¶ 58. (dissen-, ting). The majority holding in this case, authored by Chief Justice Abrahamson, is that the Finnegans' claim does not fit within the third factor in Bowen. I disagree and will address this issue first. The lead opinion, authored by Justice Sykes, concludes that the Finne-gans' claim is not permissible under chapter 655 because it is not derivative. I disagree and will address this issue second.
I
¶ 59. The majority holding, which concludes that Bowen does not permit recovery in this case, is simply wrong. The majority holding does not, because it cannot, articulate a principled distinction between the facts in this case and the facts in Bowen.
¶ 60. Bowen set forth three factors for determining whether a bystander may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress: (1) the injury suffered by the victim must have been fatal or severe; (2) the victim and the plaintiff must be related as spouses, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild or siblings; and (3) the plaintiff must have observed an extraordinary event, namely the incident and injury, or the scene soon after the incident with the injured victim at the scene. Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 633, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994). In sum, the court in Bowen concluded that
*605[T]o determine on the basis of public policy considerations whether to preclude liability for severe emotional distress to a bystander a court must consider three factors: the severity of the injury to the victim, the relationship of the plaintiff to the victim, and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs discovery of the injury. These factors relate to the underlying principles of the tort; they are relevant to measuring the authenticity of the claim and the limits of liability for emotional harm resulting from a defendant's negligence. Courts must rule on these factors and the public policy considerations on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 660.
¶ 61. It is undisputed that the Finnegans satisfy the first two prongs of Bowen: (1) Jared died due to egregious medical malpractice and (2) Jared was the Finnegans' son. Only the third prong is at issue here: whether the Finnegans observed an extraordinary event — either witnessing an incident causing death, or serious injury or the gruesome aftermath of such an event. Bowen reasoned that either witnessing an incident causing death or serious injury or witnessing its aftermath was different from "learning of a family member's death through indirect means;" therefore, this "is an appropriate place to draw the line between recoverable and non-recoverable claims." Id. at 658. According to the majority holding, "the damages [for a Bowen claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress] arise from the bystander's observation of an extraordinary event." Chief Justice Abrahamson's opinion, ¶ 54. In other words, "the damages arise from the bystander's observance of the circumstances of the death or serious injury, either when the incident [of negligence] occurs or soon after." Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 660. This is exactly what happened in this case.
*606¶ 62. Similar to the facts in Bowen, the Finnegans did not witness the negligent act that caused the death of their baby, but rather, they personally and directly experienced the traumatic aftermath. See id. at 657-58. Just as Sharon Bowen "saw her severely injured son trapped beneath the defendant's car .. . [and] watched the prolonged rescue attempt... ," the Finnegans directly experienced a prolonged attempt to save their dying baby's life. Id. at 634-35. The horrific experience of the Finnegans encompassed a series of events: receiving the news that the lab results of Jared's blood came back positive for bacteria and that this had been communicated to Dr. Schuette, who failed to notify them or act upon the results; observing Jared stop breathing when they were rushing him to the hospital for an emergency lumbar puncture; watching Jared stop breathing a second time while holding him in the hospital elevator; observing Jared change color and his head swelling; and finally witnessing Jared's death.
¶ 63. How can we say that recovery is allowed for witnessing the aftermath of a negligent act resulting in death or serious injury in a single incident, but not if one witnesses the aftermath through a series of incidents? If anything, it seems that witnessing multiple mind-numbing events due to a negligent act causing death or serious injury provides an even greater basis for recovery than witnessing just a single event. Regardless of whether the majority holding now believes that Bowen is too broad and should be limited, it is evident from comparing the facts in Bowen with those in the present case that if Sharon Bowen was allowed to recover, then the Finnegans should as well. There is no principled way to distinguish the two. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*607HH HH
¶ 64. Second, I conclude that the Finnegans' claim is derivative and is therefore a permissible claim under chapter 655. The lead opinion concludes that a claim for emotional distress that is derived from the effects of medical malpractice on an immediate family member is not a "derivative" claim. This is contrary to the common and well-acceptéd meaning of the word derivative. It is also contrary to law and logic.
¶ 65. The term "derivative" has a common and well-accepted definition: "something that derives from, grows out of, or results from an earlier or fundamental state or condition." Webster's International Dictionary 608 (3d ed. 1961). A "derivative action" is defined as "[a] lawsuit arising from an injury to another person ...." Black's Law Dictionary 455 (7th ed. 1999). Although it is not necessarily absolute that an accepted definition of an English word has the same legal definition, it should give one at least great pause when the two are so diametrically opposed. To say that a claim derived from another is not derivative but is instead independent does strain credulity.
¶ 66. The lead opinion is also contrary to law and logic. The lead opinion cannot deny and indeed admits that claims for loss of consortium and loss of society and companionship are derivative claims. Further, the lead opinion acknowledges that a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is similar to claims for loss of consortium and loss of society and companionship, in that they all arise from a shared set of underlying facts. Lead op., ¶ 27. Nevertheless, the lead opinion treats them entirely different by reaching the conclusion that claims for loss of consortium, society and companionship are "derivative," but claims for negligent infliction *608of emotional distress are "independent." Simply put, that does not logically, nor does it legally, follow.
¶ 67. The lead opinion attempts to make this distinction by asserting that "[a] Bowen claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is not merely a separate but dependent damages claim attaching to the primary negligence claim. ..." Lead op., ¶ 29.1 In support, the lead opinion claims that unlike a derivative claim for loss of consortium or society and companionship, "a Bowen bystander claim . . . has its own separate and distinct elements . ..." Id. While a Bowen claim does have distinct elements that must be met, so do claims for loss of consortium, society and companionship. In order to prevail on a claim for loss of consortium or society and companionship, a plaintiff must establish the existence of death or injury, and that the death or injury was caused by the defendant's negligent conduct. Theodore V Lyons, Jr., "Loss of Consortium, Society and Companionship," Law of Damages in Wisconsin, vol. 2, § 14.6 (2000). In addition, such a claim "must be proved separately from the underlying claim in that distinct damages must be shown . . . ." Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 405, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983).
*609¶ 68. Furthermore, similar to the current disagreement regarding the nature of Bowen claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, early case law illustrates that there was also confusion regarding the "derivative" nature of claims for loss of consortium, society and companionship. For example, this court stated in 1975 that "it is apparent. . . that the question of whether a spouse's cause of action for loss of consortium ... is derivative is not clearly settled and the cases are confusing." White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975). But ultimately, our case law has characterized claims for loss of consortium and loss of society and companionship as "derivative," based on reasoning that applies equally to Bowen claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Kottka v. PPG Indus., Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 499, 521, 388 N.W.2d 160 (1986); Korth v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 331, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983); Gragg v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 272, ¶ 12, 248 Wis. 2d 735, 637 N.W.2d 477.
¶ 69. Those cases, in contrast to the lead opinion's attempted distinction, described what makes a claim "derivative." "The claim for a loss of consortium is derivative, in the sense that it does not arise unless the other spouse has sustained a personal injury." Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 521 (citing Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 579, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968)). In the context of a claim for loss of society and companionship, we have stated that:
The minor's cause of action for physical injury and the parents' causes of action for the invasion of the parents' interests are separate in the sense that each is predicated upon the invasion of different interests of different persons. The parents' claims are derivative, *610however, in the sense that they arise from the same tortious act that inflicted injury upon the child.
Korth, 115 Wis. 2d at 331 (emphasis added). In other words, "but for [a] primary tort victim's personal injury, a claim for loss of society and companionship or for loss of consortium would not exist." Lyons, Law of Damages in Wisconsin, § 14.7 (emphasis added).
¶ 70. I see no difference in the derivative nature of claims for loss of consortium, society, and companionship and Bowen claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress — they all depend on and derive from the injury or death of someone else. Admittedly, the court of appeals has stated in dicta that "[i]n Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994), our supreme court... held that emotional distress claims are independent, not derivative." Kosieradzki v. Mathys, 2002 WI App 191, ¶ 10, 256 Wis. 2d 839, 649 N.W.2d 717. However, the court in Bowen did not address this issue, much less hold that claims for emotional distress are independent instead of derivative. See Chief Justice Abrahamson's opinion, ¶ 44 n.5.
¶ 71. In Kosieradzki, the court of appeals held that an insurance policy's "each person" limit applied instead of the "each accident" limit based on the terms of the insurance policy. The court acknowledged that its statement about Bowen was pure dicta, stating that "[h]ow the law defines particular claims is immaterial. At issue [in this case] is how the policy treats them, which is determined by the language of the policy." Kosieradzki, 256 Wis. 2d 839, ¶ 10.
¶ 72. Further, just because a claim is "derivative" does not mean that it cannot involve a separate and independent loss. As we reasoned in Kottka, even *611though a claim, such as for the loss of society and companionship of a spouse, is derivative, it "is not for the other spouse's personal injury but for the separate and independent loss which the noninjured spouse sustains." Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 521 (emphasis added) (citing Fitzgerald, 38 Wis. 2d at 579).2 Therefore, despite Bowen's distinction between the emotional harm due to serious injury or death of a family member and the emotional distress from observing a family member's death or serious injury, the relevant point is that both of these depend on and derive from the injury or death of someone else — i.e., they are both derivative. Thus, the statement in Kosieradzki that Bowen claims are independent is not only dicta, it is incorrect.
¶ 73. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Based on the above, I would hold that the Finnegans' claim is derivative and is therefore a permissible claim under chapter 655.
¶ 74. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins this dissenting opinion.
With respect to the lead opinion's reference to Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), regarding the joinder of claims, we note that we have also held that while it is "preferable that the claims of both husband and wife for loss of consortium be joined... if this cannot be done because of procedural obstacles or the inability or unwillingness of the husband to assert his claim, the wife should not be prevented from pursuing her own independent cause of action." Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 581, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968).
"An action may be considered 'derivative' in the sense that it is dependent on the existence of a separate claim based on injury to a family member, but it may be considered 'independent' in the sense that it must be based on a loss sustained personally by the parent." Robert Michael Ey, "Cause of Action by Parent for Loss of Child's Consortium," 7 Causes of Action 2d 319 (2003) (citing Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983)).