— I wholeheartedly concur in the judgment and my colleagues’ holding on the imperfect self-defense issue — so far as it goes. I write separately solely to register my view a trial court must also instruct on *89“imperfect self-defense” whenever it determines a “perfect self-defense” instruction is appropriate. In explaining my reasons, it will be helpful to begin with self-defense, both the perfect and imperfect varieties.
California Penal Code section 197, subdivision 3 makes the killing of a person justifiable if committed “. . . when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design ... to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; . . .” (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Defenses, § 241, p. 277; CALJIC No. 5.12; People v. McDonnel (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 885 [211 P.2d 910].) When this “actual” and “reasonable” belief exists it constitutes an absolute defense, relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the homicide.
As the majority explains, the courts also have recognized a related mental state which reduces, but does not eliminate, the defendant’s culpability. It is usually called “imperfect self-defense.” The California Supreme Court fully explained this concept in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].) “An honest but unreasonable belief that it was necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 674, original italics omitted, new italics added.)
Again in a very recent and exhaustive opinion, the California Supreme Court further refined and upheld the continued viability of “imperfect self-defense.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].) Quoting extensively and approvingly from this court’s opinion in People v. De Leon (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 825], the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature did not eliminate “imperfect self-defense” when it abolished the “diminished capacity defense” in 1981. (7 Cal.4th at pp. 776-778.) The high court did, however, alter somewhat the terminology used to define “imperfect self defense.” “Although Flannel and other opinions referred to an ‘honest belief’ we shall use the more precise term ‘actual belief ’ because it avoids the confusing suggestion inherent in the phrase ‘honest belief that a person could have a ‘dishonest belief’, i.e., that a person could believe something he does not believe.” (7 Cal.4th at p. 773, italics in original.)
The trial court’s decision to instruct on self-defense but not on imperfect self-defense in this case may have been based on its misunderstanding of an admittedly subtle distinction — how mistakes of fact affect the doctrine of self-defense itself. LaFave & Scott offer this explanation: “When his belief is reasonable ... he may be mistaken in his belief and still have the defense. Thus one may be justified in shooting to death an adversary who, having *90threatened to kill him, reaches for his pocket as if for a gun, though it later appears that he had no gun and that he was only reaching for his handkerchief.” (LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed. 1986) Justification & Excuse, § 5.7(c), p. 457, italics added.)
While a defendant may be mistaken and still claim self-defense, that mistake must be reasonable. (See State v. Kelly (1984) 97 N.J. 178 [478 A.2d 364, 373]; State v. Vasquez (1993) 265 N.J.Super. 528 [628 A.2d 346, 356].) An actual but unreasonable mistake about the threat of imminent peril, on the other hand, would not support self-defense yet would support imperfect self-defense. The imperfect self-defense doctrine allows for a situation where a reasonable person would not conclude a set of keys held in the victim’s hand was a gun, but the jury nonetheless could decide the defendant actually but unreasonably held such a belief.
In one sense, imperfect self-defense is a “lesser included” defense of perfect self-defense. They share common elements — the defendant killed because of an “actual” belief he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. Perfect self-defense, however, requires proof of an additional element — the defendant’s belief was reasonable. For this reason, one cannot establish the elements of perfect self-defense without proving imperfect self-defense. For this same reason, if there is sufficient evidence of all the elements required to justify a perfect self-defense instruction, by definition there is sufficient evidence supporting an instruction for the “lesser included” defense of imperfect self-defense.
This is the logic which impelled our disposition of this issue in People v. De Leon, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 815. The Attorney General argues adherence to this court’s decision in De Leon requires trial courts to instruct on imperfect self-defense whenever they instruct a jury on self-defense. In this, the Attorney General is correct. In my view, this is what De Leon indeed requires. In criticizing this position, however, the Attorney General claims “such a requirement has never been articulated by any court. . . .” In this assertion the Attorney General is incorrect.
While De Leon is the only California case I have found which clearly states this requirement, our decision does not stand alone in its reasoning. LaFave & Scott state “[w]here this ‘imperfect’ right of self-defense is recognized, it is generally the case that whenever the facts would entitle the defendant to an instruction on self-defense regarding a murder charge, an instruction on this variety of manslaughter should also be given. [Fns. omitted.]” (Lafave & Scott, supra, Crimes Against the Person, § 7.11(a), p. 666.)
The first judicial decision my research uncovered implying a necessary tie between instructing on self-defense and manslaughter was decided by the *91Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1922, over 70 years ago. (State v. Thomas (1922) 184 N.C. 757 [114 S.E. 834].) Since that time, several other states have expressly articulated this requirement.1 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has decided “. . . it is inconsistent and reversible error to deny the imperfect self-defense instruction where an instruction is given as to perfect self-defense.” (State v. Gomaz (1987) 141 Wis.2d 302 [414 N.W.2d 626, 630].)
The Illinois Supreme Court expresses their requirement as “. . . a self-defense and a voluntary manslaughter instruction should be given when any evidence is presented showing the defendant’s subjective belief that use of force was necessary. If the subjective belief is reasonable, the result is justifiable use of force; if the subjective belief is unreasonable, the result is voluntary manslaughter. [Citations.] [¶] The determination of whether the defendant’s subjective belief is reasonable is for the jury to make.” (People v. Lockett (1980) 82 Ill.2d 546 [45 Ill.Dec. 900, 413 N.E.2d 378, 381].) The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also has addressed the issue, stating, “[i]t is difficult to envision circumstances which are sufficient to generate the issue of justification or excuse by way of perfect self-defense which do not also generate the issue of mitigation by way of imperfect self-defense. Generally, if a defendant is entitled to an instruction with respect to the former, he will be entitled to an instruction with respect to the latter.” (Faulkner v. State (1983) 54 Md.App. 113 [458 A.2d 81, 84, fh. 5].)
I do not mean to suggest appellant has established “imperfect self-defense” as a matter of law. On the evidence presented, a jury reasonably could have found neither self-defense nor imperfect self-defense applied. As my colleagues also recognize, the problem is the jurors were not given the opportunity to consider the latter, since the court failed to even instruct on imperfect self-defense while it did instruct on self-defense itself.
In my view, De Leon gave expression in California to a sound, eminently logical principle which has gained wide acceptance elsewhere. In this and future cases where trial courts find sufficient reason to give an instruction on perfect self-defense, they also should grant a requested instruction on imperfect self-defense.
While the definitions of self-defense and imperfect self-defense may differ slightly from state to state, they are close enough to the California definitions to be persuasive authority on this issue.