¶ 180 (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree with the majority's conclusion that the state school finance system is not unconstitutional under Wis. Const, art. X, § 3, the uniformity clause of the education article, or Wis. Const, art. I, § 1, the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, I join sections I and III of the opinion, as well as the decision to affirm. However, I cannot agree with sections II and V of the majority opinion, which announce an expansive new state constitutional right under art. X, § 3 to "an equal opportunity for a sound basic education," defined as an education "that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally." Majority op. at ¶¶ 3, 51, 52, 87.
¶ 181. The petitioners allege that the current school finance formula violates the uniformity clause of the education article as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution by creating or failing to redress alleged educational disparities in so-called "property-poor" districts, districts with many *674high-needs children, and districts where charter schools and the school choice program decrease the enrollment in the public schools. Four members of this court are convinced that in order to decide the uniformity clause challenge, the court is required to articulate a constitutional standard or test for the right to education under art. X, § 3. And they have done so, by reference to an elaborate definition of "educational adequacy" that has no support in the text of the constitution itself nor in any of our prior art. X, § 3 cases.
¶ 182. Any definition of education or standard for educational adequacy is inherently a political and policy question, not a justiciable one. The people of this state — through their elected representatives in the legislature, the governor's office and local school boards — decide what their schools will teach and how much education is adequate or desirable for their children. What constitutes an "adequate" or "sound" or even "basic" education is most emphatically not a question of constitutional law for this or any other court.
¶ 183. As the majority opinion discusses at length, our cases pertaining to the education article have held that the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution were concerned with the nature, character and purposes of education — not the technicalities of school district size, boundaries or composition — and viewed education as necessary to the preservation of liberty and the perpetuation of a productive, honorable citizenry. Majority op. at ¶¶ 31-47; Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 485-90, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989); Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 564-66, 247 N.W.2d 822 (1977); State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860 (1928).
*675¶ 184. But I do not read these cases to mean that art. X, § 3 commits to the judiciary, in the exercise of its obligation of constitutional interpretation, questions of educational adequacy, content or scope. There is certainly nothing in the text of art. X, § 3 to support such a conclusion. Wisconsin Const, art. X, § 3 provides:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years. . ..
¶ 185. The other sections of the education article pertain to the election of the state superintendent of public instruction (art. X, § 1), the school fund (art. X, §§ 2, 5), local school taxes (art. X, § 4), the state university system (art. X, § 6) and the sale of school and university lands (art. X, §§ 7,8). There is nothing in the education article that specifically or even generally addresses the content, character or scope of the education the legislature must provide in the state's district schools.1
¶ 186. As the majority opinion notes, the power to establish schools is inherent in state government, and so the education article of the Wisconsin Constitution has always been interpreted as a directive compelling the legislature to exercise its power for the establishment of a public school system rather than as an organic grant of legislative authority over education. Majority op. at ¶ 29. Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 658, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977); Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d at 564; Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 97, 285 N.W. 403 (1939).
*676The specific constitutional guarantee of education flows from the provision that the legislature provide for the establishment of district schools. Since the power to establish schools existed without a specific grant as an inherent function of state government, the clear purpose of art. X, sec. 3, was to compel the exercise of the power to the extent designated. Art. X, sec. 3, must then be viewed as a limitation upon the broad power of the state to educate its citizens through the establishment and operation of schools. The limitations are precisely stated: District schools, uniformity, and free tuition for certain ages.
Zweifel, 76 Wis. 2d at 658 (citation omitted). See also Manitowoc, 231 Wis. at 98 ("the purpose [of art. X, § 3] was not to grant a power to the legislature to establish schools, for this power would exist without grant, but to compel the exercise of the power to the extent designated"); Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 165 Wis. 32, 35-36, 161 N.W. 6 (1917)("It is established by the decisions of this court that our state constitution is not so much a grant as a limitation of power, therefore the state legislature has authority to exercise any and all legislative powers not delegated to the federal government nor expressly or by necessary implication prohibited by the national or state constitution.").
¶ 187. However, art. X, § 3 says only that the legislature must establish uniform public schools, free and open to all. It does nothing to either prescribe or limit instructional character or content, leaving it exclusively to the legislature, which had inherent authority over it to begin with.
¶ 188. The lower courts, some members of the legislature and some amici complained about the lack of a constitutional definition or standard for the right *677to education under art. X, § 3.2 The court has responded to these complaints by adopting a broad new definition of the right to education that is as breathtaking in scope as it is disconnected to anything in the text of the constitution.
¶ 189. The court's new definition of the right to education is grounded in ideas about constitutional educational adequacy found in the law reviews and the decisions of other state supreme courts, measured by reference to the sufficiency of instruction and the equal opportunity to become proficient in specific curricular subjects. Majority op. at ¶¶ 48-52. The new approach emphasizes the objective of equalizing student outcomes, although the majority opinion notes that unequal student scores on proficiency tests would not be enough alone to make out a constitutional violation. Majority op. at ¶¶ 51-53, n.21. The court's new standard is linked in part to statutes prescribing curricular requirements for the public schools. Majority op. at ¶ 51.
¶ 190. The newly-minted constitutional right is as follows: "Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic education. An equal opportunity for a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally." Majority op. at ¶ 3. The new right to education includes "the opportunity for students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading and writing, geography, and history, and for them to receive instruction in *678the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance with their age and aptitude." Id. There is more: "An equal opportunity for a sound basic education acknowledges that students and districts are not fungible and takes into account districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, economically disadvantaged students, and students with limited English language skills." Id. And the legislature must henceforward provide "sufficient resources" to meet the new standard; otherwise, it will be in violation of art. X, § 3. Id.
¶ 191. The problem with all of this is that there is no support for it anywhere in the text of the Wisconsin Constitution. It is entirely the product of judicial invention, despite efforts to tie some parts of the standard to particular statutory enactments. This may be fine education policy, and as a parent and a citizen I certainly support the educational aspirations and goals expressed by the new standard, as well as the requirement that schools include instruction in the specified curricular subject areas. But as a judge, I am compelled to say as forcefully as I can that the court's exercise in education clause standard-writing has nothing whatsoever to do with constitutional law.
¶ 192. In my judgment, any attempt by this court to create a constitutional standard or definition of the right to education based upon ideas about educational adequacy, outcomes and curricular offerings is seriously misguided. It encroaches upon the prerogatives of the legislative branch of government, implicating separation of powers principles and bringing into play the political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The judiciary should not be drawn into deciding issues that are essentially political in nature, *679exclusively committed by the constitution to another branch of government and not susceptible to judicial management or resolution. This is clearly such an issue.
¶ 193. In Baker the United States Supreme Court established the basic framework for analyzing the justiciability of political questions:
The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers. Much confusion results from the capacity of the 'political question' label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
*680Id. at 210-11, 217. See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969). The Court ixiBaker ultimately found the reapportionment issue before it to be justicia-ble, a conclusion followed by this court in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 561-64, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964), overruling State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W.2d 903 (1952), and State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101, 23 N.W.2d 610 (1946).
¶ 194. It is, of course, the duty and particular province of the judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988).3 I am fully aware that the doctrine of political question nonjusticiability is rarely invoked and in fact has not been directly applied by this court on a question of state constitutional law since Baker.
¶ 195. I am convinced, however, of the doctrine's applicability to art. X, § 3, at least to the extent that this court has now ventured into creating a constitutional standard or test for "educational adequacy." My conclusion is based upon the text of art. X, § 3, the obvious lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards for educational adequacy, and the impossibility of deciding the issue without undertaking an initial, clearly nonjudicial policy determination.
*681¶ 196. Under the Baker analysis, "the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch." Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29. As I have already noted, while it is clear that art. X, § 3 is not a grant of legislative power but a direction that legislative power be exercised in a particular way, the text of the education article nonetheless supports the conclusion that this is an area that is committed entirely to the legislative branch. Authority over public education is inherent in the legislature; art. X, § 3 does nothing more than command its exercise for the creation and support of a system of generally uniform, tuition-free, district schools.4 The constitution is silent on the issue of the scope, content or character of the education provided by the public schools.
¶ 197. In addition, the task of filling in the constitutional gaps is clearly a judicially unmanageable one, as the profound breadth and soaring rhetoric of the court's new standard demonstrate. More fundamentally, just how much education is adequate to the requirements and expectations of students, parents and society at any given point in time manifestly involves policy determinations of a nonjudicial type.
¶ 198. Finally, there is uncertainty and risk H inherent in multiple and conflicting pronouncements about education policy emanating from different *682branches of government. By constitutionalizing the notion of "educational adequacy" (however we would choose to define it), we create the potential for never-ending school finance litigation.
¶ 199. The majority opinion refers to the necessity of adopting an adequacy-based constitutional standard for education "as a goad or as a backstop to the legislature...." Majority op. at ¶ 50. But no legislature can ever satisfy everyone, particularly in a policy area so fraught with nuances and competing interests as this one. The constitutional right to education announced by the court today guarantees not better schools but bi-annual school finance litigation, as dissatisfied combatants in the battle for state education budget dollars go to court with claims of educational "inadequacy."
¶ 200. The majority dismisses the justiciability issue by reference to the unremarkable fact that this court has entertained art. X, § 3 challenges before, in Kukor, Busé and Zilisch. Majority op. at ¶ 2, n.2. In other words: "We've gone a little way down this road before, why not continue further?" This is poor constitutional justification for the exploration in educational policymaking the court engages in today. The difference, of course, between this case and the earlier ones is that this court has never before arrogated to itself, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, the power to dictate educational content, character or scope.5 Not until today.
*683¶ 201. I recognize that courts in other states have attempted to define the parameters of their state constitution education clauses by reference to variations on the "educational adequacy" theme. Majority op. at ¶¶ 48-50. However, I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court, which invoked the political question nonjusticiability doctrine in declining to follow the trend:
What constitutes a "high quality" education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be ascertained by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards. The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's field of expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee might be warranted. Rather, the question of educa*684tional quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and administrative discretion.
To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois. Judicial determination of the type of education children should receive and how it can best be provided would depend on the opinions of whatever expert witnesses the litigants might call to testify and whatever other evidence they might choose to present. Members of the general public, however, would be obliged to listen in respectful silence. We certainly do not mean to trivialize the views of educators, school administrators and others who have studied the problems which public schools confront. But nonexperts — students, parents, employers, and others — also have important views and experiences to contribute which are not easily reckoned through formal judicial factfinding. In contrast, an open and robust public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of representative democracy. Solutions to problems of educational quality should emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the State and their elected representatives.
Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996). See also Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996)(challengers of school finance system failed to present "an appropriate standard for determining [educational] 'adequacy' that would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature").
*685¶ 202. So it is here. The expansive constitutional right to education announced and explicated by the court today is not derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense, and it is entirely inappropriate in our representative system to resolve disputes over educational content, adequacy or finance through art. X, § 3 litigation. To invoke the political question doctrine of nonjusticiability here is not to abdicate the responsibility of judicial review but to vindicate the democratic process by which these sorts of issues are best resolved. This does not leave the legislature to exercise its authority over education issues unchecked. The checks and balances of the ballot box are oftentimes far more effective than those of a coordinate branch of government.
¶ 203. Accordingly, I cannot subscribe to parts II and V, or paragraph 3 of the majority opinion, in which the court articulates a new constitutional "right to education" under art. X, § 3. Therefore, I respectfully concur in parts I and III of the majority opinion, but in other respects, I dissent.
¶ 204. I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER, joins this opinion.
See Justice Prosser's concurrence in part, dissent in part, which I join.
The Wisconsin Constitution nowhere mentions the "right to education." It is not contained in the Declaration of Rights, art. I, nor anywhere in the education article. It is a judicial extrapolation from the uniformity clause of art. X, § 3. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 567, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
See also The Federalist, No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body").
Of course, if the legislature suddenly started charging tuition or turning students away there would be a justiciable claim for violation of art. X, § 3. The text is explicit as to these matters, which are clearly capable of judicial resolution and remedy.
There is unfortunate dicta in Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), which suggests that this court has the authority to dictate the subjects to be taught in the public schools. Referring to the distinction drawn in State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 221 N.W. 860 (1928), between the "character of instruction" and the mechanics of school district *683creation, the court in Busé stated: "If 'character of instruction' was all that was required to be 'as nearly uniform as practicable' under the mandate of the constitution, then it was left up to this court to ultimately determine what subjects were to be included in 'character of instruction' and to the legislature to determine what uniformity was 'practicable.'" Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 566. This statement was completely unnecessary to the holding in Busé, which concerned the very technical issue of the constitutionality of the negative aids formula. Zilisch itself was a challenge to school district boundaries. Despite their expansive language, neither Busé nor Zilisch concerned the issue of whether art. X, § 3 mandates a certain content or character of education. I would withdraw the foregoing language from Busé. There is nothing in the text of art. X, § 3, nor in Zilisch or any of our cases, to support the proposition that this or any other court has a role in curriculum decisions.