dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe language found in the State Bar Rules1 reinstated appellant’s good standing retroactive to the date of his suspension.
By his first point of error, appellant complains that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he falsely held himself out as a lawyer. Relying on the State Bar Rules and Hill v. State2 appellant contends that when he paid his State Bar dues, his status as a practicing attorney was reinstated retroactive to the date of his suspension. Therefore, appellant argues, under the proper interpretation of the State Bar Rules, his good standing was also reinstated retroactive to the date of his suspension.
Appellant was licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. On May 1, 1993, appellant was notified that his annual State Bar dues were due and payable on June 1, 1993, with a grace period until July 1,1993 for late payment. On May 27, 1993, appellant was suspended from the active practice of law for not complying with the State Bar rules requiring a certain number of hours of Minimum Continuing Legal Education (“MCLE”). Appellant did not pay his dues on June 1, 1993, nor did he pay his dues within the grace period. State Bar Rules require that if payment is not received by July 1, 1993, a reminder notice with a sixty-day extension shall be sent to the attorney. The State Bar did not send this notice because appellant was suspended from the active practice of law for failure to meet the MCLE requirements. On August 3, 1993, appellant satisfied his MCLE requirements and was reinstated to active status.
On September 1, 1993, the State Bar mailed appellant a letter notifying him that he was suspended from the active practice of law for nonpayment of dues.3 Between October 23, 1993 and January 4, 1994, appellant sent the State Bar four checks. These checks were returned to appellant because they were written for an incorrect amount or because the checks were dishonored by appellant’s bank. Although appellant finally paid his dues with a check dated January 4, 1994, the State Bar did not credit his account until February 16,1994. From September 1, 1993 to February 16, 1994, appellant was suspended from the active practice of law for not paying his State Bar dues.
On December 13,1993, appellant appeared in open court in Jackson County as the attorney of record for John Lemke, a defendant in seven felony criminal cases. For this conduct, appellant was indicted under section 38.122 of the Penal Code.
Section 38.122 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 38.122. Falsely Holding Oneself Out as a Lawyer
(a) A person commits an offense if, with the intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself or herself, the person holds himself *620or herself out as a lawyer, unless he or she is currently licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country and is in good standing with the State Bar of Texas and the state bar or licensing authority of any and all other states and foreign countries where licensed.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.122(a) (Vernon 1994) (emphasis added). Tracking the indictment, the trial court’s charge authorized the jury to find appellant guilty if it found:
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 13th day of December, 1993, in Jackson County, Texas, the Defendant, WILLIAM SATTERWHITE, JR., did intentionally or knowingly or recklessly with intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself, to-wit: attorney’s fees, did then and there hold himself out as a lawyer to John Lemke, when the said WILLIAM SATTERWHITE, JR., was licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and that the said WILLIAM SAT-TERWHITE, JR., was not in good standing with the State Bar of Texas.
To violate section 38.122, appellant had to (1) intend to obtain an economic benefit and (2) falsely hold himself out to be a lawyer because he was either a) not currently licensed, or b) not in good standing with the State Bar. The indictment alleged that appellant was licensed to practice law in the State of Texas, and that issue was not contested. Appellant does not challenge the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of his intent to obtain an economic benefit. However, appellant contends that because the State failed to prove he was not in good standing with the State Bar, it did not prove he falsely held himself out as a lawyer. Thus, the State Bar Rules must be examined to determine when a person is in good standing.
A member in good standing is defined as “a member of the State Bar who is not in default in payment of dues and who is not under suspension from practice.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988) (State BaR Rules art. I). The State contends that because appellant was in default in payment of his dues and suspended from the active practice of law when he represented John Lemke, appellant was not in good standing with the State Bar. If the definition for good standing was the only portion of the State Bar Rules related to default in payment of dues, I would agree with the State’s argument. However, I find that the State Bar has other rules which are relevant and must be considered as well. These rules provide as follows:
ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP
Section 5. Default in Payment of Pees or Assessments
If a member is in default of payment of membership fees or any assessment levied by the Court on the thirtieth day after the due date, the clerk shall forthwith notify the member of default. If the fees and assessments are not paid on or before sixty (60) days after the mailing of the notice of default, the defaulting member shall automatically be suspended from the practice of law. Any practice of law during such suspension shall constitute professional misconduct and subject the member to discipline.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988) (State Bar Rules art. Ill, § 5).
Section 7. Return to Former Status
A When a member, who has been suspended for non payment of fees or assessments, removes such default by payment of fees or assessments then owing, plus an additional amount equivalent to one-half the delinquency, the suspension shall automatically be lifted and the member restored to former status. Return to former status shall be retroactive to inception of suspension, but shall not affect any proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988) (State Bar Rules art. Ill, § 7) (emphasis added). Thus, the issue is whether the emphasized retroactivity clause affects a person’s good standing for the purpose of section 38.122.
The original Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas were approved by the Texas Supreme Court on February 22, 1940. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. *621(Vernon 1988) (notes preceding article I). These rules did not specifically contain the retroactivity clause at issue here.4 However, even without a specific retroactivity clause, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in 1965, found that upon payment of delinquent dues, an attorney is restored to the status he occupied prior to becoming delinquent. Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1965). The Court also held that the attorney’s delinquency was purged. Id. Moreover, any acts performed during the suspension were valid and revitalized. Id.
When the current State Bar Rules were adopted by the Supreme Court on March 14, 1983, the retroactivity language found in Hill was included. See State Bap. Rule art. Ill, § 7. The rule states that former status is reinstated retroactively, but no language limits status to any particular aspect of the attorney’s membership, such as his fiscal record. In fact, the only limitation placed on the retroactivity clause is the right retained by the State Bar to discipline a delinquent attorney for practicing while suspended. Id. Thus, when construing section 38.122 in conjunction with the State Bar Rules, I believe that we must also give deference to Hill, which neither section 38.122 nor the State Bar Rules have limited in any way.
The State argues that the language of section 38.122 obviates the effect of the retro-activity clause. According to the State, the Penal Code provision specifies that the attorney be in good standing at the time of the offense.
The Code Construction Act requires that “words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to rules of grammar and common usage,” unless they “have acquired a technical or particular meaning.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988). Although the word “currently” appears in section 38.122, I read the word, pursuant to the rules of grammar, to modify only the phrase regarding licensing. The Legislature deliberately chose to place “currently” after the first “is” in the clause which provides the only exception to the offense.5 In addition, the Legislature repeated “is” in the phrase regarding good cause. I conclude that in drafting section 38.122 as it did, the Legislature intended to preserve the effect of the retroactivity clause.
What then is the effect of the retroactivity clause? When an attorney is suspended for nonpayment of dues, his right to practice law is forfeited, and he loses his good standing with the State Bar. See State Bab Rules art. I, art. III, § 5. The attorney continues to be licensed. Hill, 393 S.W.2d at 904. He remains an active member of the Bar because he is licensed. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.052 (b) (Vernon 1988). Thus, the only former status that can be restored is the right to practice law. Dues are paid retroactive to the due date, and all acts performed by the attorney during the suspension are revitalized. Hill, 393 S.W.2d at 904. From the State Bar definition of good standing6— one not in default in payment of dues and not suspended from the practice of law—it follows that if the dues and acts performed during the suspension are affected retroactively, then the suspension must be lifted and the good standing must be reinstated retroactively.
I would hold that because appellant’s payment of dues on February 16, 1994, retroactively returned him to his former status and good standing with the State Bar, the State could not present evidence that appellant was not in good standing with the State Bar. Because a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential element—that appellant was not in good standing with the State Bar—beyond a reasonable doubt, I would hold that the evidence is legally insufficient *622to support the jury’s finding. I would sustain appellant’s first point of error.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
YANEZ and CHAVEZ, JJ., join in this dissent.
. Tex Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988) (State Bar Rules art. III, § 7).
. 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1965) (holding that counsel was not ineffective merely because he was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues as counsel continued to be licensed during the suspension and his status was reinstated to that which he occupied prior to the delinquency). See also Henson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.).
. According to the State Bar, 2,000 to 2,500 attorneys are suspended each year for nonpayment of dues.
. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann., tit. 14 app. (Vernon 1973)(State Bar Rules art. 4, §§ 5, 6)(appendix following art. 320a-1)(repealed 1983)(current version at Tex Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988)(State Bar Rules art. III, §§ 5, 7)).
. [U]nless he or she is currently licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or foreign country and is in good standing with the State Bar of Texas_ Tex. Penal Code. Ann. § 38.122(a).
. State Bar Rule art. I.