(dissenting). The question is whether the Legislature, in providing, in § 3109a1 of the no-fault automobile liability act, owners of automobiles with the choice of purchasing no-fault insurance with coordination or without coordination of the medical expense component of no-fault benefits with other health coverage, intended that injured persons, who are covered by a no-fault policy the owner opted, for a higher premium, not to coordinate, would recover medical expense both from a no-fault insurer and any health insurer. I would hold that the Legislature intended that, in such a case, there be a so-called "double recovery,” and that the effort of Physicians Health Plan, Inc., the defendant health provider, to relieve itself of the burden of the medical costs arising out of the automobile accident that gave rise to this litigation is violative of § 3109a.
When the no-fault automobile liability act was enacted in 1972,2 there was no provision for coordination of the medical expense component of no-fault benefits with other health care insurance or coverage.3 As a result, a person injured in an automobile accident often obtained a double recovery — a recovery of medical expense from both the no-fault insurer and the insurer under any health *762care insurance purchased by or for the injured person.4
The no-fault act was amended in 1974 to provide owners of automobiles with the "opportunity”5 to coordinate the medical expense component of a no-fault policy with other health coverage. The amendment, adding § 3109a to the Insurance Code, requires a no-fault insurer to "offer, ” at a reduced premium, no-fault automobile insurance coordinated with other health coverage.6 The Insurance *763Commissioner and the Legislature anticipated, correctly, that most automobile owners would avail themselves of the opportunity to reduce the cost of automobile insurance in exchange for relinquishing the opportunity for a double recovery.7
*764Coordination, however, was not — and is not8— mandatory. It was and is the automobile owner’s option.9 If he did not choose to coordinate, he would, perforce, be in the same position as before the 1974 amendment; in the event of an automobile accident, there would be a double recovery of medical expense — recovery from both the automobile insurer and the health care insurer. That the Legislature recognized and contemplated that there would be double recovery clearly appears from the following statement in the analysis of HB 5724, which became § 3109a, prepared by the House Insurance Committee:
"The bill does not make it mandatory for an insurance buyer to select these deductibles and *765exclusions so many could still opt for overlapping coverage.” [Quoted in LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 410 Mich 173, 196; 301 NW2d 775 (1981). Emphasis added.]
As set forth in part hi, in 1974, when § 3109a was added to the Insurance Code, there were no hmos such as defendant php. Other health coverage meant health insurance provided, for most Michigan residents, by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan, or by other insurers such as Prudential Insurance Company of America, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and Aetna Life Insurance Company. Because an injured person had a choice of physicians under both no-fault and health care policies, there was no reason in 1974 to purchase the overlapping coverage that the Legislature contemplated that "many could still opt for” other than to obtain a double recovery.
This Court — seven years after the no-fault act became effective — observed in 1981, over thirteen years ago, that § 3109a, in providing the automobile owner the option of coordinating or not coordinating, implements "cost reduction” "on an individual basis rather than in blanket fashion,” and allows individual automobile owners to "tailor their insurance coverage to their own special needs.”10 (Emphasis added.)
The Court contrasted the operative effect of § 3109(1),11 which "requires a subtraction of government benefits from no-fault benefits otherwise payable,” with the operative effect of § 3109a which "permits a set-off of 'other health and accident coverage’ at the insured’s option.”12
*766If the automobile owner elected to coordinate, the health care insurer was primarily liable for payment of medical expense, and the automobile no-fault insurer was responsible for excess medical expense — medical expense beyond what the health care insurer had agreed to furnish.13 Federal Kemper Ins Co, Inc v Health Ins Administration, Inc, 424 Mich 537; 383 NW2d 590 (1986).14
Today — twenty years after § 3109a was added to the no-fault act — the majority concludes that an owner of an automobile who exercises his option to purchase no-fault automobile insurance that is not *767coordinated with health care coverage is not entitled to obtain a double recovery.15
i
In every case where this Court has heretofore considered § 3109a,16 legislative intent has been the lodestar in deciding the issue presented, without regard to whether the dispute was between a no-fault insurer and a health care insurer, as in Federal Kemper, or between a health care insurer or provider and a consumer, as in Tousignant17 or Owens.18
Today, in the name of reducing the cost of health care or health care insurance, and in implementation of the majority’s perception of sound public policy, the majority states that it finds "no intent by the Legislature,” in enacting § 3109a, requiring no-fault insurers to offer coordinated coverage at a reduced cost, to "prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefit clauses in the coverage provided by the health insurance policy.”19
Thus, although this Court found in Federal Kemper, in which the automobile owner had exer*768cised his option to coordinate, a legislative intent to, in effect,20 "prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefits clauses in the coverage provided by the health insurance policy.”21
The Court thus had no difficulty "finding” legislative intent to "prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefits clauses” where automobile owners had elected to coordinate. But the majority concludes today, where an automobile owner elected not to coordinate, that there is no legislative intent, thereby freeing the majority, in the name of freedom of contract, to stand on its head the choice provided automobile owners by § 3109a to coordinate or not to coordinate the medical expense component of no-fault benefits with other health coverage.
A
In both Federal Kemper and in Tousignant v *769Allstate Ins Co, 444 Mich 301; 506 NW2d 844 (1993)/Owens v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 444 Mich 314; 506 NW2d 850 (1993), the unsuccessful litigants, the health care insurers and providers in Federal Kemper, the automobile owners in Tousig-nant and Owens, argued that allowing the injured person to recover from the no-fault insurer would avoid double recovery as effectively as allowing recovery against the health care insurer or provider.
In Federal Kemper, the health care insurers unsuccessfully argued that there would only be one recovery if this Court were to enforce the coordination of benefits clause in health insurers’ policies so that the no-fault insurer would be the primary source of recovery, and, indeed, the only source of recovery for medical expense.22
In Tousignant and Owens, the injured persons unsuccessfully argued that there would be only one recovery if they were permitted to recover from the no-fault insurer, rather than from the health care providers.
In the instant case, in which the automobile owner elected not to coordinate, defendant php, an hmo health care provider, succeeds in persuading a majority of this Court with a double recovery argument. The majority is persuaded that freedom of contract and public policy justify a revisionary approach to the construction and application of § 3109a. Heretofore, the Court found a legislative intent to in effect "prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefits clauses.”23 Today the majority is unable to find such an intent._
*770B
The lodestar is, or ought to be, legislative intent, not freedom of contract. This Court is necessarily construing § 3109a whether the automobile owner elects to coordinate or not to coordinate. When § 3109a was enacted, providing the automobile owner with the "opportunity” to coordinate the medical expense component of a no-fault policy with other health coverage, the Legislature provided the automobile owner an "option” to obtain a double recovery as under the original 1972 no-fault act. It was not to be the health care insurer’s choice, or, in those cases in which the employer provides health insurance as part of the remuneration package, the employer’s choice. Clearly, it was not to be the automobile insurer’s choice. Nor is it this Court’s choice.
Allowing an opportunity to obtain a double recovery of medical expense is indeed questionable public policy, as the Legislature recognized in providing automobile owners with the opportunity to purchase coordinated coverage, in the expectation that most automobile owners would, as they have, choose to reduce the cost of automobile insurance in exchange for the elimination of the redundancy of a double recovery.24 But the Legisla*771ture deliberately chose not to eliminate "overlapping coverage” and, as this Court observed in LeBlanc, to implement "[c]ost reduction” "on an individual basis rather than in blanket fashion” and to allow automobile owners to "tailor their insurance coverage to their own special needs.”25
In substituting its view of what constitutes sound public policy for the legislative decision to permit overlapping coverage, and the continuation of double recovery by those automobile owners willing to pay for overlapping coverage, this Court exceeds the appropriate exercise of its authority.
ii
Allowing health care insurers through coordination of benefits clauses to relieve themselves of the health care cost of automobile accidents would, as the Legislature recognized in 1974, tend to increase the overall cost of providing medical care to persons injured in automobile accidents because health care policies "have established limits on their reimbursement of doctor and hospital expenses.”26 In 1974, there were no "established limits” *772on the obligation of a no-fault insurer to pay medical expense of an injured person.27 The question whether such limits should be established may yet be on the November ballot.
iii
The majority, recognizing that an automobile owner who exercises his option not to coordinate the medical expense component of his no-fault insurance with other health coverage has paid an additional premium therefor, suggests a reason for purchasing overlapping coverage other than to obtain a double recovery. The majority points out that where the health coverage is provided by an hmo, such as the defendant php, "the ability to seek treatment outside the service area is limited. Purchasers who elect uncoordinated no-fault may have a greater range of choice and control over who their treating physician will be, what type of treatment is possible, and where such treatment can be obtained.”28
In 1974, when § 3109a was enacted, other health coverage was provided by health insurers, principally by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan and other insurers such as Prudential Insurance Company of America, Aetna Life Insurance Company, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
There were no hmos in 1974. The hmo enabling act was enacted in 1974.29 The first hmos were licensed in 1975. The largest hmo today, Health Alliance Plan, was licensed in 1979. Defendant php was licensed in 1981, seven years after § 3109a was enacted._
*773The Legislature, in permitting the continuation of overlapping coverage for injured persons where an automobile owner chooses not to coordinate, could not, in 1974, have had in mind the reason suggested by the majority of enabling injured persons covered by an hmo plan to have a choice of physician and ability to obtain medical care "outside the service area.” In 1974, because other health coverage was provided by insurers, freedom of choice of physician and portability of coverage was a feature of all other health coverage.
Michigan citizens who have other health coverage generally have such coverage through an insurer, not a provider such as an hmo. The reason suggested by the majority does not explain why a person whose other health coverage was, or is now with bcbsm, Prudential, Metropolitan, Aetna, or another health insurer, would continue to pay the higher premium for uncoordinated coverage. Even those whose coverage is through an hmo may be content, as was the plaintiff in the instant case, with the choice of physician provided by the hmo. The majority has yet to supply a reason for an automobile owner opting to pay the higher premium for uncoordinated coverage, other than to have overlapping coverage and the possibility of a double recovery.
The majority observes, in response, that "it is not the responsibility of the health insurer to provide the benefit the insured seeks from the no-fault carrier,” he "contracted for uncoordinated benefits from his no-fault insurer,, which he received, and for coordinated coverage from his health insurer, which he received. That the insured did not get more than his bargain is not a *774problem to be rectified by either the health insurer or this Court.”30
The automobile owner/insured in Federal Kem-per also "contracted for . . . coordinated coverage from his health insurer.” He did not, however, receive coordinated coverage from his health insurer. He received, contrary to his contract with the health insurer, uh"coordinated coverage from his health insurer.” This Court so mandated, in Federal Kemper, in order to effectuate the legislative intent in enacting § 3109a; the Court was of the opinion, contrary to what the majority says today, that it was "the responsibility of the health insurer to provide the benefit [reduced no-fault insurance premium rates] the insured seeks from the no-fault carrier.”
This Court, in Federal Kemper, saw that implementation of legislative intent required that result even though § 3109a does not specifically "regulate[ ],”31 "substantively dictate the *775terms,”32 or control "the status of health insurance”33 or "prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefit clauses in the coverage provided by the health insurance policy.”34
The law of economics made that the only reasonable conclusion. Any other conclusion would have rendered the option granted the automobile owner/insured meaningless; as the Court says today, the automobile owner/insured’s "option would be rendered meaningless if health care providers are allowed to opt out when the no-fault coverage is coordinated.”35
The law of economics required a decision in Federal Kemper in favor of no-fault insurers because a no-fault insurer could not provide automobile no-fault insurance coordinated with other health insurance at the legislatively contemplated reduced premium unless there was a reduction in its financial exposure — a reduction that would be defeated if the coordination-of-benefits clause the automobile owner/insured contracted for with his health insurer were valid.
The same law of economics should be observed by this Court in the analysis and resolution of the issue here presented. An automobile owner/ insured who elects not to coordinate, does so to obtain the legislatively contemplated "overlapping coverage,”36 with the consequent double recovery. Just as the law of economics requires that there be a reduction in an automobile insurer’s exposure in exchange for a reduced premium, so, too, it requires an increase in coverage to an automobile *776owner/insured in exchange for a nonreduced premium — "double” coverage for "double” premium.
Enforcement today of the health insurer’s coordination clause defeats the automobile owner/ insured’s economically and legislatively based expectation as surely as it would have defeated the automobile insurer’s economically and legislatively based expectation if this Court had decided Federal Kemper differently. Why the law of economics does not make clear the correct path of decision in this case as it did in Federal Kemper has yet to be explained.
The Court’s holding, sustaining the validity of the health insurer’s coordination clause, stultifies the option legislatively granted to the automobile owner/insured not to coordinate, defies the law of economics, and substitutes the Court’s judgment of sound public policy for that of the Legislature. However outdated37 the legislative judgment may appear to the majority to be, twenty years after § 3109a was added to the no-fault act, the Court should resist the temptation to do the right thing for the wrong reason.38
There is no windfall to a person injured in an automobile accident where the no-fault insurance was not coordinated with other health coverage— the owner of the automobile paid a higher premium for the overlapping coverage and double recovery to tailor, in the words of this Court, his *777insurance coverage to his "own special needs.”39 Today’s decision denies automobile owners, in the name of freedom of contract for health insurers/ providers, the benefit of the bargain automobile owners and no-fault insurers made in reliance on this Court’s earlier decisions.
There is, however, a windfall. The windfall is to health insurers and providers who have been collecting premiums for years on the basis that the health insurer/provider is primary without regard to the language of the health insurer’s/provider’s policy.
The defendant php was, of course, unable to show that it had reduced its premium charges because of the clause in its contract that would make the no-fault insurer primary. Php’s lawyers would not have advised php that it could prudently price the health care coverage it was agreeing to provide subscribers on the assumption that this clause, found by this Court in Federal Kemper to be unenforceable when an automobile owner elects to coordinate, would be found to be valid by this Court when an automobile owner elects not to coordinate.
iv
The purpose of § 3109a was to reduce the cost of automobile insurance, not the cost of providing health care or health care insurance.
The cost to health care insurers/providers of providing care to persons injured in automobile accidents will be reduced. But the cost of health care may increase, as the Legislature apparently thought in deciding that it was in the public *778interest that health care insurers be primary for an automobile accident.40
There is no assurance that this Court’s decision will result in a reduction of premium charges by health insurers/providers. This Court is in no position to monitor what health insurers/providers do in this regard.41
v
The majority refers42 to the Coordination of Benefits Act43 and a provision44 in chapter 36 of the Insurance Code. The Coordination of Benefits Act concerns competing coordination of benefits clauses in policies of health insurance, not a coordination of benefits clause that would, in effect, make an automobile no-fault insurer primary. Chapter 36 concerns group and blanket disability insurance; the provision adverted to by the majority concerns coordination of benefits otherwise payable under other group insurance and, among other things, "[ajutomobile medical payment insur-*779anee.” Automobile medical payment insurance is not no-fault insurance.45
It is again significant that the majority, in citing these inapposite legislative enactments, ignores the failure of the Legislature in the recent 1993 legislation to eliminate, while amending § 3109a,46 the opportunity for. a double recovery that the majority finds so offensive.
VI
I agree with the majority47 that there is no need to consider whether § 3109a is preempted by the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act.48
In Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Frederick & Herrud, Inc, 443 Mich 358, 389-390; 505 NW2d 820 (1993), this Court held that by reason of the erisa, an unambiguous coordination of benefits clause in an erisa health and welfare benefit plan "must be given its plain meaning despite the existence of a similar clause in a no-fault policy,” and that to the extent that Federal Kemper "is inconsistent with our holding today, it is overruled.” This Court emphasized in conclusion "that the primacy of health care coverage over that in a no-fault policy continues in Michigan jurisprudence in all cases not within the purview” of the Court’s "narrow holding” in that case. Id., p 390.
VII
The majority states that the question presented *780is whether § 3109a "requires health insurers whose policies contain coordination of benefits clauses to reimburse an insured for medical expenses paid by an automobile no-fault insurer under a policy in which the insured elected uncoordinated medical coverage.”49 (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, it appears that the no-fault insurer provided funds to cover Michelle Smith’s medical expenses, which were transmitted to defendant php, which was the hmo provider of health care for her family. The question presented is not whether an hmo provider is obligated to "reimburse” or otherwise pay money to an hmo insured, but rather whether an hmo provider may, consistent with § 3109a, demand payment for services, where the automobile owner elected not to coordinate that it would be required, under Federal Kemper, to render without charge if the owner of the automobile had elected to coordinate.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1).
1972 PA 294, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.
See O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 550; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).
See also analysis of HB 5724 prepared by the House Insurance Committee referred to and quoted in ns 5, 14 and 26.
Id.
"The bill [that provided for the addition of § 3109a to the Insurance Code, see n 6] would make it possible to eliminate the current situation in which persons insured under accident and health policies which include medical expense and loss of wages benefits may collect benefits from such coverage and from their no-fault personal protection benefits. This double recovery is contrary to public policy in that it is wasteful and can result in an insured receiving more income when recuperating than when working.
"The bill gives each consumer the chance to select or reject deductibles based on his existing non-automotive health and accident coverage. Currently, insurers writing approximately 90% of Michigan’s no-fault coverage do not allow the consumer to make such a choice.” [Letter dated February 26, 1974, from Daniel J. Demlow, Commissioner of Insurance, to Governor William G. Milliken, quoted in LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 410 Mich 173, 195; 301 NW2d 775 (1981). Emphasis added.]
"The bill [that provided for the addition of § 3109a to the Insurance Code, see n 6] would save millions of dollars for Michigan drivers and would offer them an opportunity to eliminate their duplicate, overlapping insurance coverage since automobile insurers would be required to offer deductibles of exclusions which wrap-around a policy-holder’s health and accident coverage. No-fault insurers would offer these deductions at reduced premiums, and State insurance officials estimate the 5 to 6 million Michigan drivers could save $100 million annually.” [Analysis of HB 5724 prepared by the House Insurance Committee (February 27, 1974), quoting from LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, n 4 supra, p 196. Emphasis added.]
Section 3109a was added to the no-fault act (1972 PA 294) by 1974 PA 72, and provides:
*763An insurer providing personal protection insurance benefits shall offer, at appropriately reduced premium rates, deductibles and exclusions reasonably related to other health and accident coverage on the insured. The deductibles and exclusions required to be offered by this section shall be subject to prior approval by the commissioner and shall apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the policy, the spouse of the insured and any relative of either domiciled in the same household. [MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1). Emphasis added.]
Nineteen years later, this section was amended by 1993 PA 143. The language enacted in 1974 is now subsection (1) of § 3109a; there is no substantive change: The second sentence was changed to add the word "are” in place of the first "shall” in that sentence and to eliminate the second "shall” in that sentence. The following new subsections (2) and (3) were added:
(2) Health and accident coverage that does not become effective until after the date of the injury is secondary to personal protection insurance benefits for all services related to the injury.
(3) Coverage under title XVIII of the social security act, chapter 531, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C. 1395-1395b, 1395b-2, 1395c to 1395i, 1395Í-2 to 1395Í-4, 1395j to 1395t, 1395u to 1395w-2, 1395w-4 to 1395ccc, or title XIX of the social security act, chapter 531, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C. 1396 to 1396f and 1396i to 1396u, or coverage pursuant to a medicare supplemental policy or certificate or a contract issued by a health maintenance organization to an individual eligible for medicare is not considered other health and accident coverage for purposes of this section.
Act 143 was not given immediate effect, and thus the amendment ordinarily becomes effective by April 1, 1994, ninety days after the adjournment of the Legislature.
"Offer of such deductibles and exclusions will virtually eliminate the current overlap of coverage which occurs when an insured has both the no-fault personal protection benefits and other health and accident coverage which, like the personal protection benefits, covers medical expenses connected with auto accidents and other accidents.
"The bill will eliminate or drastically reduce the incidence of *764overlapping coverage for medical expenses related to automobile accidents and hence reduce the cost of such insurance to the insured.” [Letter dated February 26, 1974 from Daniel J. Demlow, Commissioner of Insurance, to Governor William G. Milliken, quoted in LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, n 4 supra, p 194. Emphasis added.]
See n 6 in which the text of § 3109a, as originally enacted in 1974 and the 1993 amendment adding two subsections are set forth.
It is noteworthy that, in its comprehensive reviews of the no-fault act from time to time since 1974, and the amendment of various sections of the act at fifteen legislative sessions, the Legislature has not eliminated the automobile owner’s option to not coordinate the medical expense component of his no-fault coverage with other health coverage.
It is especially noteworthy that the 1993 legislation, which represents a substantial overhaul of the no-fault act, and which focused on § 3109a to the extent of adding two subsections, did not eliminate the automobile owner’s option not to coordinate.
LeBlanc, n 4 supra, p 197, in which the Court said:
Section 3109a permits a set-off of "other health and accident coverage” at the insured’s option.
The majority acknowledges that the automobile owner has the "option of choosing between uncoordinated or coordinated no-fault automobile insurance . . . .” Ante, p 752. "There is no doubt that the Legislature intended § 3109a to give the option of coordinating to the consumer.” Ante, p 755.
LeBlanc, supra, p 197.
MCL 500.3109; MSA 24.13109.
The Court observed that permissive § 3109a, "like [mandatory] § 3109(1), serves to eliminate duplicate recovery and to contain or *766reduce insurance costs; additionally, it allows individuals to tailor their insurance coverage to their own special needs. Cost reduction is implemented under § 3109a on an individual basis rather than in blanket fashion.” LeBlanc, supra, p 197.
The obligation of the no-fault insurer to pay medical expense is statutory. MCL 500.3107(l)(a); MSA 24.13107(l)(a), provides: "Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” The obligation of the no-fault insurer in that regard is comprehensive. See Manley v DAIIE, 425 Mich 140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986); Nasser v ACIA, 435 Mich 33; 457 NW2d 637 (1990). Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443; 499 NW2d 22 (1993).
The no-fault act does not set forth the scope of the obligation of a health care insurer. It is beyond the issue presented in this case to consider whether other statutes mandate, or empower the Commissioner of Insurance to regulate, in whole or in part, the scope of health care coverage. Be that as it may, I agree with the majority that, absent such statutes or regulations, health care providers and insurers have a measure of freedom of contract regarding the scope of coverage they provide that no-fault insurers do not have, because the scope of the medical expense component of no-fault benefits is statutory.
In Federal Kemper, this Court held that although a policy of health insurance provides that the benefits thereunder are secondary to those provided under a no-fault automobile policy, the health insurer is primarily liable for payment of the health insured’s medical expense.
The Analysis of HB 5724, prepared by the House Insurance Committee and quoted in n 26, states that health care costs "could be contained to a greater extent with health and accident as primary coverage.”
See n 9 and accompanying text.
O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, n 3 supra, p 550; LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, supra, p 195; Federal Kemper Ins Co, Inc v Health Ins Administration, Inc, supra; Tatum v Government Employees Ins Co, 431 Mich 663; 431 NW2d 391 (1988); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508; 460 NW2d 194 (1990); John Hancock Property & Casualty Ins Cos v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 437 Mich 368; 471 NW2d 541 (1991); ACIA v Frederick & Herrud, Inc, 443 Mich 358; 505 NW2d 820 (1993); Profit v Citizens Ins Co of America, 444 Mich 281; 506 NW2d 514 (1993); Tousignant v Allstate Ins Co, 444 Mich 301; 506 NW2d 844 (1993); Owens v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 444 Mich 314; 506 NW2d 850 (1993).
See n 16 for full citation. See also n 21.
See n 16 for full citation. See also n 21.
Ante, p 746.
The Legislature did not in terms prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefits clauses in the coverage provided by a health insurance policy. Nor did Federal Kemper expressly prohibit health insurers from including coordination of benefits clauses. But, in denying enforcement of coordination of benefits clauses in a health insurance policy, Federal Kemper did, in effect, prohibit health insurers from including such clauses.
In Tousignant and Owens, in which the automobile owners also had exercised their option to coordinate, the Court found a legislative intent to bar them from obtaining medical care from the no-fault insurer in preference to a health care provider. In Tousignant, this Court said:
Whether the controversy is between a no-fault and a health insurer as in Kemper, or is between a no-fault insurer and a no-fault insured, as in the instant case, to make effective the legislative policy underlying § 3109a, the health insurer is the primary insurer to the extent the health insurer has agreed to pay for or provide necessary medical care. [Tousignant, n 16 supra, p 308. Emphasis added.]
Alternatively, health care insurers argued, also unsuccessfully, that the cost of such expense should be shared by the health and automobile insurers. See St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v American Home Assurance Co, 444 Mich 560; 514 NW2d 113 (1994).
See n 20 and accompanying text.
See n 4. The letter from the Commissioner of Insurance to the Governor there set forth stated that "double recovery is contrary to public policy.”
There were, however, competing policy considerations and interests. As set forth in the analysis of HB 5724 prepared by the House Insurance Committee, the Michigan Association of Insurance Companies did not support the bill.
Section 3109a was a compromise that the Commissioner of Insurance and the Governor both favored. While today it may appear to some that eliminating double recovery is the foremost policy consideration, at the time those involved, and most importantly the Legislature, decided to make coordination optional and not mandatory, recognizing that there would continue to be overlapping coverage and resulting double recovery by those who became involved in injury *771accidents who had been willing to pay the higher no-fault premium for uncoordinated coverage.
The legislative expectation was that most automobile owners would not be willing to pay the higher premium, and that has been the experience — most automobile owners choose to pay the lower premium that goes with coordinated medical expense coverage.
See n 12.
"The skyrocketing hospital and medical costs could be contained to a greater extent with health and accident as the primary coverage since these policies, like the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, have established limits on their reimbursement of doctor and hospital expenses. A physician who knows his or her patient has unlimited medical coverage has no incentive to keep the doctor bill at a minimum.” [Analysis of HB 5724 prepared by the House Insurance Committee, quoted in LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, supra, pp 197-198.]
See n 13. 1993 PA 143 establishes limits to the no-fault insurer’s obligation under § 3107 to pay medical expenses of an injured person.
Ante, p 759.
1974 PA 264, former MCL 325.901 et seq.-, MSA 14.1280(1) et seq., now MCL 333.21001 et seq.; MSA 14.15(21001) et seq.
Ante, p 759, n 13.
The majority states:
In response to Justice Levin’s dissent, post, pp 772-773, in which it is asserted that the majority has not provided a reason that an insured would purchase uncoordinated no-fault insurance other than double recovery, we observe that even if double recovery is the aim of the insured, it is not the responsibility of the health insurer to provide the benefit the insured seeks from the no-fault carrier. While it may be obvious that the insured wanted double recovery, the fact remains that he only contracted with one of the two necessary parties. He contracted for uncoordinated benefits from his no-fault insurer, which ■ he received, and for coordinated coverage from his health insurer, which he received. That the insured did not get more than his bargain is not a problem to be rectified by either the health insurer or this Court.
The statement that the "fact remains that [the automobile owner/ insured] only contracted with one of the two necessary parties” seems inconsistent with the next sentence, stating that he "contracted for uncoordinated benefits from his no-fault insurer . . . and for coordinated coverage from his health insurer.”
Ante, p 750.
Ante, p 754.
Ante, p 756.
Ante, p 746.
Ante, p 755.
See text following n 9.
Employers who wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to reduce the cost of providing health insurance by transferring part of the burden to automobile insurers may already be seeking to avail themselves of this Court’s decision in Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Frederick & Herrud, Inc, 443 Mich 358, 389-390; 505 NW2d 820 (1993).
In all events, in recognition of the tens, possibly hundreds of millions of dollars paid by automobile owners/insureds for overlapping coverage, any change in the law should be made prospective.
With acknowledgment to T. S. Elliot, Murder in the Cathedral, pt. i.
See n 10 and accompanying text.
See part n.
Section 3109a requires the Commissioner of Insurance to monitor what automobile no-fault insurers do in this regard.
Ante, p 750, n 5.
The majority also refers (ante, p 754, n 6) to a provision of The Nonprofit Health Care Corporation Reform Act (1980 PA 350, MCL 550.1101 et seq.; MSA 24.660[101] et seq.) that authorizes bsbcm to issue a certificate that, provides "for the coordination of benefits, subrogation, and the nonduplication of benefits.” MCL 550.1401(4); MSA 24.660(401X4). Clearly, this language does not address the question whether enforcing such a provision in a certificate issued by bcbsm would be consistent with the legislative policy embodied in § 3109a. We know from Federal Kemper that such a provision is unenforceable where the automobile owner elects to coordinate. It begs the question presented in this case to cite this provision as bearing on the correct resolution of the question presented.
1984 PA 64, MCL 550.251 et seq.; MSA 24.13671 et seq.
MCL 500.3610a; MSA 24.13610(1).
Automobile medical payment insurance is the kind of coverage that was provided under automobile liability policies issued before the no-fault act. Such policies may still be issued in states that do not have a no-fault act, or in states that provide, under their no-fault act, benefits that differ significantly from those provided under this state’s no-fault act.
See n 6 for text of § 3109a and the 1993 amendments.
Ante, p 746, n 2.
29 USC 1001 et seq.
Ante, p 746.