Commonwealth v. Jeffries

Opinion of the Court by

Justice STUMBO.

Billy Stewart Jeffries1, the appellee herein, was convicted of the murder and attempted rape of an elderly female. This Court affirmed Jeffries’ conviction following a matter-of-right appeal. Jeffries v. Commonwealth, No.l997-SC-525-MR. Jeffries was a seventeen-year-old juvenile at the time he was convicted of the crimes brought against him. He was sentenced on June 9, 1997. In December 1997, Jef-fries reached his eighteenth year and was sent to the Shelby Circuit Court, which conducted a hearing pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 640.030(2). Under this statute, the trial court must determine whether Jeffries should be given probation or conditional discharge, returned to the Department of Juvenile Justice for treatment not to exceed six months, and then be discharged, or remanded to the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of his sentence in an adult prison.

Prior to Jeffries’ eighteen-year-old sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that a psychological evaluation of Jeffries be conducted by Dr. Katherine Peterson. Jeffries subpoenaed Dr. Peterson in order to question her with regard to her expertise concerning sexual offender treatment programs for “non-admitters,” that is convicted offenders who do not admit they committed a sex crime. During Jeffries’ confinement at the Central Kentucky Youth Development Center (CKYDC), his trial counsel had requested that Jeffries be placed in a treatment program for non-admitters. Jeffries contended that he should be allowed to call Dr. Peterson as a witness in order to question her about his amenability to sexual offender treatment if a non-admitter program were provided to him. He also subpoenaed witnesses from CKYDC that would provide testimony regarding his progress in treatment.

The trial court, however, would not allow Jeffries to cross-examine Dr. Peterson or call any other witnesses on his behalf at the hearing. In addition, the trial court did not allow avowal testimony of Dr. Peterson or any other witness. The trial court determined that Jeffries was not prime for probation and placed him in the *62custody of the Department of Corrections to serve out the remainder of his sentence in an adult prison. Jeffries subsequently appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which reversed the determination of the trial court because its refusal to admit evidence of rehabilitation was a denial of Jeffries’ due process rights. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it did not allow Jeffries to cross-examine Dr. Peterson and when it did not permit any evidence by avowal. The Commonwealth, the appellant herein, moved for discretionary review, which was granted. The Commonwealth now asks this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold the decision of the trial court.

The issue to be decided is what process is due a youthful offender during a KRS 640.030(2) sentencing hearing held after he or she has reached the age of majority. The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court should apply the same sentencing procedures during a youthful offender’s eighteen-year-old sentencing hearing as applied in a typical adult sentencing hearing.

KRS 640.030(2) provides that a youthful offender, following his or her eighteenth birthday, must be returned to the sentencing court if time remains on his or her sentence. The sentencing court must then make a determination and decide: 1) whether to place the youthful offender on probation or conditional discharge; 2) whether to return the youthful offender to the Department of Juvenile Justice for six months of additional treatment, followed by discharge; or 3) whether to place the youthful offender in an adult correctional facility.

In Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 12 (1998), we addressed sentencing hearings of youthful offenders who have attained the age of majority. A youthful offender has no guarantee of probation and under KRS 640.030(2), the sentencing court may only make a decision regarding probation after considering the factors set forth in KRS 533.010. Id. at 15. KRS Chapter 533 “Probation and Conditional Discharge,” the statute which applies to the probation of adult offenders, is equally applicable to youthful offenders. Id.

The Commonwealth argues that the same sentencing guidelines apply to a youthful offender’s KRS 640.030(2) sentencing hearing, as they apply in an adult offender’s sentencing hearing. The Commonwealth also claims that this view is fully supported by Johnson, supra. We agree that our decision in that case supports the idea that the guidelines regarding an adult offender’s sentencing hearing were intended to apply to a youthful offender’s sentencing hearing as well. However, Jeffries did not receive the same treatment that an adult offender would have received under KRS 532.050.

Jeffries should have been afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence against him at his sentencing hearing. This opportunity is provided for in the codified presentence procedure for felony convictions found in KRS 532.050. KRS 532.050(6) states:

Before imposing sentence, the court shall advise the defendant or his counsel of the factual contents and conclusions of any presentence investigation or psychiatric examinations and afford a fair opportunity and a reasonable period of time, if the defendant so requests, to controvert them. The court shall provide the defendant’s counsel a copy of the presentence investigation report. It shall not be necessary to disclose the sources of confidential information. (Emphasis added).

*63Here Jeffries received no opportunity to present any evidence or information in his favor at his sentencing hearing. The sen-’ tencing court relied on a report assessing Jeffries’ propensity for committing further crimes against the public. Jeffries was not allowed to cross-examine Dr. Peterson, the psychiatrist who prepared that report. Nor was he permitted to present any testimony regarding his progress in his treatment program at the juvenile facility where he was confined. Furthermore, it should be noted that the sentencing court did not even allow any evidence to be taken by avowal.

Additionally, Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.02(1) requires the sentencing court to “consider the possibility of probation or conditional discharge” and to “afford the defendant and the defendant’s counsel an opportunity to make a statement or statements in the defendant’s behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.”

In Edmonson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 595 (1987), we held that a trial court may only exercise its discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences after the defendant has been afforded “a fair opportunity to present evidence at a meaningful hearing in favor of having the sentences run concurrently or present other matters in mitigation of punishment.” Id. at 596. Applying the same logic to the present matter, and in view of KRS 582.050(6) and RCr 11.02, we hold that a trial court, when conducting a KRS 640.080(2) sentencing hearing of a youthful offender, must exercise its discretion to impose one of the three sentencing alternatives outlined in KRS 640.030(2) only after the youthful offender has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence against him and to present evidence in mitigation of punishment.

The Court of Appeals below held that it was error for the sentencing court to not allow Jeffries to present “his side” of the case in mitigation of punishment. The Court of Appeals further held that Jeffries should have been allowed to introduce testimony of CKYDC treatment staff by avowal, and that he should have also been permitted to cross-examine Dr. Peterson. While we affirm the ultimate decision of the Court of Appeals, our holding today is more limited. We do not reach the issue of whether the sentencing court committed error in its refusal to permit the testimony of specific witnesses. Rather, we hold that the trial court committed error by not providing Jeffries a worthwhile hearing. We decline to prescribe the exact procedures the trial court here, or trial courts in general, should follow. "Instead, the trial court should use its learned discretion when it must determine what process is due a youthful offender at a sentencing hearing held pursuant to KRS 640.030(2). Allowing Jeffries to call CKYDC treatment staff as witnesses or allowing him to cross-examine Dr. Peterson may be necessary to provide Jeffries with an appropriate sentencing hearing. However, any such decision lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court simply finds that, in this instance, the trial court did not provide Jeffries a fair opportunity to controvert the evidence against him at his eighteen-year-old sentencing. To hold otherwise would be a violation of Jeffries’ right to due process of law.

Jeffries is entitled to receive a meaningful, fair, and equitable opportunity at his sentencing hearing to controvert evidence presented against him. Further Jeffries should be allowed to present evidence in mitigation of punishment. Due process demands no less. On remand, the trial court will need to conduct a sentencing hearing pursuant to KRS 640.030(2) and render a decision regarding Jeffries’ future *64disposition in conformity with our holding today.

For the aforementioned reasons, we remand this case to the Shelby Circuit Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

LAMBERT, C.J.; and COOPER, J. concur. KELLER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. JOHNSTONE, J., dissents by separate opinion, with GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ„ joining that separate opinion.

. We note that the appellee, Billy Stewart Jeffries’ middle name has been spelled Stewart as well as Stuart throughout the various pleadings. This opinion uses the name set forth in the indictment.