filed a dissenting opinion
joined by BAIRD, OVERSTREET and MEYERS, Judges.Because I find the majority’s statutory analysis flawed, I dissent.
Appellant’s State Bar dues were due and payable on June 1,1993. Following a thirty-day grace period, appellant was suspended for failing to pay his bar dues.1 Between October and January, appellant sent a total of four cheeks to the State Bar, as payment of his dues. However, three of the checks were not written for the correct amount, and one was for the correct amount, but was not paid due to insufficient funds. Finally, on January 4, 1994, appellant paid his bar dues in the proper amount.
On December 13, 1993, appellant represented one John Lemke in seven felony cases. As a result of this, an indictment was filed against appellant on May 27, 1994, and he was subsequently re-indicted, the latter filed on October 17, 1995. Appellant was eventually convicted under Tex. Pen.Code Ann. 38.122 (Vernon 1994), titled “Falsely Holding Oneself Out as a Lawyer.”
Ultimately, this is a case of statutory interpretation, based on the interaction between Tex. Pen.Code § 38.122 and Tex. State BaR R. art. Ill, § 7, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988). As we have previously stated, when interpreting a statute, we look to the literal text for its meaning, and we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The only exceptions to this rule are where application of the statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, or if the plain language is ambiguous. Id.
§ 38.122(a) provides that:
A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself or herself, the person holds himself or herself out as a lawyer, unless he or she is currently licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country and is in good standing with the State Bar of Texas and the state bar or licensing authority of any and all other states and foreign countries where licensed, (emphasis added)
Two things are immediately discernible from the language of the statute. First, the term “currently” only modifies “licensed to practice law”; that is, it does not modify “good standing.” Also, the use of the phrase “is in good standing with the State Bar of Texas” indicates that this provision of the penal code fully incorporates, unthout modification, the State Bar concept of “good standing.”
Art. Ill, § 7(A) of the State Bar Rules provides that:
*631When a member, who has been suspended for nonpayment of fees or assessments, removes such default by payment of fees or assessments then owing, plus an additional amount equivalent to one-half the delinquency, the suspension shall automatically be lifted and the member restored to former status. Return to former status shall be retroactive to inception of suspension, but shall not affect any proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct, (emphasis added)
It is clear from the language of the rule that an attorney’s former status is returned once payment is made, and that it is deemed to apply from the initial date of suspension. However, this retroactivity does not apply in regard to disciplinary measures.
Reading the penal statute and the State Bar Rule together, then appellant’s conduct certainly did not fall under the prohibition of § 38.122. When appellant paid his dues on January 4, 1994, his former status of good standing was reinstated and was deemed to go back to July 1, 1993. As a result, appellant does not fit within the prohibition of § 38.122, since on the date that the alleged criminal conduct took place, December 13, 1993, he was deemed, retroactively, to have been in good standing with the Bar.
Nevertheless, the majority gives two rationales for affirming appellant’s conviction. First, it argues that the language of Art. Ill, § 7, which provides that the retroactive return to good status “... shall not affect any proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct” still allows for appellant to be prosecuted under § 38.122. Ante, at 628. Although it is unclear, it appears that the majority is arguing that prosecution under § 38.122 is a “proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct.” 2 I disagree. The language of Art. Ill, § 7, which states that the retroactive return to former status “... shall not affect any proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct,” can only reasonably be interpreted to cover disciplinary proceedings by the State Bar, and not criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, there is nothing in the State Bar Rules or anywhere else to suggest that this language encompasses a criminal prosecution; in fact, the contrary appears to be the case.3
*632The majority also suggests that it is construing Art. Ill, § 7 as it does because to do otherwise would render it unconstitutional, since it would conflict with § 38.122. In other words, if the state bar rule attempts to “alter or negate” 38.122, then it is unconstitutional. Ante, at 629. This is undoubtedly true, since a state bar rule cannot “trump” or override a statute enacted by the Legislature. To do so would surely violate Tex. Const, art. II, § 1 (division of powers), as well as Tex. Const. art. I, § 28 (only Legislature may suspend laws of the state).
However, for the majority to simply assert this truism as an answer is to put the cart before the horse. The real issue to determine is whether or not an interpretation of the Retroactivity Clause of Art. Ill, § 7 of the State Bar Rules that would prohibit prosecution under § 38.122 of the Penal Code would “negate or alter” § 38.122. As noted above, § 38.122 fully incorporates the concept of “good standing,” as provided by the State Bar, without modification, and specifically does not modify that concept with the term “currently.” Thus, a plain reading of § 38.122 indicates that it defers to the Bar’s determination of “good standing.” That is, if the Bar determines that a member was in good standing at a particular time, even retroactively, there is nothing, by the terms of § 38.122 itself, to be “altered or negated.”
Finally, it is important to emphasize that such an interpretation of § 38.122, in con-junetion with the Retroactivity Clause of Art. Ill, § 7 of the State Bar Rules, does not lead to an absurd result. It only prohibits criminal conviction, under § 38.122, of a member of the Bar who was not in good standing due solely to a failure to pay his dues and who held himself out as a lawyer during that time, but who subsequently paid such dues prior to indictment, and was retroactively deemed to be in good standing at that time. It does not prohibit prosecution, under § 38.122, of one who was not in good standing for any other reason for which retroactivity does not apply. Also, of course, it does not prohibit disciplinary action by the State Bar of one who was not in good standing due to a failure to pay his dues and who held himself out as a lawyer during that time. See Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Sherman, 945 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).4
Based on the above, I would hold that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that appellant was not in good standing with the State Bar, an essential element of § 38.122. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and set aside appellant’s conviction.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
. At the time of this suspension, appellant was not sent a reminder notice, because he was already on suspension for noncompliance with MCLE requirements. Appellant subsequently met those requirements as of August 3, 1993.
. The majority states that the language of section 7(a) "... indicates that appellant may still face administrative discipline by the State bar for any conduct which occurred prior to the lifting of his suspension. Appellant is still subject to prosecution for illegal conduct committed by him during the period of suspension ...” Ante, at 628 (slip op. at 6). Taken together, these two sentences indicate that the majority is arguing that prosecution under § 38.122 is a "proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct.”
. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code § 81.071(0 (distinguishing between prosecution of an attorney in a disciplinary action and conviction for a criminal act based either on the weight of the conviction or on conduct by the attorney that led to the attorney’s conviction); Tex. State Bar R. art. XIII, § 7, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G-app. (Vernon Supp.1998) (disciplinary proceedings are to be imposed by Texas Supreme Court or State Bar); TexR. Disciplinary P. Preamble, reprinted in Tex Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (Texas Supreme Court has constitutional and statutory responsibility within Texas for lawyer discipline and disability system and responsibility for administering and supervising lawyer discipline and disability is delegated to Board of Directors of State Bar); Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(F), (I), (K) & (N), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) ("Disciplinary Proceedings” defined as investigation and processing of an Inquiry or Complaint before a Disciplinary Action; “Inquiry” defined as any written matter concerning attorney conduct received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel that, even if true, does not allege Professional Misconduct or Disability; "Complaint” defined as those written matters received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel that, either on the face thereof or upon screening or preliminary investigation, allege Professional Misconduct or attorney Disability, or both, cognizable under these rules or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; “Disciplinary Action” defined as proceeding brought by or against an attorney before an evidentiary panel of a Committee or any judicial proceeding covered by Rules of Disciplinary Procedure). Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 2.01-2.21, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (setting out procedures to be followed by District Grievance Committees); Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 4.01-4.08, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (setting out procedures to be followed by Commission for Lawyer Discipline); TexR. Disciplinary P. 5.01-5.03, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (setting out selection, duties and *632accountability of Chief Disciplinary Counsel); Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 6.05, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (final disposition of any Disciplinary Proceeding or Disciplinary Action resulting in imposition of Sanction other than private reprimand shall be reported by Commission to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas); TexR. Disciplinary P. 6.07, reprinted in Tex Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp. 1998) (relating to publication of final disposition of all Disciplinary Proceedings and Disciplinary Actions); TexR. Disciplinary P. 6.08, reprinted in Tex Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (limiting access to confidential records, information, and proceedings relating to Disciplinary Proceeding, Disciplinary Action, or Disability suspension); Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 7.01-7.12, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp. 1998) (setting out selection and procedures for Board of Disciplinary Appeals); Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 15.04, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann , tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-l (Vernon Supp.1998) (the processing of an Inquiry, Complaint, Disciplinary Proceeding, or Disciplinary Action is not, except for good cause, to be delayed or abated because of substantial similarity to the material allegations in pending civil or criminal litigation).
. The majority also justifies its decision by distinguishing our decisions in Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.Crim.App.1965) and Cantu v. State, 930 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) from the instant case. Ante, at 629. Because a plain reading of § 38.122 and the Retroactivity Clause of the State Bar Rules clearly prohibits appellant’s conviction and does not lead to an absurd result, it is not necessary to discuss these cases. However, it is notable that the majority factually distinguishes Hill and Cantu from the instant case, but does not give an adequate basis to legally distinguish them.