dissenting.
We granted review of these causes, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 200(c)(1), to determine whether Article 37.07, § 3(a), as amended in 1989, allows the admission of extraneous conduct evidence at the punishment phase of non-capital trials. The plurality says no; I say yes.
The statute in question now provides in relevant part:
Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may, as permitted by the Rules of Evidence, be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character. The term prior criminal record means a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged.
(Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion was inserted by legislative amendment effective September 1, 1989; the rest of the statutory language was left unchanged. The Legislature apparently did not realize that its insertion of the amendatory language would lead inevitably to serious problems with interpretation. See M. De-Koatz, et al., Assessing Punishment: What Should the Jury Know?, 55 Texas B.J. 355 (1992).
Paradoxically, the plurality now interprets the amendatory language in a way that leaves it essentially ineffectual. This interpretation was arrived at because of the plurality’s misapplication of the canons of construction and its failure to recognize relevant legislative history. In my view, the legislators who amended Article 37.07, § 3(a), in 1989 almost certainly intended for the amendment to allow the admission of extraneous conduct evidence at the punishment phase in a non-capital case, so that jurors would have a complete picture of the defendant when they were assessing punishment.
The plurality’s first mistake rests in its use of the “canons of construction.” Over the centuries English and American courts have developed numerous canons to aid in the process of statutory interpretation. These canons — really nothing more than specialized proverbs — are based on commonsense notions of how ordinary people use language to express meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785, fn. 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). When used with care, the canons can help suggest what legislators had in mind when they drafted particular statutory language. When used improperly, however, the canons can as easily lead away from the legislators’ probable intent as toward it.
The plurality focuses exclusively and unrealistically on only one canon, the one stating that, if possible, all parts of a statute should be harmonized and given effect. See Thomas v. State, 164 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1942). This canon, based as it is on the sound notion that when legislators enact a statute they surely intend all parts *562of it to be effective, is highly persuasive when a court is faced with a statute which was wholly enacted in the first instance. The canon is less persuasive, however, when the court is dealing with a major amendment to a pre-existing statute. The canon is significantly less persuasive when the amendment causes the statute to become facially ambiguous.
When a court seeks to interpret a statute that has been amended and, as a result of the amendment, is ambiguous, it seems to me that, realistically, the legislative purpose behind the amendment will be more closely approximated if the court focuses on the amendatory language and on those canons — completely ignored by the plurality — dealing specifically with such language.
Three such canons come immediately to mind. First, as we recognized in Ex Parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), “[i]n enacting an amendment the Legislature is presumed to have changed the law, and a construction should be adopted that gives effect to the intended change, rather than one that renders the amendment useless.” Second, whenever the Legislature has used a phrase in a statute in one sense and with one meaning, and subsequently uses the same phrase in legislating again on the same subject matter, the Legislature is presumed to have used the phrase the second time in the same sense and with the same meaning. 2B Sutherland Stat. Const. § 51.02 (5th ed.1992); H. Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws § 70 (1896); 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 366 & 370 (1953). Third, if, after a statute has been interpreted by a court, the Legislature makes a radical change in the statute’s phraseology, an intention is thereby shown to establish a rule different from that announced by the court. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 384 (1953).
Applying these three canons to Article 37.07, § 3(a), I cannot but conclude that the Legislature most likely intended for the 1989 amendment to significantly alter the meaning of the statute and to allow for the admission of extraneous conduct evidence at the punishment phase of non-capital trials. Certainly, it was no accident that the amendatory language inserted into Article 37.07, § 3(a), was the broadest possible language and essentially identical to language in Article 37.071(a) — language that we have long held allows for the admission of extraneous conduct evidence at the punishment phase of capital trials. See, e.g., Gentry v. State, 770 S.W.2d 780, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). I cannot believe the Legislature chose essentially identical language to achieve a radically different outcome.
The legislative history of Article 37.07, § 3(a), also supports my conclusion. In Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), in our opinion on original submission handed down April 6, 1988, we interpreted the pre-1989 amendment version of the statute to prohibit the admission of extraneous conduct evidence at the punishment phase of non-capital trials. Presiding Judge Onion and Judge White vigorously dissented to that holding. At the very next opportunity, the Legislature amended Article 37.07, § 3(a), by inserting the phrase “any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing” from Article 37.-071(a). Again, I cannot believe the timing of the amendment was an accident and that the amendment was not a direct attempt to legislatively abrogate the holding in Murphy on original submission.1
*563The plurality concedes that the term “including” in the 1989 amendment is a term of enlargement and not of limitation and that, therefore, “evidence other than prior criminal record, general reputation and character is admissible” at the punishment phase of non-capital trials under Article 37.07, § 3(a). Op. at 524-525 (emphasis in original). But the plurality goes on to reason that “retention of the term ‘prior criminal record’ and its definitional provision indicates an intent to maintain limitations on the admission of specific conduct evidence, including unadjudicated extraneous offenses.” Op. at 524-525. Again, the plurality misses the point. The notion that “[i]t would not make sense that the legislature intended that extraneous, unadjudicat-ed offenses and their details be admissible, but that prior convictions must be final before being admissible and even then that details of the underlying offenses are to be excluded” assumes erroneously that the law would remain unchanged as to the admission of the details underlying prior convictions. However, if, as I believe, the Legislature intended to open the punishment door to prior unadjudicated acts2 in general, then it would logically follow that adjudicated facts supporting prior convictions would also be admissible to show, if nothing else, the seriousness of the offenses represented by those prior convictions. The idea, after all, of the 1989 amendment was to open up the punishment hearing to allow the jury to get a complete picture of the offender.
I must address finally the Legislature’s retention of the phrase “as permitted by the Rules of Evidence.” The retention of this phrase is significant because Rule 405 would seem to preclude the admission of extraneous conduct evidence at the punishment phase of non-capital trials. But, again, the Legislature’s retention of this phrase does not dissuade me of the correctness of my interpretation of Article 37.07, § 3(a). Rather, along with Professors Goode, Wellborn, and Sharlot, I think it is reasonable to conclude
that the [1989] amendment was intended to and has the effect of expanding the definition of relevant evidence found in Criminal Rule 404(c) [to include evidence of extraneous conduct].3 Although this is grammatically difficult, it would seem the only way to give effect to the legisla*564tive language [in the amendment]. Even if the courts accepted this interpretation they would continue to have the authority [under the statute] to admit or exclude proffered evidence, other than that provided for specifically in Article 37.07 § 3(a), on the basis of their decision as to its relevance to the punishment decision.4
S. Goode, O. Wellborn & M. Sharlot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence § 404.7, fn. 10.90 (Supp.1991). Furthermore, under this interpretation of the statute all other rules of evidence would still be applicable, and trial courts would admit evidence of extraneous conduct as limited by, for example, Rules 401, 402, and 403.
I would reverse the Fifth Court of Appeals’ judgment in Grunsfeld and affirm the Second Court of Appeals’ judgment in Hunter.
. Interestingly, a reader of both the plurality opinion and Judge Clinton's concurring opinion might conclude that the solution to the problem of what evidence is admissible at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial is now really quite simple. The plurality opinion, citing Murphy on rehearing, finds that evidence such as “family background, religious affiliation, education, employment history and the like are appropriate considerations in the assessment of punishment," separate and apart from the defendant’s prior criminal record, general reputation, and character. Op. at 524, fn. 7. Judge Clinton, also citing Murphy on rehearing, concludes that circumstances of the offense and the offender are admissible, the latter being "‘appropriate’ if for no other reason than that, in the absence of express legislative policy, courts have traditionally believed that punishment should fit the particular criminal as well [as the crime].” Op. at 544-545.
*563How do these two opinions illuminate the effect of the 1989 amendment? As I read these opinions, a defendant in a non-capital trial may introduce evidence that, for example, he is a model father, a deacon in his church, a holder of a doctoral degree in physics, and has been steadily employed for the previous twenty years. And what sort of evidence might the State, under the plurality’s interpretation of the present statute, offer to counter the defendant’s evidence? If the State had evidence that the defendant had looted his church’s treasury while he was a deacon, might the State offer such evidence? Or will the State be limited to offering character or reputation testimony that the defendant is not a peaceable and law-abiding citizen, leaving the jury to wonder how the defendant could be perceived thusly by others? If the State had evidence that the defendant had sexually abused his children, might the State offer such evidence? Or will the State be limited once again to presenting only character and reputation testimony? Indeed, the plurality leaves undefined the term "circumstances of the offense and the offender.”
These questions are basically rhetorical but serve to demonstrate that the plurality’s interpretation of Article 37.07, § 3(a), renders the 1989 amendment ineffectual. The net loser when all this is sorted out is not the Legislature,
or even the prosecution, but rather the people who sit on criminal juries in this state. For it is jurors who are left to make the difficult punishment decisions in criminal cases without having the benefit of all the “circumstances of the offense and the offender."
From my interpretation of the plurality opinion, the answer to the question of what change was wrought by the 1989 amendment is obvious — no change at all. The jurisprudential quagmire that has encased Article 37.07, § 3(a), is alive and well.
. It should be noted that a defendant’s extraneous conduct may reflect adversely on him — and thus be relevant to punishment — regardless of whether that conduct might give rise to criminal liability. Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 490, fn. 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 404(c) provides:
In the penalty phase, evidence may be offered by an accused or by the prosecution as to the prior criminal record of the accused. Other evidence of his character may be offered by an accused or by the prosecution. Nothing herein shall limit provisions of Article 37.071, Code of Criminal Procedure.
. Presumably, evidence is "relevant” to the punishment decision if it helps the jury decide what level of punishment will best fulfill the objectives of punishment (i.e., general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.) in the defendant’s case.