Giovagnoli v. State Civil Service Commission

Justice NEWMAN,

Dissenting.

The Majority states that Section 708 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 708, this Court’s holding in Commonwealth, Auditor General v. Borough of East Washington, 474 Pa. 226, 378 A.2d 301 (1977), and various provisions of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, are relevant to the instant matter. Because I do not believe that they are dispositive, I must dissent from the decision to reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court.

*666As the Majority notes, Section 202 of the Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court provides in relevant part:

Each ... petition [for permission to appeal an administrative agency’s denial of an application for counsel fees and costs, arising from litigation before such agency] shall indicate on its face: (l)[t]hat a final decision on the merits has been made[][and] (2)[t]hat the petitioner has presented a similar petition to the administrative agency and that the petition has been denied.

210 Pa.Code § 67.12.

In Dept. of Envtl. Res. v. Oermann, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 560, 632 A.2d 603, 606 n. 3 (1993), the Commonwealth Court correctly noted:

The required contents for a petition for permission to appeal are markedly different from those for a petition for review. A petition for review requires little more than a general statement of objections and a short statement of the relief sought, whereas a petition for permission to appeal requires, inter alia, the text of the order in question; the questions presented for review; a concise statement of the case and the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal; and appended copies of related cases, statutes, and regulations. (Citations omitted).

The Petition for Review filed by Appellant in the instant matter did not provide the Commonwealth Court with the information required by a Petition for Permission to Appeal. This is not simply a case of a wrongly titled pleading, but of an inadequate one. Furthermore, as the Majority recognizes, Section 3(e) of the Costs Act, 71 P.S. § 2033, states that the appropriate method by which to seek review of a fee determination is a Petition for Leave to Appeal. The Costs Act is by no means a complicated statutory scheme riddled with pitfalls for the unwary. Rather, it consists of only a few sections and clearly advises parties who wish to appeal an unfavorable decision exactly what they must do to protect their interests. Because of these circumstances, I do not believe that the *667decision of the Commonwealth Court to quash the Petition for Review was either an abuse of discretion or an error of law.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.