(dissenting).
I vote to grant the writ of prohibition.
Neither applicant is presently eligible to be a circuit court judge because neither one is a voting resident within the circuit from which they are to be appointed. This is clear from a plain reading of the text, *508history, precedent and policy surrounding Article V, Section 6, of the South Dakota Constitution.
TEXT
[J]udges of the circuit courts ... must be ... voting residents within the [ ] circuit ... from which they are elected or appointed.
S.D. Const, art. V, § 6 (emphasis added). According to the plain language of the constitution, a circuit court judge must be a voting resident within the circuit from which they are elected or appointed at the time of election or selection by the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC). The constitution does not say “registered to vote” or “eligible to vote.” Instead, it says “voting resident[] from.” In this context, these words mean that the applicant must have voted in the circuit prior to election or appointment.
South Dakota statutes provide that individuals seeking election as a circuit court judge must meet constitutional and statutory qualifications. SDCL 12-9-4.1 These include the requirement that they be a voting resident of the same circuit as the signatures on their nominating petitions. SDCL 12-6-8.2 According to SDCL 3-4-73, individuals applying for judicial appointment must qualify in the same manner as required of those elected.4 Therefore, it is clear that, at the time of application to the JQC, an applicant must be a voting resident in the circuit from which they apply for appointment as circuit court judge.
According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, “voting” is defined as “the act or process of casting a vote esp. in a political election.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2565 (1976). Neither applicant was a voting resident at the time of application for selection by the JQC or appointment by the Governor, but, was, simply registered to vote. Article V, Section 6 does not say that judges must be registered to vote or eligible to vote. Rather, the section requires that a resident appointee have acted, i.e. cast a vote. In fact, just living in the circuit for years without voting is not enough.
[Vjoting is the affirmative act of marking the ballot and depositing it in the ballot box in conformity with the election laws. Neither signing the registry of voters, nor being issued a ballot, nor having one’s name appear on the poll book is enough, standing alone, to constitute the act of voting.
Montana ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson, 160 Mont. 175, 500 P.2d 921, 926 (1972). These plain words5 require a voting resident.
*509Obviously, this language was chosen by the drafters for a particular purpose, inherent in its plain meaning. If those implementing the constitution do not like what the constitution says, they must get the people to change the constitution, not reinterpret it.
HISTORY
In interpreting and defining constitutional provisions, we frequently look to the intent of the draftsmen or framers. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.11 (5th ed. 1992). “In the interpretation of such legislation the reports of these committees or commissions are considered valuable aids.... Such reports are acceptable interpretive aids under the same rule which justifies the use of legislative committee reports.” Id.
Robert E. Driscoll, III6, a drafting consultant to the South Dakota Constitutional Revision Commission (Commission) who assisted in the revisions, reorganization and drafting of Article V, submitted a sworn affidavit. According to Driscoll’s affidavit, he prepared Article V, Section 6 in its present form, consistent with what he believed was the intent of the Commission. Dris-coll’s affidavit states:
I provided that judicial personnel be residents of the district (in the case of Supreme Court Justices), circuit (in the case of judges of the circuit courts), or jurisdiction (in the case of persons presiding over courts of limited jurisdiction) from which they are elected or appointed. [] I also recall adding the word “voting” to the word “residents” to further reflect my understanding that the Commission’s intent was that judges were to be elected or appointed from within the district, circuit, or jurisdiction of their voting residence where they would serve. [T]he word “from” was also chosen to reflect this understanding.
Driscoll’s affidavit continues, and describes the Commission members’ reactions to the misinterpretation and implementation of Section 6.
[Sjometime following the first appointment of a judge from outside a district or circuit[,] I spoke informally to Dr. Far-ber7 and later Justice Fosheim8 commenting that this was not my understanding of what was intended in Section 6. [Tjhey confirmed my understanding of the intent of Section 6 that judges were to be appointed to fill vacancies from within districts or circuits in which they were voting residents. That over perhaps ten or more years of such judicial appointments, whenever I would see these men and reminisce[,] I would informally suggest that we should perhaps leave an “oral history” of the true intent for the inevitable day when someone would challenge this practice and before all of the original Commission members were gone.
(Emphasis added.) It is clear from a reading of the Driscoll affidavit, that the intent of the Commission was that applicants for appointment as a circuit court judge be a voting resident from the circuit prior to submitting their name to the JQC.
Additional support for the intent of the framers is found in the minutes of the Commission. Although the Commission was discussing, at the time, the geographical distribution of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the discussion is analogous. According to the minutes, Mr. Robert *510Hirsch9 noted an opposition to the need for geographical distribution of the Justices because the state Supreme Court represented the whole state and not any particular district. In response, Judge Fosheim explained that there would be a great deal of opposition to this point of view because “people [ ] believe that they need a representative on the Supreme Court from their particular area.” Minutes, Constitutional Revision Commission, May 6-7, 1991 (emphasis added).
As with Supreme Court Justices, people believe that the judges in their circuit represent them and their particular area of the state. To allow an individual from outside the circuit to be appointed as a judge contravenes and is in direct opposition to this theory and was rejected by the Commission, and in turn, by the people.
PRECEDENT
As Applicant Attorney Doug Cummings (Cummings) stated in his argument to the court, precedent indicates that for over ten years from the adoption of the constitutional amendments, applicants for circuit judge positions came from the circuits where the openings occurred and you had to be a voting resident to apply.
Cummings stated:
[I] would like to remind the court that what we’re asking is not for a new system, or some kind of a new interpretation. This was the interpretation up until 1985 or 1986. Before that time the Judicial Qualifications Commission wouldn’t even accept an application from someone who wasn’t a resident of the circuits. Then came along the Judicial Qualifications Commission deciding that they were going to interpret it differently and opening up the application to anyone and saying “You can become a voting resident after you get the appointment.” And that’s when that has started
Additional support for this theory is found in Driscoll’s affidavit wherein he indicated that it has only been within approximately the last ten years that judicial appointments have come from outside the circuit. Neither the statements of Driscoll nor Cummings have been challenged or refuted.
As Driscoll and Cummings stated, precedent indicates that this is the correct practice, founded upon an accurate interpretation of the constitution, and not an attempt to change what the constitution states or means. The recent practice of the last seven years is the aberration and in direct contravention to the constitution. As indicated above, if a constitutional change is really desired, those wishing change must look to the people of the State of South Dakota to make that change.
POLICY
The policy of the State of South Dakota is set by the people of South Dakota. This is principally done by the people through enactment of a constitution, ratification of amendments, and enactment of statutes through their legislative representatives.
It is clear from the constitution that the people want to retain the right to elect circuit court judges. S.D. Const, art. V, § 7. It is also clear that the people want the circuit court judges they elect to come from and live in the area they serve. S.D. Const, art. V, § 6. It is equally clear that the people want appointment and election qualifications to. be equal. SDCL 3-4-7. No one would be foolish enough to argue that the office of a circuit court judge would not become vacant by his moving outside of the circuit he serves. See SDCL 3-4-l(5).
A circuit court judge is a constitutional officer. The position of circuit court judge is a state office established by the constitution. S.D. Const, art. V, § 3. A vacancy in a state office is filled by the people through election or appointment. When, however, *511an election by the people is inconvenient, the Governor, as a servant of the people, is empowered by them to appoint someone to fill the vacancy. This does not, however, provide the Governor10 with discretion to appoint someone to fill the vacancy who would not be qualified through an election. Rather, this requires that the Governor appoint someone who meets the same qualifications required of one elected to such position. SDCL 3-4-7.
Circuit court judges are empowered by the people to affect the lives of the people in many ways, including life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. Therefore, it is only fitting and proper that the people want their judges to be from the people and area they serve. This is the policy of the people of the state of South Dakota. We must correctly interpret and follow it.
In conclusion, a plain reading of the text, history, precedent and policy makes it clear that neither applicant is presently eligible to be a circuit court judge because neither one is a voting resident within the circuit from which they are to be appointed.11
. SDCL 12-9-4 provides:
Nominating petitions for judicial office filed pursuant to this chapter shall state the judicial position sought, using the designations established pursuant to § 12-9-3.1, which shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state within the time prescribed by § 12-6-4 and shall be signed by not less than fifty registered voters of the district or circuit or other division of court boundaries. To the extent it is consistent with this chapter, § 12-6-8 shall govern such petitions.
. SDCL 12-6-8 provides in part:
No person shall sign the nominating petition of a candidate ... for whom he is not entitled to vote.... There shall be added by either the signer or the circulator, the signer’s place of residence, and the date of signing. A formal declaration of the candidate shall be signed by him prior to the circulation of petitions. The signed declaration of the candidate, or a facsimile thereof, may accompany and be a part of the petition. The original signed declaration shall accompany the group of petitions upon filing. Such petition shall be verified under oath by the persons circulating the same[.]
. SDCL 3-4-7 provides:
Persons appointed to offices as herein provided shall qualify in the same manner as is required of those elected, the time of which shall be prescribed in their appointment.
. Application to the JQC for selection as one of the individuals qualified for appointment is analogous to obtaining signatures on a petition to have one’s name placed on the ballot for election.
. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people *509must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or extraordinary gloss[.]
Boe v. Foss, 76 S.D. 295, 303, 77 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1956) (citation omitted).
. Robert E. Driscoll, III is the present Dean of the University of South Dakota School of Law.
. Dr. William Farber, professor emeritus and former chairman of the Department of Government at the University of South Dakota, was a member of the subcommittee to review amendments and revisions to Articles III, IX, X, XIX, and XXIII.
.Jon Fosheim was chairman of the subcommittee to review amendments and revisions to Articles V, VI, and VII. A former Chief Justice of the South Dakota Supreme Court, Fosheim is currently a licensed, attorney in Huron, South Dakota.
. Mr. Robert Hirsch was a former state senator. At the time of the Commission, he was chairman of the subcommittee to review amendments and revisions to Articles III, IX, X, XIX and XXIII.
. I find no fault with the Governor’s office, whose appointments have all come from the list supplied to his office by the JQC. This was in accordance with Article V, Section 7 of the South Dakota Constitution. The problem has been that the list included constitutionally non-qualified applicants.
The consequences of a correct vote in this case are neither disastrous nor life threatening. Cummings acknowledged on oral argument that even if he wins, these applicants could, and probably would, be reappointed upon becoming constitutionally qualified voting residents.
. An examination of the majority opinion reveals numerous weaknesses.
1. It fails to set forth any substantial argument on either the text of the present constitution or the precedent or practice under it.
2. While it was explained to the Legislature that the constitutional enactment removed the durational period of time, as shown in the minutes of the 1971 report from the Commission, the "substituted" words require an applicant be a voting resident from the circuit. It doesn’t matter whether one is a voting resident for two weeks or two months, as long as one is a voting resident. Likewise, what the Commission says to the Legislature about the text of the constitutional enactment is not as important as the words in the text themselves as acted upon by the Legislature and the people. The Legislature and the people can read the words themselves. There is no proof that they even heard or read the Commission’s comments or notes.
3. The affidavits of Jon Fosheim and Ronald D. Olinger are general in nature. Their duties were general, not specific. Neither one had any specific duty in choosing the words used, as did draftsman Driscoll. Neither Fosheim nor Olinger counter the specific choice by Driscoll of the words "voting resident from.” If their memories were specific, certainly they would have countered Driscoll’s affidavit concerning the specific conversations about the misinterpretation by the JQC. Also, Fosh-eim’s "general affidavit” conflicts with his own specific response to Senator Hirsch as reported in the Commission’s minutes. (See text surrounding footnote 9.)
4. The majority wholly ignores SDCL 3-4-1(5) and SDCL 3-4-7, both of which were in existence then and are now. The people are presumed to act on the law in existence. There is absolutely no support in this record for the claim that qualifications for those appointed is less than for those elected. The law is otherwise. SDCL 3-4-7.
5. Finally, the fatal defect or flaw in the majority’s writing is that it misinterprets the words "voting resident from" to merely mean "registered to vote” or “eligible to vote.”