OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COLINS.Before the Court is the demurrer of Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary of the Department of Corrections (DOC), Superintendent Stickman of the State Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene), and the Inmate Accounts Supervisor at SCI Greene (collectively, respondents) to inmate James Harding’s petition for review seeking to have DOC cease deducting funds from his inmate account pursuant to DOC Policy DC-ADM 005, entitled Collection of Inmate Debts, and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5), as amended by Act 84 of 1998.1
In his petition for review, Harding avers that the deductions DOC is currently making from his account are not authorized by court order and that he has not been afforded a hearing to determine his financial ability to pay, in support of which he cites our decision in Boofer v. Lotz, 797 A.2d 1047 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 572 Pa. 567, 817 A.2d 1079 (2003). Harding requests that we direct DOC to cease the deductions and to reimburse him for the funds deducted since April 2000.
The respondents demur on the grounds: 1) that Harding is not entitled to injunctive relief because he has an adequate remedy at law with the sentencing court that authorized the deductions from his inmate account and an adequate administrative remedy through the prison grievance system to challenge the amount of the deductions, and because DOC acted pursuant to statutory authority to make deductions to collect court-ordered restitution and fines; and 2) that Harding is not entitled to reimbursement by DOC, which remitted the deducted funds to pay court-ordered obligations.
To prevail in an action for injunction, a party must establish that his right to relief is clear, that an injunction is necessary to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated by damages, and that greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the relief requested. P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 669 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). A court may not grant injunctive relief where an adequate remedy exists at law. Id.
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Simmons v. Township of Moon, 144 Pa.Cmwlth. 198, 601 A.2d 425, 428 (1991). To prevail on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to a claim for injunctive relief, a court must find that the petition is clearly insufficient to establish a right to injunctive relief, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer. P.J.S., 669 A.2d at 1113.
In his complaint, Harding acknowledges the outstanding obligation for which DOC made deductions, but alleges that he never received a court order requiring him to pay the obligation while incarcerated, that he never received a hearing to determine his financial ability to pay the obligation, and that despite the deductions, county court records show that he still owes the full amount of the obligation.
*1112In this case, we sustain DOC’s demurrer on the basis that Harding had an adequate remedy at law through the prison grievance system and through post-conviction relief with the court of common pleas and because his right to relief is not clear.
Attached to his complaint as Document 22 is a grievance Harding filed with DOC in September 2002 in which he raised the same issues raised in his complaint with this Court. In response, DOC informed Harding that it was in possession of a court order authorizing deductions from his inmate account to pay $735 in fees, that he was not entitled to a hearing because the fees were part of his sentence and not misconducts, and that through deductions he had paid $300.82 toward the fees and owed a balance of $452.18. (Complaint, Document 23.)
As part of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b) provides in pertinent part:
(3) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing, pretrial disposition or other order, transmit to the Department of Probation of the respective county or other agent designated by the county commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge of the county and to the county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced or to the Department of Corrections, whichever is appropriate, copies of all orders for restitution and amendments or alterations thereto, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties.
(5) The county correctional facility ... or the Department of Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation. Any amount deducted shall be transmitted by the Department of Corrections or the county correctional facility to the probation department of the county or other agent designated by the county commissioners of the county.... The Department of Corrections shall develop guidelines relating to its responsibility under this paragraph.
This provision is not penal in nature; rather it provides a procedural mechanism for the collection of court costs and fines. Sweeney v. Lotz, 787 A.2d 449 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 572 Pa. 717, 813 A.2d 848 (2002); Sweatt v. Department of Corrections, 769 A.2d 574 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001).
Harding does not dispute that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County imposed costs and restitution totaling $735, and he does not allege that the payment of the obligation was ordered to be deferred until his release. The Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5), explicitly authorizes DOC to make deductions from an inmate’s account upon its receipt of a court’s order transmitted by the county clerk of courts pursuant to subsection (b)(3) as quoted above. Harding may not challenge the substance of the court’s order by seeking an injunction against DOC. Subsection (b)(5) quoted above explicitly states that the amounts deducted shall be transmitted to the county probation department or such other agent appointed by the county commissioners. Any inmate may address inquiries as to the outstanding balance of any obligation with the appropriate county agent; furthermore, DOC responded to Harding’s grievance with an accounting of his total payments and outstanding balance.
Harding has no right to injunctive relief pending a hearing into his financial ability to pay his court-ordered obligations based on our decision in Boofer, which is distinguishable from the present case. In Boof*1113er, deductions from the inmate’s account were based not on the transmission of a court order assessing fines, costs, or restitution, but rather on a letter from the county clerk of courts requesting deductions. The inmate filed a writ of habeas corpus with the trial court challenging deductions from his inmate account, the denial of which he then appealed. Harding may not, based on our decision in Boofer, enjoin DOC from following its statutory mandate to garnish his inmate account to pay a court-ordered obligation on the ground that he is somehow entitled to a hearing before the trial court to determine his financial ability to meet that obligation.2 Harding’s remedy, if he has one, is at law, and not an injunction against DOC.3
As for Harding’s request for reimbursement from DOC, the amounts deducted from Harding’s inmate account were sent to the county probation department or other designated agent in partial payment of a court-ordered obligation. Harding has no remedy of reimbursement against DOC.
Accordingly, the respondents’ preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is sustained because the law permits no recovery under the allegations of Harding’s complaint, and the petition for review is dismissed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of May 2003, the respondents’ preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is sustained, and the petition for review is dismissed.
Dissenting opinion by Judge FRIEDMAN.. Act of June 18, 1998, P.L. 640, effective October 18, 1998. Act 84 rewrote subsection (b) to include provisions for transmission to DOC of orders for restitution, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties and authorizing DOC to make deductions from inmate accounts for the purpose of collecting such court-ordered obligations in accordance with its own guidelines.
. In Commonwealth v. Fleming, 804 A.2d 669 (Pa.Super.2002), our Superior Court determined that an inmate is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his ability to pay only where the Commonwealth initiates an enforcement action for unpaid fines or where the inmate is in default.
. See e.g., Fleming (inmate appealed trial court order directing DOC to make deductions from inmate account to satisfy costs, fines, and restitution).