dissenting:
I find myself unable to join either of my colleagues. Although they express themselves somewhat differently, their respective lines of reasoning seem to me essentially the same. Both assume that involuntary intoxication will in some circumstances be a defense to a criminal charge; for one who is involuntarily intoxicated may lack any criminal intent. See opinion by BROSKY, J., at 75; opinion by MONTEMURO, J., at 84. I agree with this assumption1; *92my disagreement is with respect to the definition of the circumstances in which it is applicable.
Judge BROSKY would recognize involuntary intoxication as a defense in the case of “someone who has drunk some coffee which unbeknownst to him contained a hallucinogin and, as a consequence of its effects, committed a crime.” Opinion by BROSKY, J., at 81. And while Judge MONTEMURO does not use such an illustration, nevertheless, as I understand his opinion, he agrees with it. Opinion by MONTEMURO, J., at 84 et seq. Also, it seems fair to say that with Judge BROSKY and JUDGE MONTEMURO would recognize involuntary intoxication as a defense in the case of someone who as a result of being forced to drink alcohol became so involuntarily intoxicated as to. lack any criminal intent. But that is as far as either judge will go; neither will recognize involuntary intoxication as a defense, even if the defendant was so intoxicated as to lack any criminal intent, if the involuntary intoxication occurred because the defendant could not help drinking because he was a chronic alcoholic.
For my part, I see no distinction in principle between these three cases: drinking unknowingly; being forced by another person to drink; and being helpless to stop drinking. I should be somewhat surprised if appellant could prove that because he was a chronic alcoholic he was in fact helpless to stop drinking. However, as Judge BROSKY recognizes, that is what he offered to prove, and at this stage we must assume that he could prove it.2 Accordingly, I should reverse and remand for a new trial with instructions to let him try to prove it.
*93-1-
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, prohibited the State of Texas from punishing the appellant, who claimed to be a chronic alcoholic, for public drunkenness. The appellant’s argument was that as a result of his chronic alcoholism, he was incapable of refraining from public drunkenness, and that the cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibited the State of Texas from punishing him for behavior he could not control. In support of this argument, the appellant relied on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, reh’g denied, 371 U.S. 905, 83 S.Ct. 202, 9 L.Ed.2d 166 (1962), in which the Court had held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibited a state from punishing someone for being a narcotics addict.
A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Harlan, concluded that the record was inadequate to support the trial court’s finding that the appellant as a result of his chronic alcoholism was unable to refrain from public drunkenness. The plurality noted that the appellant had called only one expert, whose “testimony consumed a total of 17 pages . . . . [f]ive [of which] were taken up with a recitation of [the expert’s] qualifications,” id. 392 U.S. at 517, 88 S.Ct. at 2147, and that “[t]he State made no effort to obtain expert psychiatric testimony of its own, or even to explore with appellant’s witness the question of appellant’s power to control the frequency, timing, and location of his drinking bouts, or the substantial disagreement within the medical profession concerning the nature of the disease, the efficacy of treatment and the prerequisites for effective treatment," id. at 520, 88 S.Ct. at 2148. Moreover, and of special importance, the appellant’s expert admitted on cross-examination that “when appellant was sober, the act of *94taking the first drink was ... undertaken under the ‘exceedingly strong influence’ of a ‘compulsion,’ . . . .”, but that the act was nevertheless “a ‘voluntary exercise of his will’ [because] the ‘compulsion’ ... was ‘not completely overpowering.’ ” Id. at 525, 88 S.Ct. at 2151. Confronted with this record, the plurality held:
We are unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their performance of either or both of these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication. . . .
Id. at 585, 88 S.Ct. at 2155.
In closing, the plurality said that “[i]t is simply not yet the time” to adopt as a constitutional rule that a chronic alcoholic may not be criminally punished for public drunkenness. Id. at 537, 88 S.Ct. at 2156.
Justices Black and Harlan, in a separate opinion by Justice Black, made it clear that their rejection of the appellant’s argument was not contingent on the inadequacy of the record. They approached the issue much as does Judge BROSKY for this court, stating that “punishment of ... a defendant [for an action that was ‘compelled’] can clearly be justified in terms of deterrence, isolation, and treatment.” Id. at 540-41, 88 S.Ct. at 2158-59. Indeed, they went so far as to say that “the question whether an act is ‘involuntary’ is ... an inherently elusive question, and one which the State may, for good reasons, wish to regard as irrelevant.” Id. at 544, 88 S.Ct. at 2160. Thus they foreclosed the issue of a chronic alcoholic’s criminal responsibility, which the Chief Justice and Justice Marshall had left open.
The “swing vote” was Justice White’s. He concurred in the result reached by the plurality of the Court on the ground that even if the appellant “could not have resisted becoming drunk ..., nothing in the record indicates that he could not have done his drinking in private.” Id. at 553, 88 *95S.Ct. at 2164. He made it clear, however, that in his opinion a chronic alcoholic who suffers from an irresistible compulsion to drink cannot constitutionally be punished for yielding to that compulsion, without regard to whether the goals of criminal sentencing might be advanced by punishing him. Thus he said: “If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 [82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758] (1962), I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a compulsion.” Id. at 548, 88 S.Ct. at 2162.
Justice Fortas, writing for the dissent, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, accepted the trial court’s finding that the appellant was unable to refrain from public drunkenness, id. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 2172, and concluded that Robinson prohibited the imposition of a criminal sentence on the appellant:
Robinson stands upon a principle which, despite it subtlety, must be simply stated and respectfully applied because it is the foundation of individual liberty and the cornerstone of the relations between a civilized state and its citizens: Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.
Id. at 567, 88 S.Ct. at 2171.
Thus, in Powell five Justices agreed that a chronic alcoholic may not be criminally punished for conduct that because of his alcoholism he could not avoid; two Justices would permit him to be punished anyway; and two Justices reserved their decision as to what they would do.
This case is of course different from Powell. First, appellant was not convicted of being intoxicated; he was convicted of criminal acts that he claims to have committed while he was intoxicated. Second, appellant has not argued that the cruel and unusual punishment clause precluded the trial court from punishing him; rather, he has argued that he should have been permitted to prove that because he was a chronic alcoholic, he could not avoid being so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing when he did the *96acts in question. I therefore do not suggest that Powell is, in any sense, controlling. But it is instructive. For just as appellant claims here, the appellant in Powell claimed to be a chronic alcoholic, and he relied on the consequent involuntariness of his intoxication in support of his conclusion that he should not be punished.
-2-
Judge BROSKY, in his opinion, properly assumes that appellant could have proved what he offered to prove — that because he was a chronic alcoholic, he could not avoid being so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. BROSKY, J., at 80, n. 5. Judge BROSKY then states that “[such] a person should not be punished for committing a criminal act due to a condition for which he was not responsible.” Id. at 80. (footnote omitted). This reasoning seems to be in agreement with the five Justices in Powell who would not criminally punish a chronic alcoholic for conduct that because of his alcoholism he could not avoid. But then Judge BROSKY goes off on a different tack and holds that even so, a chronic alcoholic may be sentenced as a criminal, because “there are ... purposes of criminal sentencing other than punishment.” Id. at 81. These purposes, he explains, are prevention, rehabilitation and restitution; of these, he particularly emphasizes prevention, or public safety. Id. at 82. Since these purposes will be served here, he continues, “involuntary intoxication cannot, as a matter of law, be established through evidence showing that the criminal defendant was a chronic alcoholic incapable of voluntarily refraining from ingestion of alcohol.” Id. at 82.
Judge MONTEMURO’s reasoning is similar. Thus he says that “in the case of the involuntary inebriate, there is no mens rea, and hence, no criminal culpability....” MONTEMURO, J., at 87. In his view, however, the chronic alcoholic may not be classified as an involuntary inebriate. Id. at 89. While acknowledging that “the chronic alcoholic faces considerable hardship, and that the propriety of incarceration is not clear cut,” id. at 91, he *97concludes, as does Judge BROSKY, that “in the interest of public safety,” id., incarceration may nevertheless be warranted.
I am unpersuaded by this reasoning.
In the first place, any criminal sentence is, so far as the criminal is concerned, a punishment. His pain is lessened not at all by the sentencing judge saying, “I’m not punishing you by committing you to prison; I’m only preventing you from getting drunk again, and helping you get well.” In addition, the purposes the majority says will be served will not be served. For although by committing the alcoholic to prison, the judge will prevent him from getting drunk, the prevention will last only so long as the alcoholic is in prison. I know of no reason — and my colleagues offer none — to suggest that when the alcoholic is released from prison, he will have been rehabilitated, or helped even one step on the way. I agree with what Judge Fortas said in Powell:
It is entirely clear that the jailing of chronic alcoholics is punishment. It is not defended as therapeutic, nor is there any basis for claiming that it is therapeutic (or indeed a deterrent). The alcoholic offender is caught in a “revolving door” — leading from arrest on the street through a brief, unprofitable sojourn in jail, back to the street and, eventually, another arrest. The jails, overcrowded and put to a use for which they are not suitable, have a destructive effect upon alcoholic inmates.
Finally, most commentators, as well as experienced judges, are in agreement that “there is probably no drearier example of the futility of using penal sanctions to solve a psychiatric problem than the enforcement of the laws against drunkenness.”
Id. at 564-65, 88 S.Ct. at 2170-71 (footnotes omitted).
But there is an even greater difficulty with my colleagues’ reasoning. It is not simply that the result anticipated by them will not occur. Assume that the result did occur — that the chronic alcoholic was rehabilitated by being imprisoned. That might be useful. But it would be wrong.
*98Let us suppose a case in which the evidence shows that the defendant did not know what he was doing because he was dead drunk, and that he was dead drunk because he drank a beverage that he honestly and reasonably believed to be harmless but that in fact had a high alcoholic content. My colleagues agree that such a defendant should not be criminally sentenced, Judge BROSKY giving as the reason that as the incident is not likely to happen again, the purposes of prevention and rehabilitation would not be served. BROSKY, J., at 79-81. But the much more fundamental reason such a defendant should be sentenced is that he has done nothing wrong. A prison is not an institution to educate or to heal, like a school or a hospital. We do not — at least, we should not — commit people to prison “for their own good.” But that is what my colleagues say may be done with appellant. I am by no means unmindful of considerations of public safety. I quite agree that our “legal system [must] respond effectively” to actions committed by chronic alcoholics. BROSKY, J., at 82 n. 8. But it is a mistake, I suggest, to assume that the only effective response is resort to the criminal law.
For my part, I see no distinction in principle — that is, as a matter of law — between the case of someone who became involuntarily intoxicated because he did not know what he was drinking, and someone who became involuntarily intoxicated because, while he did know what he was drinking, he could not help drinking it because he was a chronic alcoholic. Of course, there may be a distinction as a matter of fact: The chronic alcoholic may not be able to prove that he was as powerless as he claims he was. That happened in Powell. But that is not the issue here. The issue here is whether he should be permitted to try to prove it. In Powell, the trial judge did permit him to try. Here, the trial judge did not permit him to try, and I believe that was error. For I agree with the five Justices in Powell, that the “cornerstone of the relations between a civilized state and its citizens” is the principle that “[c]riminal penalties may *99not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.” Id. at 567, 88 S.Ct. at 2171.
The judgment of sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
. There is of course a distinction between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. As regards voluntary intoxication, it has been said that “[t]he usual statement of the rule is that intoxication is admissible when relevant to disprove a ‘specific intent’ which is an element of the crime charged, but not to disprove ‘general intent’ when that is the required mental element.” Toll, Pa.Crimes Code Ann. § 308, Model Penal Code Comment, T.D. No. 9, pp. 2-13 (1974). Voluntary intoxication is no longer a defense to specific intent crimes other than murder. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308 (1983). As regards involuntary intoxication, we have assumed that proof of involuntary intoxication will negate the specific intent element of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 313 Pa.Super. 521, 533, 460 A.2d 310, 316 (1983) (evi*92dence did not justify involuntary intoxication defense); Commonwealth v. Todaro, 301 Pa.Super. 1, 4-6, 446 A.2d 1305, 1307-8 (1982) (same). See also Commonwealth v. Bridge, 495 Pa. 568, 573 n. 3, 435 A.2d 151, 154 n. 3 (1981) (Discussion of availability of voluntary intoxication as a defense. "We intentionally exclude from our present consideration any state of intoxication not voluntarily induced.”).
. There is an enormous literature on the nature and causes of alcoholism, see, generally, G. Vaillant, The Natural History of Alcoholism (1983) but given that appellant’s offer of proof must be accepted, this is not the time to go into it; that should be left for trial.