in this situation.
"The rule of governmental immunity has as legal defense only the argument that age has lent weight to the unjust whim of long-dead kings. It is hard to say why the courts of America have adhered to this relic of *49absolutism so long a time after America overthrew monarchy itself!
"[I]n relation to the doctrine of governmental immunity, 'the application of the rule is more harmful than helpful and results in more injustice than it prevents.’ ”
Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 258, 265; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).
The Court was faced with a related situation in Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), wherein we abrogated the common-law immunity of charitable institutions: "It is our conclusion that there is today no factual justification for immunity in a case such as this, and that principles of law, logic, and intrinsic justice demand that the mantle of immunity be withdrawn”. Id at 25. That same analysis is appropriate to this case.
"The doctrine of governmental immunity is an historical anachronism which manifests an inefficient public policy and works injustice upon everyone concerned.” Brown v Wichita State University, 217 Kan 279, 297; 540 P2d 66 (1975).7
Accordingly, we hold that the traditional common-law judge-made immunity that the state and its instrumentalities heretofore enjoyed from its torts should be and it hereby is abrogated.8
*50In so doing, we agree with the Supreme Court of Minnesota that
"[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is an exception to the fundamental concept of tort law that liability follows tortious conduct and that individuals and corporations are responsible for the acts of their employees acting in the course of their employment. We are aware of no substantial reasons, and none have been called to our attention, which support the continuation of this exception to the well-established principles of tort law. And we will certainly not retain the doctrine on the basis of stare decisis alone.
" ' * * * [W]hen a rule, after it has been tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.’ Cardozo, Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, pp 107, 152 (1947).
"The reasons for the creation of the state’s tort immunity are now obscured. * * * Because no compelling reasons have been presented in support of its continued existence, we have concluded that the time has come for the abandonment of the rule.” Nieting v Blondell,—Minn—; 235 NW2d 597, 601 (1975).
As we said in Williams: "We eliminate from the case law of Michigan an ancient rule inherited from the days of absolute monarchy which has been productive of great injustice in our courts”. Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 250; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).
The holding we announce today is prospective, with the exception of the instant case and any cases now pending in which an express challenge to the common-law defense of governmental immunity had been made and preserved. See Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946).
The Wayne County Circuit Court order of July 17, 1972, granting summary judgment in favor of *51the Taylor Board of Education is hereby vacated and this case remanded to Wayne County Circuit Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
No costs, a public question.
Levin and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, C. J.In reaching this result we reexamined the case of McDowell v State Highway Commissioner, 365 Mich 268; 112 NW2d 491 (1961). In McDowell, the majority of the Court concluded that 1945 PA 87 *47granted statutory tort immunity to the state. This conclusion, we believe, was erroneous. The Legislature in 1945 PA 87 did not statutorily grant to the state governmental tort immunity. Rather, it repealed the statutory waiver of immunity found in 1943 PA 237 and returned the state to the common-law immunity it had enjoyed prior to the 1943 amendment. This conclusion was correctly explained by Justice Edwards dissenting in McDowell:
"By this statute [1945 PA 87], the legislature repealed PA 1939, No 135, § 24, as amended by PA 1943, No 237, the amendment being a legislative grant of the right of maintaining tort actions against the State. By enactment of this statute, the legislature moved to abolish the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity. By repealing this statute, the legislature returned to its prior posture which was no statutory provision on the subject whatsoever.
"It is now proposed that the citizens of this State should be held to be barred from maintaining tort actions against the State by 2 statutory enactments which achieved utter negation. The undersigned cannot agree to such logic.” 365 Mich 268, 272-273.
See also, Cooperrider, The Court, the Legislature, and Governmental Tort Liability in Michigan, 72 Mich L Rev 187, 262-263 (1973).
For an exhaustive review of those cases, see Cooperrider, fn 1 supra.
The term "misunderstanding” is employed by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in his analysis of the origin of the doctrine in United States jurisprudence. 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 25.01, pp 435-439.
Cooperrider, supra, p 188.
Const 1963, art 1, § 1.
As was stated in Williams, supra, "We deal in this case with a declaration which would clearly state an ordinary tort claim against a private individual or a private corporation. Our holding herein is limited to the statement that there is no longer any judicial doctrine of governmental immunity as to such a claim. "364 Mich at 260.
All except 13 states have abolished or limited the governmental immunity defense of the state. See Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and Prospects For the Future, 10 Suff U L Rev 521, 524, fn 13 (1976).
We reiterate that our holding in this case abolishes common-law governmental immunity. Such immunity was judicially created and, when it becomes clear that it works an injustice, it may be judicially abrogated. In Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976), we are faced with a statutory grant of immunity. We are required to give effect to the statute, whether we think its policy is wise or not, unless it violates the Constitution.