United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxation

Yetka, Justice

(dissenting in part and concurring in part).

I respectfully dissent. It appears clear to me that, under the language of the statute, the materials that are the subject of this appeal were intended to be exempt.

Minn. St. 1971, § 297A.25, subd. 1(h), states as follows:

“Subdivision 1. The following are specifically exempted from the taxes imposed by sections 297A.01 to 297A.44:
* * * * *
“(h) The gross receipts from the sale of and the storage, use, or consumption of all materials, including chemicals, fuels, petroleum products, lubricants, packaging materials, feeds, seeds, fertilizers, electricity, gas and steam, used or consumed in agri*156cultural or industrial production of personal property intended to be sold ultimately at retail, whether or not the item so used becomes an ingredient or constituent part of the property produced. Such production shall include, but is not limited to, production of any tangible personal property, manufacturing, processing (other than by restaurants and consumers) of agricultural products whether vegetable or animal, commercial fishing, refining, smelting, reducing, brewing, distilling, printing, mining, quarrying, lumbering, generating electricity and road building. Such production shall not include painting, cleaning, repairing or similar processing of property except as part of the original manufacturing process. Machinery, equipment, implements, tools, accessories, appliances, contriva/nces, furniture and fixtures used in such production and fuel, electricity, gas or steam used for space heating or lighting, are not included within this exemption.” (Italics supplied.)

While it is true that in the case of Jaspersen v. Commr. of Taxation, 300 Minn. 131, 218 N. W. 2d 463 (1974), this court held that certain polishers, cheeks, and rings attached to a large machine for the purpose of polishing, shaping, and finishing drainage tile were not within the statutory exemption, I think that case should be limited strictly to its facts.

Relator makes what to me is a compelling case that the statute should be interpreted to treat as fixtures or part of the machinery for sales and use tax purposes those items which are treated by the taxpayer and commissioner of revenue as items that may be depreciated for income tax purposes and to treat those items which are current expense items for income tax purposes as exempt from the sales tax.

To hold otherwise means that the commissioner and the Tax Court will be compelled to decide almost every appeal on a case-by-case basis.

No tax is a good tax to one who has to pay it. However, a tax can be made more acceptable and palatable to the taxpayer if the *157statute imposing it is clear and precise in its language and interpretation, and is easy to administer.

Adopting as applicable to the sales tax act an interpretation of language, such as “fixture” and “expense,” used and defined under the income tax laws since their inception, would enable both the administrator of the act and the taxpayer to know what is meant, and the tax itself would be easier to administer. While the 1973 amendment referred to in the majority opinion will be helpful in the future, it is of little aid for the disputes arising prior to the passage of that act.

I concur in the holding of the majority in regard to the tax-ability of the rental payments on the leased equipment.