concurring specially.
I agree with the dissent that the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right and that the denial of recovery for personal injuries is not simply *203social. It is undeniably economic.1 However, this case is not about the “denial of recovery for personal injuries” caused by the negligence of others. If it were, I would agree with the analysis and join the dissent of Surrogate Judge Erickstad.
If it were a “denial of recovery for personal injury,” the “close correspondence” standard of review would certainly apply. Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733 (N.D.1988). The result reached by the majority opinion does not, of course, in any manner impose on Robert Haney’s right to recover from Grindberg Farms for any act of negligence on their part which caused his injury. It is for this reason that decisions such as Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D.1986) and Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974) are inappo-site.
Ironically, one of the initial challenges against the workers compensation system was the exclusivity of the remedy, i.e., that those workers covered by the act could not bring an action against the employer, co-employees, third persons, or the workers for injury. E.g., Tandsetter v. Oscarson, 56 N.D. 392, 217 N.W. 660 (1928) and Nyland v. Northern Packing Co., 56 N.D. 624, 218 N.W. 869 (1928). Continuing attempts are made to allow the injured worker to bring action directly or indirectly against the employer, co-employee, or third party rather than limiting the worker to seeking compensation for injuries through our worker compensation system. See, e.g., Schreder v. Cities Service Co., 336 N.W.2d 641 (N.D.1983); Barsness v. General Diesel & Equipment, 422 N.W.2d 819 (N.D.1988); Gernand v. Ost Services, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500 (N.D.1980).
Whether or not to cover employers and employees under a worker compensation system is a legislative decision. So too, I believe, is the decision of the workers to be covered. I agree with the majority that the legislative decision is subject to review under a rational basis standard and that there is, as the majority outlines, a rational basis for its decision to exclude farm laborers.
Although the dissent has marshalled persuasive legislative arguments for including agricultural employers within the system, those arguments do not drive our decision. Thus, I agree with Judge Erickstad’s footnote number one that in this day it is questionable wisdom from the standpoint of the employer to exclude agriculture from the scope of the worker compensation system.2 However, that is essentially a legislative matter, not a judicial matter, and it is in the area of legislative discretion that we apply a rational basis standard of review. Once that discretion is exercised, this Court has been deferential to legislative classifications. See, e.g., Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 (N.D.1973). Although the Court has found a classification to be unreasonable and arbitrary where it imposes a burden not shared by others, Hospital Services v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69 (N.D.1975), we should be more deferential to legislative classification where the legislation involves a program in the nature of social welfare or an entitlement rather than the affirmative imposition of a burden.
Furthermore, this Court has held that when the legislature attempts to resolve a *204particular problem it need not resolve the entire problem in order that the legislation meet constitutional muster:
“That more or fewer activities than fall within the exceptions of Sunday closing laws could with equal rationality have been excluded from the general ban does not make irrational the selection actually made.”
and
“A statute is not to be struck down on the supposition that various differently treated situations may in fact be same.”
State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D.1966) [Syllabus by the Court],
In Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511 (N.D.1982), the constitutionality of the legislation (section 32-12.1-15, NDCC) conditioning a tort victim’s right to recovery from the State upon the permissive purchase of liability insurance was challenged under Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Because it involved the right to recover from a tort-feasor, we applied the intermediate standard of review. In upholding the legislation, we stated that “[i]t is well established that a legislative enactment is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not attempt to cure all the evils within its reach.” Patch at 514.
Thus, I am not convinced that because the legislature has determined to provide “sure and certain relief ... regardless of questions of fault” for certain workers it must do so for all workers if it has a rational basis for not doing so. Other states have held that social welfare legislation does not violate constitutional principles of equal protection so long as the legislative classification is reasonably related to the purpose of the statute. E.g., Kunde v. Teesdale Lumber Co., 52 Mich.App. 360, 217 N.W.2d 429, appeal after remand 55 Mich.App. 546, 223 N.W.2d 67 (1974) [Legislature has prerogative to redefine extent of worker’s compensation benefits].
Logic and common knowledge indicate agricultural employment is hazardous. We attempt to construe legislative enactments in a logical manner, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 436 N.W.2d 246 (N.D.1989), but we have never said that the legislature does or must always act in a logical manner. In the area of social welfare legislation we should intervene only when the actions are unreasonable. Here, as outlined by the majority, there is enough rationality to sustain the legislative enactment. I concur in the majority opinion.
. The State is not obligated to establish a worker compensation system but has done so in the exercise of its “police and sovereign powers” because "the prosperity of the state depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its wage workers, and, hence, for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for their families and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation...." NDCC § 65-01-01. It appears undeniable that the worker compensation system is social welfare, as well as economic, legislation.
. Were it the agricultural employer who was complaining because the State did not provide protection from a lawsuit claiming damages for the employers negligence, would the issue be viewed differently? Haney has not argued that the statute, section 65-04-29, NDCC, permitting non-covered employers to elect coverage and the employee of such employers who elect coverage to elect not to be covered, violates equal protection principles. See Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511 (N.D.1982) [No violation of equal protection for victims injured by State agency not purchasing insurance and not waiving sovereign immunity and those injured by agency purchasing insurance and waiving sovereign immunity.]