specially concurring.
[¶20] I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion because I believe that, if *1213the Trooper saw what he says he saw, then he was justified in making the traffic stop.1 I write separately, however, to point out a couple of conceptual difficulties. First is the question of whether a traffic stop must be justified by probable cause or by the lower reasonable suspicion standard. Our law is not at all clear in that regard. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-108(a) (LexisNexis 2009) provides that a "citation may issue as a charging document for any misdemeanor which the issuing officer has probable cause to believe was committed by the person to whom the citation was issued." W.R.Cr.P. 3(b)(8) contains similar language. In Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶¶ 24-28, 146 P.3d 492, 499-501 (Wyo.2006), and in Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo.2003), we held that an officer's observation of a traffic violation gave rise to probable cause so as to justify a traffie stop. And in Norman v. State, 747 P.2d 520, 528 (Wyo.1987), we noted that the evidence revealed "facts demonstrating the requisite probable cause for" a traffic stop based upon the very statute at issue in this case. At the same time, however, we have said several times that traffic stops are analyzed under the lesser reasonable suspi-clon standard. See, eg., Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, 118, 228 P.3d 55, 58 (Wyo.2010); Garvin v. State, 2007 WY 190, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d 725, 728-29 (Wyo.2007), Fender v. State, 2008 WY 96, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Wyo.2008); and Damato, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d at 704-05.
I raise this issue because the cases cited in the majority opinion, as well as the majority opinion itself, do not seem to come down clearly on one side or the other on this question. Furthermore, the cited cases, plus cases such as McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo.1999); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215 (Wyo.1994); and Keehn v. Town of Torringion, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo.1992), suggest that the distinction between a traffic stop based upon an observed traffic violation-the stop being made for the purpose of issuing a citation-and a traffic stop based upon reasonable suspicion that some crime may have been committed-the stop being made for the purpose of investigating that possible crime, traffie or otherwise-has been blurred.2
[¶22] Of even more concern to me, however, is the fact that this is one bizarre statute. Apparently, it is not a crime if one violates the statute a little bit, but it is a crime if one violates the statute somewhat more than a little bit. If you stay in your lane, you have not violated the statute, but if you go out of your lane, you may have violated the statute. In the context of the present case, if the appellant's conduct may or may not have provided the officer with reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to believe that the appellant violated the statute, how on earth is the appellant supposed to have notice, before the fact, that his conduct will violate the statute?
[¶23] We said the following in Fertig: *1214Fertig, 2006 WY 148, ¶27, 146 P.3d at 501 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. at 1776-77) (emphasis added). The point is that a traffic code provision, like any criminal law, is supposed to describe the conduct that is prohibited. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 81-5-209 (LexisNexis 2009), however, the trial judge at some later point in time tells both the defendant and the officer whether the observed conduct even provided reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause that the statute was violated. How can a stop be justified by an observed "violation" where the officer does not know whether what he has observed is a violation?
*1213We also find the rationale of Whren [v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ] persuasive in that we are not in a position to identify which traffic laws should be enforeed and which violations should be disregarded by law enforcement. Violations of the traffic code provide an objective standard by which to judge the reasonableness of a traffic stop seizure because an observed violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop seizure.
*1214[¶24] This is not simply an evidentiary issue. It is an issue involving the clarity of a criminal statute. Compare the "single lane" statute with, for instance, the traffic-control device statute, the latter being found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-402(a) (LexisNexis 2009):
(a) The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable thereto placed or held in accordance with this act. ...
Under § 31-5-402(32), if a driver fails to stop at a stop sign, both the driver and the officer observing that failure know that the driver has violated the statute. The officer has the requisite reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to stop the vehicle and to issue the driver a citation for running the stop sign, and the driver cannot defend by claiming that he only ran the stop sign a little bit. Furthermore, the trial judge cannot declare that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make the traffic stop because the driver only violated the statute a little bit. Given a particular set of evidentiary facts-the driver ran the stop sign-different judges should not be allowed to declare differently whether that conduct justified a traffic stop3 But under § 31-5-209(a), that is precisely the case. Both the citizenry and law enforcement require more guidance than that.
. I am not entirely comfortable with that statement because, as the majority points out in a footnote, quoting the Trooper, the weather was "overcast, rainy, I believe a little bit of snow mixed in there, and some wind." Could that not have made it "impracticable" to keep the vehicle entirely within a single lane, and would that not mean that the driver had not violated the statute? See United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir.1996). It would seem, though, that the question of impracticability should, in most cases, be an evidentiary issue at trial, rather than a factor determinative of justification for the traffic stop.
. If a traffic stop can be made based only upon reasonable suspicion, but the issuance of a citation requires probable cause, every reasonable suspicion traffic stop requires further investigation for the development of probable cause. That makes no sense in the context of the observed violation of a section of the traffic code because no further investigation is necessary before issuance of a citation.
. There are three circuit court judges in Cheyenne. Under the "as nearly as practicable" language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-209(a), Judge A could impose a standard whereby reasonable suspicion/probable cause exists where the officer observes a vehicle cross the fog line for 300 feet, Judge B could impose a standard whereby reasonable suspicion/probable cause exists only if the officer observes a vehicle cross the fog line for at least 500 feet, and Judge C could impose a standard whereby reasonable suspicion/probable cause exists only if the officer observes a vehicle cross the fog line more than once, with the tires being at least eight inches across the line. More significant, of course, is the fact that a particular defendant might or might not be guilty of violating the statute, depending upon which standard was being imposed. Ludicrous.