specially concurring:
I agree entirely with the majority’s conclusion that, unless five Board members conclude during the closed preliminary hearing that a complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds, the Board must conduct a public hearing on that complaint. I write separately only to underscore the disastrous public policy consequences associated with the contrary result.
The State Board of Elections, unlike most other state agencies, boards, and commissions, is constitutionally mandated. Article III, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution provides:
“A State Board of Elections shall have general supervision over the administration of the registration and electian laws throughout the State. The general assembly by law shall determine the size, manner of selection and comprehension of the Board. No political party shall have a majority of members of the Board.”
To this end, the General Assembly has provided that the Board membership shall consist of eight members, four from each of the two major political parties. 10 ILCS 5/1A — 2 (West 1998). In addition, “5 votes are necessary for any action of the Board to become effective.” 10 ILCS 5/1A — 7 (West 1998). In construing the legislature’s intent with respect to these provisions, this court has held that “the General Assembly obviously sought to negate partisanship as much as possible and to guarantee the Board’s political independence.” (Emphasis added.) Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516, 527 (1976).
With these principles in mind, consider the following question: Whose reading of section 9 — 21 does a better job of negating partisanship and guaranteeing the Board’s political independence, the majority’s or the dissent’s? A simple hypothetical provides the answer.
Assume that a verified complaint is filed against a Republican candidate. Assume next that, during the closed preliminary hearing, the Board membership votes along strict party lines on whether the complaint was “filed on justifiable grounds.” Under the majority’s construction of section 9 — 21, these facts would lead to a public hearing on the verified complaint. Partisanship goes unrewarded, and the investigation continues. By contrast, under the dissent’s construction of section 9 — 21, a strict party line vote precludes any further inquiry into the verified complaint. Thus, as long as partisanship prevails and the two sides never break ranks, no complaint will ever be considered on its merits in a public forum. Were the dissent’s view to prevail, the Board might as well pack up and go home, as no complaint would ever receive a public hearing.
Again, in designing the Board membership, the General Assembly “sought to negate partisanship as much as possible and to guarantee the Board’s political independence.” Lunding, 65 Ill. 2d at 527. The dissent’s reading of section 9 — 21, while perhaps expedient under the particular facts presented, makes a mockery of the General Assembly’s designs. The majority, by contrast, not only construes section 9 — 21 consistently with its plain language, but it also ensures that the public policies that inspired the Board are vindicated.