(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
OVERVIEW
The following is my view on this case believing the majority's authorities support my position. A vital flaw in the majority’s holding is that it uses a historical perspective to support its conclusion, but it fails to include the history behind the phrase “voting resident.” Thus, the writing I now contribute analyzes the latter phrase and reaches the opposite result. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Significant to the issues before this Court is when Severson and Caldwell became eligible to serve as judges in their respective circuits. In Article V, § 6 of the South Dakota Constitution, we find the necessary residency qualifications:
Justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the circuit courts and persons presiding over the courts of limited jurisdiction must be citizens of the United States, residents of the state of South Dakota and voting residents within the district, circuit, or jurisdiction from which they are elected or appointed.
The Constitution plainly states that Sever-son and Caldwell must be “voting residents within the district, circuit, or jurisdiction from which they are elected or appointed.” (Emphasis supplied). After review of the South Dakota law, reports of the Constitutional Revision Commission, and decisions *505from other jurisdictions, the majority writing holds “that a person appointed to the office of circuit court judge must establish residency in that circuit prior to assuming said office.” With this part of the holding, I concur. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the majority writing for the very authorities upon which it relies mandates the opposite conclusion: Applicants are not eligible for appointment.
Perhaps the majority opinion is analytical and logical, but it does arrive at the wrong answer. It is unreasonable because it has missed the historical perspective of “voting resident.” It may be likened unto a person who is given a set of numbers. After totaling the figures, he or she reaches a correct and confident answer. Unfortunately, the answer is incorrect because one number was never furnished to the person doing the arithmetic. Although the majority writing has a confident answer, much like the mathematician above, it is missing some important information.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 4, 1992, Governor Mickel-son was served with an Application for Writ of Prohibition. On December 6, 1992, our Governor aggressively forged ahead, appointing Caldwell to the position of Circuit Judge of the First Judicial Circuit. She was then a voting resident of the Second Judicial Circuit. Severson was appointed to Circuit Judge for the Second Judicial Circuit. At that time, he was a voting resident of the Third Judicial Circuit. On December 11, 1992, the Governor caused to be filed with the Secretary of State Certificates of Appointment. As far as I can determine from the record herein, on December 11, 1992, Caldwell was not a voting resident of ,the First Judicial Circuit and Severson was not a voting resident of the Second Judicial Circuit. They were not voters there, did not vote there, and had essentially established only a mailing address there just days earlier. These appointees maintain that those facts are immaterial; they urge that if they become voting residents of the circuits to which they were appointed before taking the oath of office, they are in compliance with Section 6, Article V of our State Constitution. Needless to say, the two appointees, to bring themselves within their theory, trod to the respective courthouses and then and there (for the first time) become registered to vote. This is fast action in the practical world of State Government as it exists today.
ANALYSIS
Upon reading the writing of Justice Sabers, I was prone to concur therein. There are but few expressions therein to which I could not fully subscribe. Believing I have certain observations akin to his but are independent thoughts relating to the justice of this case, this dissent was born. I took it upon myself to read every page of all of the minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission. Under various discussions of the Judicial Article, the participants would mention, by consensus, that Judges should be “geographically distributed”; further, that there should be “geographical districts.” Sometimes, one reads “geographical areas.” Unquestionably, the geography of our state was in the minds of this Commission. See, as an example, the May 6 and 7,1971, minutes of said Commission. Therein, it reflects that the concept of electing judges be preserved and the election of circuit judges and justices be geographically distributed. There was very strong contention that Justices come from diverse areas in view of varying “terrain and economic factors.” This latter contention became a “consensus.”
If this state continues to follow the theory of the majority opinion, the people’s will shall be thwarted and we could entertain chaos. There are, as an example, lawyers licensed to practice law in South Dakota who live in many distant states. Many live in nearby Nebraska, Minnesota, and Iowa. Were they appointed, and never having lived in South Dakota, or having lived in South Dakota many years past, they could receive an appointment — register to vote in one day — and become a Circuit Judge the following day. Remember, Article V, Section 6, requires circuit judges to be voting residents of the circuit from which they *506are elected or appointed. Under the majority’s theory, a lawyer from Lemmon (extreme northwestern part of the state) may run for circuit judge located at Canton (extreme southeastern part of the state); he or she qualifies (even though a non-voting resident of the circuit wherein Canton is located), under the majority holding, so long as he or she is elected and takes the oath of office. Residence, as a requirement, would be rendered meaningless.
When reviewing constitutional amendments, we look to the historical background should there be ambiguity in the constitutional language requiring interpretation by principles of construction. South Dakota Auto Club Inc. v. Volk, 305 N.W.2d 693 (S.D.1981). The historical background provides guidance in addressing this issue. City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, 89 S.D. 455, 234 N.W.2d 35, 37 (1975).
On December 11, 1992, Governor Mickel-son officially appointed Severson as circuit court judge in the Second Circuit and Caldwell as circuit court judge in the First Circuit. Prior to their appointment, neither was a resident of the respective circuit. Upon notification of their impending appointments, both Severson and Caldwell registered to vote in counties located within their soon to be new home circuits. This action was taken in hopes of fulfilling the voting resident requirements of Art. V, § 6. Severson registered on December 1, 1992. Caldwell did not bother to register until the day of appointment. Ironically, Caldwell was a bona fide resident of the Second Circuit when the judicial position opened. Apparently, Severson got the Governor’s attention first.
In 1963, the Legislature enacted SDCL 12-4-8 detailing voter registration. When registering to vote, a person was required to attest to the following:
I hereby declare, under penalty of perjury, that I am a citizen of the United States and that I am or will be 21 years of age on the next ensuing School, Township, Special Municipal, Primary, General, or Independent School District Election and that I have resided in the United States 5 years, the State of South Dakota 1 year, _ County 90 days and the _ Ward and _ Precinct and ___ Independent School District 30 days and am legally qualified to vote.
By state law, as it existed in 1972, when the constitutional amendment became operative, one was obligated to reside in a county for at least 90 days before becoming a registered voter in that county. The majority relies upon the definition of voting residency as stated in SDCL 12-1-4. However, that statute was not enacted until 1973 — one year after the passage of the amendment. In 1972, the people perceived the amendment as “must be residents of the United States, residents of the state of South Dakota, and have resided for 90 days within the circuit from which they are appointed.” These words and “voter residents” were equivalent terms when Art. V, § 6 was passed. Thus, when voting on Art. V, § 6, voters knew of and were bound to the 90 day requirement.
I am cognizant of Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), where the United States Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee law requiring a three month residency to vote. Nowhere in that opinion did the Court limit durational requirements for judicial residency. Art. V, § 6 used voter residency as a measuring stick for length of residency, not as a means for restricting an appointee’s right to vote.
Although this 90 day requirement has since been removed from the statutes, it was a requirement for voter residency in 1972 when Art. V, § 6 was approved by voters. South Dakota voters could only vote on what they knew to be the law when they bought into the idea of amending the Constitution. It is the missing number. Statutorily, the Legislature may redefine a term, but to change the definition of the Constitution requires the vote of the people.
Therefore, Severson and Caldwell should be residents of Minnehaha and Lincoln Counties, respectively, for at least 90 days before becoming residents of their respective circuits. This would comport with the *507constitutional amendment and the intent of the people. Otherwise, we permit a feigned residency to be created upon the Governor’s notice of an intent to appoint: In essence, judicial carpetbagging. Although I do not suggest that they postpone their right to register to vote, I do profess that the voters in 1972 understood that their judges would reside in the circuit at least 90 days before being appointed as circuit judge.
Intent of the drafters of the amendment, although extremely important, should not be the singular focus; rather, we must strongly consider that which the people knew the law to be when they cast their ballots for the constitutional amendment. This amendment was submitted to an informed electorate who must be presumed to have known the reasons for the recommended changes. Barnhart v. Herseth, 88 S.D. 503, 222 N.W.2d 131, 137 (1974). Had the will of the Legislature and the people been to alter the previous residency requirements for judges, such could have easily been drafted into Art. V, § 6. Kneip v. Herseth, 87 S.D. 642, 214 N.W.2d 93 (1974). This was not done. When registering to vote on Art. V, § 6, people learned that the residency requirement was 90 days. They had to know this in order to vote; the county auditors were responsible to know that a person had a 90 day residency. It was the law when the amendment was passed. Such must be the true intent of voter residency as we interpret it today. To hold otherwise amounts to rewriting the State Constitution by simply changing the statutes. The Constitution is the mother law. It is not the baby. Statutes must conform to the Constitution, not vice versa.
By following the very authorities and jurisprudence cited by the majority, we cannot ignore the definition of voter residency as it existed when Art. V, § 6 was enacted. As the informed voters knew the law to be in 1972, a candidate/appointee for circuit judge was required to live in a county 90 days before becoming a voting resident of the respective circuit. That is what the voters relied upon and voted for — not the hindsight now applied by this Court.
Essentially, I agree with the discourse on Issues 1 and 2 of the majority opinion. A writ of prohibition is the proper remedy here. However, I would issue it to prohibit these two appointees from taking office. Certainly the facts in this case are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” It is by this standard that the United States Supreme Court hears cases that are allegedly moot. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 219 U.S. 498, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). As the Governor is capable of repeating the same actions, this Court has authority to hear this case and enforce a writ of prohibition under the authorities cited in the majority opinion. Sedlacek v. S.D. Teener Baseball Program, 437 N.W.2d 866 (S.D.1989); Corbly v. Matheson, 335 N.W.2d 347 (S.D.1983); Brandon Savings Bank v. Swanson, 54 S.D. 95, 222 N.W. 660 (1928).
Frankly, I believe the decision of this Court lessens the qualifications of the judiciary in this state. It is antithetical to the concept of a self-governing people. Judges preside over matters of the greatest importance in people’s lives. Judges need roots. Roots so they are implanted with their own people. People should know their judges, where they come from and what kind of people they are. Were it not so, there would be no election of judges in this state. Obviously, that is not true, because under Art. V, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution and SDCL § 12-9-1, people do have a right to vote for their judges. The framers of the Constitution and the people of South Dakota, in amending our State Constitution, did not intend a “have suitcase, have briefcase, will travel, with gavel” appointment process. Stranger in town? That’s your new judge.