dissenting.
“It is no part of the duty of the judiciary to resort to technical subtleties to defeat the obvious purposes of the legislative power in a matter over which that power has a constitutional right to control.” 1
Although this Court has on many occasions found the Legislature to have stepped beyond its bounds, today the majority fails to recognize the role of the judiciary and ignores Article 2, Section 1 of our Texas Constitution. The majority openly thwarts the will of the people as expressed by legislative enactment in order to substitute its own sense of justice. To such unwarranted and unconstitutional judicial activism, I vigorously dissent.
I.
THE ISSUE
The issue presented in these cases is whether Article 37.07, Section 3(a), of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the introduction of unadjudicated extraneous offense evidence during the punishment stage of a trial for any offense other than capital murder.2 This Section, as *553amended in 1989, now provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Sec. 3. Evidence of prior criminal record in all criminal cases after a finding of guilty.
“(a) Regardless of the plea and whether punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may, as permitted by the Rules of Evidence, be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character. The term prior criminal record means a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or a suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged.” Article 37.07, Section 3(a), V.A.C.C.P. (emphasis added to reflect the amendatory language).
See Act of June 15, 1989, Chapter 785, Section 4.04, 1989 TEX.SESS.LAW SERY. 3492 (Vernon).
“When we interpret statutes such as [Article 37.07, Section 3(a) ], we seek to effectuate the 'collective' intent of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), citing Camacho v. State, 765 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). As this Court explained in Boykin:
“When attempting to discern this collective legislative intent or purpose, we necessarily focus our intention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment. We do this because the text of the statute is the law in the sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through compromise, and submitted to the Governor for her signature. We focus on the literal text also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute was enacted into law. There really is no other certain method for determining the collective legislative intent or purpose at some point in the past, even assuming a single intent or purpose was dominant at the time of enactment. Yet a third reason for focussing on the literal text is that the Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.” Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 (emphasis omitted).
The Boykin Court concluded that “if the meaning of the statutory text, when read using the established canons of construction relating to such text should have been plain to the legislators who voted for it, we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning.” Id. at 785, citing Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Thus, if the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the Judiciary to add or subtract from such a statute. Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785; Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Ex parte Davis, 412 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). On the other hand, if the plain language of a statute is not clear or would lead to absurd results, “then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a court to consider, in arriving at a sensible interpretation, such extra-textual factors as executive or administrative interpretation of the statute or legislative history.” Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, we must first determine whether Article 37.07, Section 3(a), is clear and unambiguous on the issue of admission of unadjudicated extraneous offenses during the punishment phase of trial.
Several Texas appellate courts have explicitly held that Article 37.07, Section (3)(a), as amended, permits admission of unadjudicated extraneous offenses at the punishment phase of a noncapital trial. See Rexford v. State, 818 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd, reh’g pending); Gallardo v. State, 809 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, pet. granted); Hubbard v. State, 809 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. granted); McMillian v. State, 799 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. granted); Huggins v. State, 795 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex.App.— *554Beaumont 1991, pet. ref’d). The Dallas Court of Appeals, however, has determined otherwise in Grunsfeld v. State, 813 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991). Judge Onion, writing for eight of the fifteen justices of that court, determined that:
“At first blush, it seems that the additional language [in the amended Article 37.07, section (3)(a) ] is broad and sweeping. Upon closer examination it appears that evidence of extraneous, unadjudicat-ed offenses, even if deemed relevant to sentencing by the trial court, would have to meet two tests. First, it would have to be evidence permitted by the rules of evidence. Second, if it is part of a defendant’s prior criminal record, as it has been considered in the past, it must comply with the statutory definition of that term.”
See also Blackwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.App.—Waco 1991, pet. pending). Arguably, this conflict among the courts of appeals demonstrates that the amended statute is not clear and unambiguous; hence, we should now use the prescribed rules of statutory construction to examine Article 37.07, Section 3(a), and determine whether there is an articulate, sensible way to interpret it.
II.
CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE 37.07, SECTION 3(a)
A. Presumptions
In construing a statutory amendment, courts must presume that the Legislature intended to change the law; courts should subsequently construe the amendment in a way that gives effect to the change rather than in a way that renders the amendment useless. Ex parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Courts then should presume that the Legislature intended that the effect of the change be given to the entire statute. Ex parte Austin, 746 S.W.2d 226, 236 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 311.-021(2). Finally, courts should presume the Legislature intended the change to effect a just and reasonable result that favors the public interest over any private interest. Lindsay v. Papageorgiou, 751 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 311.021(5).
B. The Code Construction Act
To assist courts in construing statutes, the Legislature has provided a nonexclusive list of factors a court may consider. These are: (1) the object sought to be attained; (2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) the legislative history; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; (6) administrative construction of the statute; (7) title (caption), preamble and emergency provisions. V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 311.-023 (The Code Construction Act). See Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Judge Baird, dissenting at 629, when construing statutes courts should consider all factors enumerated by Government Code Section 311.023).
(1) The object sought to be attained.
To ascertain the legislative intent — i.e., the object sought to be attained — we look to the language of' the statute itself. Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The Legislature amended Article 37.07, Section 3(a), by adding the phrase that evidence may be admitted “as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including ....”3 The added phrase “as to any matter the court deems relevant” clearly expands the evidence admissible at the punishment phase. The ad*555dition of the word “including” merely emphasizes the expansion because it is a term of enlargement or inclusion rather than a term of limitation or exclusion. V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 311.005(13). That is, rather than evidence being limited to a defendant’s prior criminal record, it now includes his prior criminal record as well as “evidence as to any matter the court deems relevant.”
As stated above, this Court must presume that the Legislature intended to change the law when Article 37.07 was amended. Thus, we can easily conclude from the broad language added to the statute that the Legislature’s objective in amending Article 37.07, Section 3(a), was to expand the scope of evidence to be admitted at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial. In fact, the only limits on the scope of admissibility apparent from the language of Article 37.07, section 3(a), are the Rules of Evidence and the determination of relevancy by the trial court.4
(2) The circumstance under which the statute was amended.
When interpreting the pre-amendment version of Article 37.07, Section 3(a), this Court held that extraneous offense evidence is not admissible at the punishment phase of a trial unless one of the parties opens the door to such evidence. Murphy v. State, 111 S.W.2d 44, 64 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Plurality opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing). Such a narrow construction, however, had not always been the law. In a series of cases prior to Murphy, this Court held that:
“Evidence to be offered at the hearing on punishment pursuant to the provisions of Article 37.07, Section 2(b), Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P. is by no means limited to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his general reputation and his character. Evidence legally admissible to mitigate punishment or evidence that is relevant to the application for probation, if any, is also admissible.” Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
Murphy overruled these cases sub silentio. In a plurality opinion on a motion for rehearing, Judge Clinton reasoned that although character evidence was admissible at the penalty phase, and the Rules of Evidence permit proof of character with specific acts of conduct, Section 3(a) authorized proof of a criminal record solely with final convictions, thereby evidencing a legislative intent to exclude proof of character With extraneous unadjudicated offenses. Id. at 61. Judge Duncan explained in a concurring opinion that “[i]f the Legislature wants the jury to have access beyond that authorized by Art. 37.07, § 3(a), supra, it should pass legislation to that effect. It is not this Court’s function to authorize an expansion of the statute beyond its language.” Id. at 71 n. 1 (Duncan, J., concurring).
We presume that the Legislature accomplished precisely this expansion when they amended the statute. See Welch v. Welch, 369 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas, 1963, no writ.) (presumption that Legislature knew the circumstances and conditions affecting or relating to the amendment, including prior court decisions). Thus aware that this Court gave Article 37.07, Section 3(a), a narrow interpretation because of its restrictive language, the Legislature obviously intended such not to be the case when they amended the statute by adding such expansive language.
(3) The legislative history.
The legislative history of the 1989 amendment to Article 37.07, Section 3(a), reveals that it was effected by House Bill 2335, a voluminous piece of legislation which, among other things, created the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Representative Hightower first introduced House Bill 2335 in the House. The House approved the bill and sent it on to the *556Senate. There was no amendment to Article 37.07 in the proposed bill. The bill, however was reported unfavorably in the Senate by the Senate’s Justice Committee. Senator McFarland then offered Committee Substitute to House Bill 2335 which included a section amending Article 37.07, Section 3(a), to read as follows:
“Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may, as permitted by the Rules of Evidence, be offered by the state or the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing. This subsection may not be construed as authorizing introduction of evidence seized in violation of the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution.”
As initially proposed, therefore, the amendment to Article 37.07 was virtually as broad as Article 37.071(a), Y.A.C.C.P., which places only constitutional limitations on the evidence admissible at the punishment stage of a capital trial.5
We can find no stated explanation why the Legislature added to the proposed Article 37.07, Section 3(a), the phrase “including the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character,” and kept the proviso from the former article that a prior criminal record means “a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or a suspended sentence that had occurred prior to trial.” We surmise that the phrasing in the present statute was a simple adoption of the language of Article 37.071 which had been interpreted by this Court on numerous occasions. See Grunsfeld v. State, 813 S.W.2d 158, 166-67 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991) (detailing House and Senate actions on the proposed amendment).
This simple addition did not defeat the attempt to broaden the scope of admissibility because the word “including” means that a prior criminal record is no longer exclusively required. See part 11(B)(1), supra. See also Stavinhoa v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76 at 78 n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (“In that amendment [of 37.07, § 3(a) ] the Legislature provided that evidence may be admitted at the punishment phase of trial ‘as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including’ those matters previously made expressly admissible under the statute, viz: the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character. Query what the Legislature means by ‘relevance’ in this . context.” [cites omitted]).
(4) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects.
Article 37.071, Section 2(a), controls admissibility of evidence in the punishment phase of capital trials and is quite similar to the amended version of Article 37.07, Section 3(a). That is, the phrase in Article 37.071, Section 2(a) — “evidence ... as to any matter the court deems relevant” — is the phrase that was added to Article 37.07, Section 3(a), when it was amended. Evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses has long been admissible under this phrase in the punishment stage of capital trials. See Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Wilder v. State, 583 *557S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Thus, the addition of the phrase to Article 37.07, Section 3(a), clearly suggests that evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses is now admissible in the punishment phase of non-capital trials.6
Judge Clinton’s explanation of the distinction between Article 37.071 and the pre-amendment Article 37.07 in Rumbaugh v. State, 589 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), further emphasizes the argument for construing the sections in a like manner. He stated:
“Nothing in Article 37.071 requires that there be a final conviction for an extraneous offense to be admissible at the punishment phase of the [capital] trial. The statement implies a comparison with Article 37.07, Section 3(a), V.A.C.C.P., which, in the punishment phase of a non-capital trial, does limit proof of a defendant’s prior criminal record to final convictions and other adjudicated offenses. The significance of the comparison is this: In a non-bifurcated trial, in which the issues of guilt and punishment are litigated at the same time, there is a rule of evidence that excludes proof of extraneous offenses because it confuses and prejudices the issue of guilt. The purpose of bifurcated procedure is to eliminate the need for this exclusionary rule of evidence. The very choice by the Legislature to establish a bifurcated procedure in capital cases, like the one in non-capital cases, evinces its intention to eliminate the rule of evidence that excludes proof of extraneous offenses. Had it wanted to limit the proof in capital trials to adjudicated offenses, it could have provided so in Article 37.071, as it has in Article 37.07. There being nothing in Article 37.071 to require such a limitation, this Court cannot impose it. The net result is that, by choosing a bifurcated procedure, the Legislature abolished the rule of evidence that excluded proof of extraneous offenses; by deliberately choosing not to abolish the other exclusionary rules of evidence, the Legislature has kept them in effect at the punishment phase of a capital trial.” Rumbaugh v. State, 589 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). [footnotes and citations omitted].
The choice by the Legislature to amend Article 37.07 by adding the language of Article 37.071 clearly evinces a legislative intent to remove the restriction from Article 37.07 requiring exclusion of unadjudi-cated extraneous offense evidence from the punishment phase in non-capital trials.
(5) The consequences of a particular construction.
This guideline, more than any other, supports the position that the Legislature intended to allow the admission of unadjudi-cated extraneous offense evidence at the punishment stage of a non-capital trial. As previously stated, it is presumed that the Legislature intends to change the law whenever it enacts an amendment. Furthermore, this Court has an obligation to construe the amendment in a way that gives it effect rather than in a way that renders the amendment a nullity. Ex parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d at 842. The construction the majority gives the statute effectuates no change and renders the amendment completely useless.
III.
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND RELEVANCY
The adoption of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence in September, 1986, significantly changed the legal standards of admissibility of evidence in criminal trials. See Herasimchuk, “The Relevancy Revolu*558tion in Criminal Law: A Practical Tour Through the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence,” 20 St. Mary’s L.J. 737 (1989) (hereinafter “The Relevancy Revolution”). The codified rules of evidence are rules of inclusion, not exclusion, and favor the admission of all logically relevant evidence except as provided otherwise by constitution, statute, rules of evidence or rules prescribed pursuant to statutory authority. Rule 402, Tex. R.Crim.Evid. A trial court’s first step in determining admissibility, therefore, must be to ascertain whether the evidence is “logically relevant.” See Rule 104(a), Tex. R.Crim.Evid. (Preliminary questions concerning admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court).
Evidence is “logically relevant” that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 401, Tex.R.Crim.Evid. But logical relevance at the punishment stage of a non-capital trial is difficult to determine because there are few, if any, discrete fact issues for the jury to decide. Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Indeed, this Court has held that deciding what punishment to assess is a normative process, policy oriented and not intrinsically fact bound. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d at 63. Thus, punishment evidence is not “relevant” in the sense that it tends to make more or less probable some identifiable fact; rather, punishment evidence is simply information that has been deemed appropriate, either by the Legislature or by the courts, for fact finders to consider in assessing punishment. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d at 63. Since The Rules of Criminal Evidence apply at sentencing only “to the extent matters of evidence are not provided for in the statutes which govern the procedure therein or in another court rule,” we shall look first to the statute that governs procedure during the punishment stage in non-capital trials to see if it provides any guidance for determining what evidence is appropriate to punishment. Rule 1101(d)(1), Tex.R.Crim.Evid.
Article 37.07, V.A.C.C.P., governs procedure at the punishment stage of non-capital trials and provides the only legislative guidelines for determining what is appropriate to punishment. First, Article 37.07, Section 3(a), authorizes the admission of any evidence the court deems relevant to sentencing. This gives the trial court an almost unlimited discretion to determine relevancy to sentencing, but restricts admissibility by further requiring that evidence may be offered only “as permitted by the Rules of Evidence.” See Rule 402, Tex.R.Crim.Evid. (relevant evidence not admissible if proscribed by statute, constitution, rules). Second, Section 3(a) provides a list of specific examples of evidence expressly admissible at punishment.7 In light of the rule that only relevant evidence is admissible, we can thus infer that these specific examples have been predetermined to be appropriate or relevant to punishment. See Rule 402, Tex.R.Crim.Evid: (relevant evidence is admissible, irrelevant evidence is not). Since character evidence is expressly included in this list, we conclude that evidence of the character of a defendant is admissible at punishment, and ergo, relevant to punishment by legislative mandate.
The relevancy of character evidence does not, however, guarantee its admissibility. We have just acknowledged that the admissibility of character evidence, or any evidence determined relevant to punishment for that matter, is dependant on the Rules of Evidence. Therefore, we must ascertain whether the Rules of Criminal Evidence exclude proof of character at the punishment stage.
Rule 403 in the Rules of Criminal Evidence permits the exclusion of relevant evidence, inter alia, if the court finds that the *559prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. This general rule is followed by several rules that in circumscribed situations, perform this balancing for the court. See Rules 404 and 406-412, Tex.R.Crim.Evid. These rules are the result of courts having been faced on numerous occasions with the same evidentiary scenario and having repeatedly found either that the probative value of a certain type of evidence is outweighed by various counterfactors, or that the probative value consistently outweighs the prejudicial effect. Herasimchuk, “The Relevancy Revolution” at p. 794. One of these predetermined balancing rules, Rule 404(c), states in plain and simple language that evidence of a prior criminal record and all “other evidence of an accused’s character” may be offered at the punishment stage.8 Thus, the probative value of character evidence, as well as evidence of a prior criminal record, is never substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and it is admissible. The reasonable result of this predetermined balancing is that evidence of both “good” and “bad” character is now admissible at the punishment deliberations in non-capital trials. Moreover, Rule 404(c) places absolutely no restrictions on the “other evidence of character;” it does not distinguish between the various reasons for offering evidence as does Rule 404(b) nor does it distinguish between the methods for proving character as established by Rule 405(b). Since all character evidence for whatever purpose in whatever form is admissible under Rule 404(c) at punishment, this rule, standing alone, does not preclude the admission of character evidence.
Unfortunately, determination of the relevancy and admissibility of character evidence does not guarantee the admissibility of unadjudicated extraneous offense evidence, because Rule 405 of the Rules of Criminal Evidence limits the methods for proving character.9 See Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (determination of relevancy does not supersede rules of evidence regarding manner of proof); Hernandez v. State, 800 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (character evidence may be admitted at punishment but its admission is governed by Rule 405).
Rule 405 provides the following three methods for proving character: (1) reputation of the person in the community; (2) personal opinion testimony of witnesses who know the person; and (3) specific instances of conduct. Unadjudicated extraneous offenses certainly are specific instances of conduct, but Rule 405(b) further limits proof of specific conduct to show character in “cases in which character or trait of character of a person is an essential *560element of a charge, claim, or defense.” This language raises the same confusion that determining relevancy to punishment raised, because there are no “elements” to be determined at punishment.
The term “essential element” is nowhere defined, but the Penal Code defines “element of an offense” as the forbidden conduct, the required culpability, any required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section I.07(a)(13). Each offense defined in the Penal Code designates which elements are necessary to prove that offense. Proof of each element in a particular offense is essential to determining guilt or innocence, but there are no elements to be proved at punishment.
As noted previously, punishment is a policy determination which is not guided by specific elements, but by information deemed appropriate to the process by judicial or legislative mandate.10 It follows then that any information deemed appropriate to punishment deliberations by judicial or legislative mandate would necessarily be the elements essential to making the policy decision. In general, evidence appropriate or relevant to punishment has a relationship to the circumstances of the offense or to the circumstances of the defendant. See Stiehl v. State, 585 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Davis v. State, 478 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (courts routinely instruct jurors they may consider all evidence that was admitted during guilt/innocence at punishment as relevant to circumstances of the offense). Character evidence is most certainly a circumstance of the defendant; ergo, character evidence is germane to punishment deliberations. Rule 404(c), explicitly makes evidence of character admissible at punishment; ergo, under Rule 404(c) this Court has decided that character is germane or essential to the determination of punishment. Article 37.07, Section 3(a), likewise declares that character is admissible at punishment; ergo, the Legislature has mandated that character is appropriate or essential to punishment. It is apparent from these judicially created rules and this legislative mandate that character is essential to the assessment of punishment. Moreover, there is no express language in the rules or the statute that limits proof of character to reputation or opinion. See Hedicke v. State, 779 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Legislative use of terms reputation and character, joined by conjunction and evidences intent to abrogate old rule that reputation was the only approved method of proving character); but see Murphy v. State, 111 S.W.2d at 63.11
*561Accordingly, the Rules of Evidence do not prevent a trial court from exercising his discretion to find specific conduct evidence in the form of unadjudicated extraneous offenses to be both relevant and admissible at the punishment stage of a non-capital trial.
I join the comments of both Judges Campbell and White, and dissent.
. Cain v. The State, 20 Tex. 355 (1857), citing Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law.
. Much of this opinion is taken from Justice Lagarde’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Grunsfeld v. State, 813 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991) (Lagarde, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pet. granted).
. Prior to its amendment, Article 37.07, Section 3(a), read as follows:
“Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may, as permitted by the Rules of Evidence, be offered by the state and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of
the defendant, his general reputation and his character. The term prior criminal record means a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged_" Article 37.07, Section 3(a), V.A.C.C.P. (1988).
. If we read Article 37.07 in its entirety, we find that Section 3(e) states that "[n]othing herein contained shall be construed as affecting the admissibility of extraneous offenses on the question of guilt or innocence." This section was not amended in 1989, but it clearly declares that Article 37.07 does not affect the admissibility of extraneous offenses at the guilt/innocence stage of trial.
. Section 2(a) of Article 37.071 provides in pertinent part that in the punishment phase of a capital murder trial
".... evidence may be presented by the state and the defendant or the defendant’s counsel as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, including evidence of the defendant’s background or character or the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Texas....’’ Article 37.071, Section 2(a), V.A.C.C.P. (emphasis added).
Unadjudicated extraneous offenses have long been admissible in the punishment phase of capital trials, with the rationale for admissibility usually being that extraneous offenses are relevant to determining the statutory issue of the future dangerousness of a defendant. See Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349, 361 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) ("Nothing in Article 37.071(a) requires a final conviction for an extraneous offense to be admissible at the punishment stage."). Cf. Reed v. State, 644 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Testimony relative to future dangerousness held not admissible at punishment stage of non-capital trial because of language in pre-amendment Article 37.07).
. See 33 Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 404.7 (1991 Supplement to 1988 Texas Practice at p. 41) (footnotes omitted). “In 1989, following the Murphy decision, the legislature amended Article 37.07 § 3(a) to make admissible ‘any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing.’ The significance of this language may lie in the fact that it is virtually identical to that employed in Article 37.071(a) which governs the punishment phase of capital cases. Inasmuch as that article is viewed as authorizing the admission of unadjudicated extraneous offenses, it would be reasonable to argue that the new language has the same effect in non-capital cases."
. Section 3(a) lists specific examples of evidence predetermined by the Legislature to be relevant to the assessment of punishment: (1) defendant’s prior criminal record, (2) defendant’s general reputation, (3) defendant’s character, (4) defendant’s conduct while participating in a program under Article 17.40 or 17.42(a) of this code as a condition of release on bail; and (5) under certain conditions, defendant’s adjudication of delinquency based on violation of a felony law.
. Rule 404(c) provides in full:
“(c) Character relevant to punishment. In the penalty phase, evidence may be offered by an accused or by the prosecution as to the prior criminal record of the accused. Other evidence of his character may be offered by an accused or by the prosecution. Nothing herein shall limit provisions of Article 37.071, Code of Criminal Procedure."
. Rule 405(b) has a counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence; in fact, Rule 405(b) was taken verbatim from Federal Rule 405(b). When language is adopted from federal rules, the judicial interpretation as well as the wording is usually adopted. See Moreno v. State, 807 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Campbell v. State, 718 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Since the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 405(b), do not apply to the punishment phase of trials in federal courts, it is arguable that Texas Rule 405(b) was not intended to apply at the punishment phase. See U.S. v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1235 n. 3 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 710, 112 L.Ed.2d 699 (1991) (rules of evidence, except for privileges, do not apply to sentencing). There are, however, two important distinctions between punishment in the federal system and punishment in the Texas system that must be considered: (1) punishment in the federal system is determined solely by the court, while punishment in Texas may be by jury or by the court; and (2) Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d)(3) states that the Federal Rules of Evidence, except for the privileges, are not applicable to sentencing proceedings; but Texas Rule of Evidence 1101(d)(1) states that the Texas Rules of Evidence apply to sentencing or punishment, whether before the court or a jury, to the extent “matters of evidence are not provided for in the statutes which govern procedure therein or in another court rule prescribed pursuant to statutory authority.” We do not analyze these distinctions but recognize them and note that we do not choose to rely on an analogy between the Texas Rule 405(b) and the Federal Rule 405(b) for our decision today.
. Query whether the Legislature has determined elements or specific issues for guiding the process of assessing punishment in V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.02(1)(A-C)? Section 1.02 states:
"The general purposes of this code are to establish a system of prohibitions, penalties, and correctional measures to deal with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to those individual or public interests for which state protection is appropriate. To this end, the provisions of this code are intended, and shall be construed, to achieve the following objectives:
(1) to insure the public safety through:
(A) the deterrent influence of the penalties hereinafter provided;
(B) the rehabilitation of those convicted of violations of this code; and
(C) such punishment as may be necessary to prevent likely recurrence of criminal behavior ...”
. In Murphy this Court held that Article 37.07, Section 3(a), prior to its amendment, precluded admission of specific conduct to show character at the punishment phase of trial. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d at 64. The plurality opinion initially reasoned that Section 3(a) authorized admission of character evidence at punishment, but Section 3(a) simultaneously authorized proof of only final convictions, thereby excluding proof of extraneous unadjudicated offenses or specific conduct to show character. Id. at 61. Judge Clinton, writing for the plurality, went on to say that
"... We also find it untenable that specific acts may be admitted at the punishment phase to prove some circumstance of the offender apart from his character per se.... Thus, albeit in terms anachronistic from its inception, Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, affords the only indicator of what the Legislature deemed in appropriate to the punishment decision, viz: specific conduct. It seems incredible that the Legislature would have bothered to limit proof of character per se, by excluding evidence of specific conduct to that end, while at the same time contemplating identical evidence would always be admissible as ‘relevant’ to the broader category, circumstances *561of the offender. Loath to nullify the apparent legislative intent, we hold that Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, precludes admission of specific conduct to show character or anything else under the rubric of circumstances of the offender at the punishment phase of trial, either in mitigation or aggravation of punishment.” Id. at 64. (emphasis in original).
This argument has been extended to apply to Rule 404(c). That is, since the “criminal record" in Article 37.07, Section 3(a), excludes proof of character with specific conduct or unadjudicated extraneous offenses, the use of "criminal record" in Rule 404(c) would also exclude proving “other evidence character" with unadjudicated extraneous offenses. In light of the amendment of Article 37.07, Section 3(a), this rationale is no longer apropos. See part II B(l), supra. Furthermore, there is nothing in Rule 404(c) to indicate that proof of character was to be limited to only two of the three methods.