with whom TAYLOR, C.J. and KAUGER, J. join, dissenting:
T1 The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after an automobile accident on April 27, 2007. At that time, the defendant was a minor, and both parents had excluded him from coverage in their liability insurance policies. The statutes in effect at the time of the accident, *1189regarding exelusion of coverage are found in title 47. Section 7-824(b)(8) 1 provided:
"Owner's policy. Such owner's policy of liability insurance: ... 8. May by agreement in a separate written endorsement between any named insured and the insurer exclude as insured any person or persons designated by name from coverage under the policy."
Section 7-600(1)(c) 2 in pertinent part provided:
"1. 'Owner's policy'. An owner's policy of liability insurance: ... (c) may provide for exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing laws...."
Section 7-601(B) 3 in pertinent part provided:
"... Every person, while operating or using a motor vehicle registered in this state which is not owned by such person, shall maintain in force security for the payment of loss resulting from the liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death or property damage sustained by any person arising out of the operation or use of the vehicle, unless such security has been provided by the owner in accordance with this section which does not exclude said person from coverage." [Emphasis provided.]
€ 2 The majority opinion identifies § 7-824 as a part of the "fault-based financial responsibility law", and §§ 7-600 and 7-601 as a part of the "compulsory insurance statutes" or "compulsory omnibus coverage". However, both provide for exelusions. In Pierce v. Oklahoma Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 1995 OK 78, 901 P.2d 819, Teresa Horse purchased automobile liability insurance that specifically named and exeluded her husband, Gerald Horse, because the insurance company did not want to insure him since his driver's license had been revoked. There is no indication that Mrs. Horse's insurance was issued under the "fault-based financial responsibility law", in fact, just the opposite. Paragraph 1 of Pierce states: "We hold that such a named driver exelusion does not violate Oklahoma's public policy regarding compulsory liability insurance, and that the insurance contract, by its express language, operates to bar any liability on behalf of the insurer, including that of negligent entrustment by the insured". The policy issued under the compulsory liability insurance laws, but exeluded a specifically named person from driving, and the Court upheld the exclusion.
113 Pierce observes that the last sentence of § 7-601 contemplates specific individuals can be excluded from coverage, and that § 7-600(1)(c) states that the liability insurance policy "may provide for exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing laws". Pierce, 1995 OK 78, 10, 901 P.2d 819, 822. And, as noted above, the policy was issued under the laws of compulsory liability insurance, and the Court held that such an exclusion did not violate Oklahoma's public policy. Pierce, 1995 OK 748, 11, 901 P.2d 819, 820. In the Pierce case the facts reveal that a policy issued under the laws of compulsory liability insurance does allow a specific individual to be excluded from coverage even though an innocent victim suffered injury from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Gerald Horse struck the motorcycle on which April Pierce was riding as a passenger, and she was severely injured; she was an innocent victim.
14 The Pierce case distinguished three cases: Young v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 1987 OK 88, 748 P.2d 1084; Equity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 1987 OK 121, 747 P.2d 947; and Nation v. State Farm Ins. Co., 1994 OK 54, 880 P.2d 877; not because their exclusions failed to meet a "fault-based financial responsibility law" but "because of their broad and sweeping nature" 4 Young invalidated a clause that excluded liability coverage for any person under the age of twenty-five; Equity Mutual invalidated exclusion that confined liability coverage to a two-hundred mile radius; and Nation invalidated an exelusion that omitted *1190from coverage all resident members of the household. Pierce, 1995 OK 78, 8, 901 P.2d at 821.
15 Harkrider v. Posey, 2000 OK 94, 115, 24 P.3d 821, 829, states the principal purpose of the "compulsory automobile lability policy" is to protect the public from the financial hardship that may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons, and concludes that this policy overrides contrary private agreements that restrict coverage. That public policy came from the statutes, the very statutes that recognize exclusions. In Young, the Court found that the intent of the Legislature embodied in 47 0.9$.1981, $ 7-601, required that any vehicle operated on the highways of Oklahoma be secured against liability to innocent victims of the negligent operation or use of the insured victim. Young, 1987 OK 88, 16, 743 P.2d at 1088. The very next sentence states: "We do not necessarily find that this intent is so broad as to eliminate all possible bargaining regarding liability exclusions which may be contained in the required liability insurance policies." Young, 1987 OK 88, 16, 743 P.2d at 1088.
T6 The Legislature, from which we derive our public policy, provides for exclusion as insured of "any person or persons designated by name from coverage under the policy." That exelusion is not a broad exclusion as found in Young, Equity Mutual, and Nation, but the statute does provide for exclusions of any person or persons designated by name. The endorsement in the contracts of both of Benjamin Neal's parents excluded him by name. On its face, that exclusion appears to be valid under the statutes, enacted by the Legislature, from which comes the public policy.
T7 The majority opinion characterizes the holding of Pierce, as requiring that a named driver exclusion be based on fault, such as a poor driving record. But the rationale for the holding was that the Legislature realized that premiums might be too costly in some cireumstances, and so it chose to allow the contracting parties to exclude specifically named individuals, because in so doing, the Legislature allowed for families to obtain insurance that might not otherwise have been affordable. Pierce, 1995 OK 78, 15, 901 P.2d 819, 823. The same rationale may be used to allow parties to exclude their teenage children from their automobile liability insurance policies.
T8 The result of forbidding exclusion of teenaged children from automobile liability policies is that families with moderate incomes who have been able to insure their vehicles for the parents who are not high risk, may not be able to afford their policies after the premium is increased to cover teenaged children. Then the parents may be forced to risk driving without or with less insurance. Thus, fewer people have compulsory insurance.
T9 This majority opinion will result in all insurance companies requiring parents to insure all teenagers in the family who are old enough to hold drivers' licenses, regardless of whether or not they have a car, do not choose to drive, or merely need a license for work or identification purposes. Forcing this additional insurance premium on parents would occur even though the Legislature has specifically allowed teenagers to be excluded from the insurance policies. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 519, § 32.
. 47 0.$.2001 § 7-600(1)(c). This section was amended by 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 62, § 28, and ch. 185, § 1.
. 47 O.$.2001 § 7-601(B). This section was amended by 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 62, § 31.
. Pierce v. Oklahoma Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 1995 OK 78, 8, 901 P.2d 819, 821.